摘要翻译：
本文发展了传染病流行病学经典SIR模型（“Nash SIR”）的纳什均衡扩展，将病毒流行期间人们是否参与经济活动的决定内生性化，并允许社会经济活动的互补性。均衡疫情是指疫情期间的纳什均衡行为产生疫情的疫情。可能会有多种均衡流行病，在这种情况下，除了采取其他干预措施，如家庭订单和加速疫苗开发之外，还可以通过协调预期来形成流行病的轨迹。给出了一个计算所有平衡流行病的算法。
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英文标题：
《Nash SIR: An Economic-Epidemiological Model of Strategic Behavior During
  a Viral Epidemic》
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作者：
David McAdams
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  This paper develops a Nash-equilibrium extension of the classic SIR model of infectious-disease epidemiology ("Nash SIR"), endogenizing people's decisions whether to engage in economic activity during a viral epidemic and allowing for complementarity in social-economic activity. An equilibrium epidemic is one in which Nash equilibrium behavior during the epidemic generates the epidemic. There may be multiple equilibrium epidemics, in which case the epidemic trajectory can be shaped through the coordination of expectations, in addition to other sorts of interventions such as stay-at-home orders and accelerated vaccine development. An algorithm is provided to compute all equilibrium epidemics.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.10109