摘要翻译：
我们研究了具有连续玩家且无附带支付的范式博弈的核心问题。我们考虑弱核概念，它是由韦伯、沙普利和舒比克引入的核的近似。对于收益依赖于玩家的策略剖面，我们证明了弱核是非空的。该存在性结果建立了一个弱核元素作为适当有限对策弱核元素的极限。我们通过实例证明了我们的正则性假设在连续统情况下是相关的，弱核可以严格地大于Aumann的α-核。对于收益依赖于博弈者策略分布的博弈，我们证明了保证纯策略纳什均衡存在的类似正则性条件对于弱核的非空性是不相关的。
---
英文标题：
《On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players : a
  correction》
---
作者：
Youcef Askoura
---
最新提交年份：
2019
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--

---
英文摘要：
  We study the core of normal form games with a continuum of players and without side payments. We consider the weak-core concept, which is an approximation of the core, introduced by Weber, Shapley and Shubik. For payoffs depending on the players' strategy profile, we prove that the weak-core is nonempty. The existence result establishes a weak-core element as a limit of elements in weak-cores of appropriate finite games. We establish by examples that our regularity hypotheses are relevant in the continuum case and the weak-core can be strictly larger than the Aumann's $\alpha$-core. For games where payoffs depend on the distribution of players' strategy profile, we prove that analogous regularity conditions ensuring the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria are irrelevant for the non-vacuity of the weak-core.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.09819