摘要翻译：
在线平台收集关于参与者的丰富信息，然后与他们分享这些信息，以改善市场结果。本文研究了双边市场中的信息披露问题：如果一个平台想要最大化收益，该平台应该允许哪些卖家参与，以及该平台应该与买家分享多少关于参与卖家质量的信息？我们在两个不同的双边市场模型中研究了信息披露问题：一个是平台选择价格，卖家选择数量（类似于拼车），另一个是卖家选择价格（类似于电子商务）。我们的主要结果提供了一些条件，在这些条件下，实践中常见的简单信息结构，如禁止某些卖家进入平台，而不区分参与的卖家，使平台的收入最大化。我们分析的一个重要创新是将平台的信息披露问题转化为有约束的价格歧视问题。我们利用这种转换来获得我们的结构结果。
---
英文标题：
《Quality Selection in Two-Sided Markets: A Constrained Price
  Discrimination Approach》
---
作者：
Ramesh Johari, Bar Light, Gabriel Weintraub
---
最新提交年份：
2021
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--
一级分类：Mathematics        数学
二级分类：Optimization and Control        优化与控制
分类描述：Operations research, linear programming, control theory, systems theory, optimal control, game theory
运筹学，线性规划，控制论，系统论，最优控制，博弈论
--

---
英文摘要：
  Online platforms collect rich information about participants and then share some of this information back with them to improve market outcomes. In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in two-sided markets: If a platform wants to maximize revenue, which sellers should the platform allow to participate, and how much of its available information about participating sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers? We study this information disclosure problem in the context of two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce). Our main results provide conditions under which simple information structures commonly observed in practice, such as banning certain sellers from the platform while not distinguishing between participating sellers, maximize the platform's revenue. An important innovation in our analysis is to transform the platform's information disclosure problem into a constrained price discrimination problem. We leverage this transformation to obtain our structural results.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.02251