摘要翻译：
本文利用矿产出口国数据库重新检验了自然资源诅咒假说的有效性。我们的研究结果如下：（一）资源丰富的国家不一定表现出糟糕的政治、经济和社会绩效；㈡业绩不佳的区域中心出口组合多样化程度低；㈢相比之下，出口组合多样化程度低的区域资源中心的业绩不一定很差。然后，我们建立了一个贝叶斯博弈模型来研究领导和治理在自然资源管理中的作用。我们证明，领导-治理二项式的改进有助于约束游说团体的行为（定理1)，并在自然资源管理中产生帕累托改进（定理2）。来自世界银行集团CPIA数据的证据证实了后来的发现。我们的结果在经过一些稳健性检查后仍然有效。
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英文标题：
《The artefact of the Natural Resources Curse》
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作者：
Matata Ponyo Mapon and Jean-Paul K. Tsasa
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  This paper reexamines the validity of the natural resource curse hypothesis, using the database of mineral exporting countries. Our findings are as follows: (i) Resource-rich countries (RRCs) do not necessarily exhibit poor political, economic and social performance; (ii) RRCs that perform poorly have a low diversified exports portfolio; (iii) In contrast, RRCs with a low diversified exports portfolio do not necessarily perform poorly. Then, we develop a model of strategic interaction from a Bayesian game setup to study the role of leadership and governance in the management of natural resources. We show that an improvement in the leadership-governance binomial helps to discipline the behavior of lobby groups (theorem 1) and generate a Pareto improvement in the management of natural resources (theorem 2). Evidence from the World Bank Group's CPIA data confirms the later finding. Our results remain valid after some robustness checks.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.09681