摘要翻译：
我们考虑了委托人和代理人之间的动态道德风险问题，委托人激励代理人的唯一工具是信息披露。委托人的目标是最大化代理人选择某一特定行动的（折扣）次数，例如努力工作。我们证明了存在一个最优契约，当委托人的最优行为是对代理人的静态最优答复时，委托人停止披露信息，或者继续披露信息，直到代理人完全了解委托人的私有信息。如果智能体完全学习状态，那么他在有限时间内以概率1学习状态；代理人越有耐心，学得越晚。
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英文标题：
《Contracting over persistent information》
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作者：
Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We consider a dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and an agent, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses a particular action, e.g., to work hard. We show that there exists an optimal contract, where the principal stops disclosing information as soon as its most preferred action is a static best reply for the agent or else continues disclosing information until the agent perfectly learns the principal's private information. If the agent perfectly learns the state, he learns it in finite time with probability one; the more patient the agent, the later he learns it.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2007.05983