摘要翻译：
本文采用博弈论方法，研究了具有单位执行时间的开放式车间调度问题，以最小化完工时间之和。通过假设一个初始调度，并将每个作业（由多个操作组成）关联到不同的参与者，我们可以构造一个与任何开放车间调度问题相关的合作TU-博弈。我们给每个联盟分配通过允许的作业重新安排所能获得的最大成本节约。通过提供一个核心分配，我们表明相关博弈是平衡的。最后，我们放宽了联盟的可容许重安排的定义，以研究平衡仍然存在的范围。
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英文标题：
《Open shop scheduling games》
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作者：
Ata Atay, Pedro Calleja, Sergio Soteras
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of operations) to a different player, we can construct a cooperative TU-game associated with any open shop scheduling problem. We assign to each coalition the maximal cost savings it can obtain through admissible rearrangements of jobs' operations. By providing a core allocation, we show that the associated games are balanced. Finally, we relax the definition of admissible rearrangements for a coalition to study to what extend balancedness still holds.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.12909