摘要翻译：
在持续收益异质性存在的情况下，在许多演化动态下，总体策略的演化在很大程度上依赖于潜在的策略组合，而在标准BRD下的总体动态退化为均质光滑BRD，其中持续收益异质性平均为均质短暂收益冲击。在本文中，我们考虑了异质种群中的确定性进化动力学，并通过对持久收益异质种群的鲁棒性，发展了更强的局部稳定性概念。众所周知，如果在给定的演化动态中，切换速率与切换的收益相关，则非聚集性一般成立。为了参数化一个演化动态的收益敏感性，我们提出使用有界支持切换成本的回火最佳响应动态。
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英文标题：
《Distributional stability and deterministic equilibrium selection under
  heterogeneous evolutionary dynamics》
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作者：
Dai Zusai
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  In the presence of persistent payoff heterogeneity, the evolution of the aggregate strategy hugely depends on the underlying strategy composition under many evolutionary dynamics, while the aggregate dynamic under the standard BRD reduces to a homogenized smooth BRD, where persistent payoff heterogeneity averages to homogeneous transitory payoff shocks. In this paper, we consider deterministic evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous population and develop the stronger concept of local stability by imposing robustness to persistent payoff heterogeneity. It is known that nonaggregability holds generically if the switching rate in a given evolutionary dynamic correlates with the payoff gain from a switch. To parameterize the payoff sensitivity of an evolutionary dynamic, we propose to use tempered best response dynamics with bounded support of switching costs.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.04895