摘要翻译：
一个委员会通过按委员会主席选择的顺序对一组备选方案进行顺序投票来对其进行排名。虽然主席不知道选民的偏好，但我们表明，如果她有完美的信息，她可以做得很好。我们从两个方面来描述这种“无遗憾”性质的策略：（1）它们是有效的，(2)它们避免了两个直觉错误。一种没有遗憾的策略是排序算法，称为插入排序。我们表明，它具有词典学性质，结果等价于大量研究的修正过程的递归变体。
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英文标题：
《Agenda-manipulation in ranking》
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作者：
Gregorio Curello and Ludvig Sinander
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  A committee ranks a set of alternatives by sequentially voting on pairs, in an order chosen by the committee's chair. Although the chair has no knowledge of voters' preferences, we show that she can do as well as if she had perfect information. We characterise strategies with this 'regret-freeness' property in two ways: (1) they are efficient, and (2) they avoid two intuitive errors. One regret-free strategy is a sorting algorithm called insertion sort. We show that it is characterised by a lexicographic property, and is outcome-equivalent to a recursive variant of the much-studied amendment procedure.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.11341