摘要翻译：
我们对合伙企业解散的胜者-出价拍卖和败者-出价拍卖进行了实证均衡分析（Velez and Brown,2020,ARXIV:1907.12408)。我们证明，在完全信息环境下，即使这些拍卖在纳什均衡预测中本质上是等价的，但当它们被操作时，可以预期它们在根本上是不同的。除了直接的政策影响外，还有两个一般后果。首先，一个解释均衡的经验似然性的机制设计者可能不受马斯金不变性的约束。第二，一个不考虑均衡的经验合理性的机制设计者可能会无意中设计出有偏见的机制。
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英文标题：
《Empirical bias of extreme-price auctions: analysis》
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作者：
Rodrigo A. Velez and Alexander L. Brown
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We advance empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2020, arXiv:1907.12408) of the winner-bid and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. We show, in a complete information environment, that even though these auctions are essentially equivalent for the Nash equilibrium prediction, they can be expected to differ in fundamental ways when they are operated. Besides the direct policy implications, two general consequences follow. First, a mechanism designer who accounts for the empirical plausibility of equilibria may not be constrained by Maskin invariance. Second, a mechanism designer who does not account for the empirical plausibility of equilibria may inadvertently design biased mechanisms.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.08234