摘要翻译：
本文研究了企业和员工对薪酬透明度要求的反应。自2018年以来，每年都有1万多家英国公司被要求公开披露其性别薪酬差距和工资分布中的性别构成。从理论上讲，薪酬透明度意味着作为一种信息冲击，以相反的方式改变男女员工对公司的讨价还价能力。再加上薪酬不平等对企业声誉的潜在负面影响，这种冲击可能会改善妇女的相对职业和薪酬结果。我们使用差异中的差异策略来检验这些理论预测，该策略利用了英国授权在企业规模和时间上的差异。这项分析提供了四个主要发现。首先，与政策出台前的平均值相比，薪酬透明度使女性从事中位数以上工资职业的可能性增加了5%。其次，虽然这一影响尚未转化为妇女薪酬的显著提高，但该政策导致男子实际时薪下降2.8%，将政策前的两性薪酬差距缩小了15%。第三，将差异中的差异策略与对工作列表的文本分析相结合，我们发现受待遇的公司在高性别薪酬差距职业的广告中采取了对女性友好的招聘做法。第四，声誉动机似乎驱动了雇主的反应，因为发布更糟糕的性别平等指标的公司在YouGov女性排名中得分更低。此外，上市公司在公布性别平等数据后的几天内，累积异常回报平均下降35个基点。
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英文标题：
《Pay Transparency and Cracks in the Glass Ceiling》
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作者：
Emma Duchini, Stefania Simion, Arthur Turrell
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  This paper studies firms' and employees' responses to pay transparency requirements. Each year since 2018, more than 10,000 UK firms have been required to disclose publicly their gender pay gap and gender composition along the wage distribution. Theoretically, pay transparency is meant to act as an information shock that alters the bargaining power of male and female employees vis-\`a-vis the firm in opposite ways. Coupled with the potential negative effects of unequal pay on firms' reputation, this shock could improve women's relative occupational and pay outcomes. We test these theoretical predictions using a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits variations in the UK mandate across firm size and time. This analysis delivers four main findings. First, pay transparency increases women's probability of working in above-median-wage occupations by 5 percent compared to the pre-policy mean. Second, while this effect has not yet translated into a significant rise in women's pay, the policy leads to a 2.8 percent decrease in men's real hourly pay, reducing the pre-policy gender pay gap by 15 percent. Third, combining the difference-in-differences strategy with a text analysis of job listings, we find suggestive evidence that treated firms adopt female-friendly hiring practices in ads for high-gender-pay-gap occupations. Fourth, a reputation motive seems to drive employers' reactions, as firms publishing worse gender equality indicators score lower in YouGov Women's Rankings. Moreover, publicly listed firms experience a 35-basis-point average fall in cumulative abnormal returns in the days following their publication of gender equality data.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.16099