摘要翻译：
布莱克和考克斯（1976）声称，当公司价值较低时，次级债务的价值在资产风险中增加。我们用闭式解表明，次级债务的价值是驼峰形的。这对银行次级债券的市场约束作用有有趣的影响。
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英文标题：
《A closed-form solution to the risk-taking motivation of subordinated
  debtholders》
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作者：
Yuval Heller, SharonPeleg-Lazar, Alon Raviv
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Black and Cox (1976) claim that the value of junior debt is increasing in asset risk when the firm's value is low. We show, using closed-form solution, that the junior debt's value is hump-shaped. This has interesting implications for the market-discipline role of banks' junior debt.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.15309