3，3 main points: china is a country filled with specificities.local government debt is hidden .Chinese banks are very likeky to loan money to them.in essence.they are an interest group.both are state-owned .in addition.banks do not worry about local government breach.

23,23
In general, the investment and financing in local government has three characteristics: First, paid and public nature; Second, both financial and fiscal; third is flexibility;Because of the characteristics,there are many hidden debts of the local governments.In order to acquire more social benifits,they all neglect the expense of the economic benifits,let alone the debts.
Good macro-environment is able to bring a good investment environment,at the same time ,it can increase the ability to resist the risk or contingence.
I can spare lots of time on the holidays.

24,24

Like other entities,  a local government participates in a market economy as a debtor,  Soliciting capital requires legitimacy for its fund-raising purposes.  According to this article, we can find most local governments in China are heavily in debt.  The debts of some local governments are even many times greater than their annual revenues.  This kind of information may appear local governments lack reliability for financing,  and the end-result may be counterproductive.  In other words,  implicit debt that turns explicit poses a constraint on a local government’s ability to borrow in a controlled manner.

24,24

Today's article is very awakening. It is a classic example of institutionalism at its extreme. However, it is not quite different from Western nations where there are significant interference from governments during crisis (e.g. 2008-2010 recession) or to put it simply, the invisible hand of the market being replaced by the visible hand of the government.

However, what is interesting is the analysis on the depth of the crisis in China which is not only rooted in hierarchical relations (top down) but also the hetarchical relations existing between powerful central bank and local affiliates pumping blood into the economy. Also, the rationale of potential economic benefits gaining edge over social disharmony is not an easy one for a country which has modernised recently and China's lesson will have deeper implications for its Asian neighbours.

After all, "China’s public finances may not be as sweet as they appeared, but they are not sour."

p.s. 端午节小长假有时间发帖。因为在英国没有端午可过，没有粽子可以吃。

11 11
it is time to clean up the mess....

先抢个地坐会，呵呵

This a big challenge to China central government. it is not only to tackle the bad loans, but also  to affect the interest which involves how central government to administrate local government.


BANKS in Western countries dragged their economies into the great recession. Banks in China pulled the country out of it. Much of the Chinese government’s stimulus effort from 2008 to 2010 was left to financial institutions, which proved better at shoving money out of the door than America’s federal government. 在西方国家，银行把他们的经济拖入了大后退。而，在中国，银行把这个国家带出了经济后退（困境）。从2008年到2010年，中国ZF很多刺激努力是留给了金融机构，事实表明，相对于美国联邦ZF，中国ZF更好地打开了（增加）货币之门。
The banks lent to thousands of investment corporations set up by local governments, which cannot borrow in their own name. With the help of some initial capital and collateral, like land, these investment vehicles directed the lending into local bridges, tunnels and real-estate ventures. But many of the loans have turned bad, threatening the balance-sheets of the banks that made them.银行放贷给数千家地由地方ZF组建的投资公司，这些地方ZF是不能一个自己的名义去借款的。在一定创办资本和像土地一样的担保帮助下，这些投资工具直接将贷出的投入到当地的桥梁、隧道和房地产风险之中。但是，大部分贷款已经变成坏账，这些正威胁到给他们贷款的银行资产平衡状况。
Now the central government has at last resolved to clean up the mess, according to unnamed officials cited by Reuters this week. China’s government will consolidate thousands of investment vehicles and hive off some of their debts into separate companies open to private investors. It will force the banks to write off another slice of the bad debt, and repay a chunk of it from its own budget. Much of the stimulus lending of 2008-10 may turn out to be public spending after all. 本周路透社据不透露姓名的官员称，现在中央ZF终于下决心要清理这种混乱状况。中国zf将合并数千家投资工具，同时分离出一些他们的债务给独立公司以开放给私人投资。中国zf将强令银行划去又一块坏账，并从自己的预算中给予大量的补偿。毕竟，2008-10的许多刺激借贷是由公共消费来支出的。



提前预祝大家端午节快乐！
回家吃粽子了哦！哈哈。

4,4
With the government begin to clean up the debt mess, I do believe it will stimulate the public spending.
Besides, the article mentions the "four big worries" that is hunting Chinese economists, including property bubbles and inflation. It reminds me of one article Iv read before. It mainly deals with the difference between China's property bubble and U.S's. Real estate bubble is one severe issue nowadays. Both commercial and residential property is in hot demand. It is estimated that hot money flow into Chinese real estate has reached over 210 billion in 2009.

最后一句的BUT后应该省去

22.22
端午节要吃粽子了。

21,21
The only entities that could trigger a crisis of confidence in government debt are themselves owned by the government
唯一可能引发ZF债务信用危机的事情是，他们本身就属于ZF。
I have never thought that China have such a heavy debt burden---80% of GDP--according to the consultancy refered in the last paragraph. The goverment collects money by three means: debt, tax, and inflation. The increasing debt must be covered by tax, which is known as "Ricardian equivalence". The financial situation drives the goverment or the central bank depending on the former to create more money, which form a pressure on the price.  
I have free time~~

20-20
The hidden debts of  China will be a large number of money。

which proved better at shoving money out of the door than America’s federal government.

4,4
目前水平不济，只能查查单词，还不能用英语评论时事~~

1.consolidate     vt.   巩固，使固定；联合vi. 巩固，加强
2.hive   n. 蜂房，蜂巢；热闹的场所；熙攘喧闹的人群
vi. 群居；入蜂房；生活在蜂房中
vt. 入蜂箱；贮备
hive off   脱离编制；分出,脱离ZF编制,转制
3. a chunk of   一大块
4. opacity   不透明度
5. these hidden liabilities have become one of the four big worries haunting China-watchers, along with the property bubble, inflation and lightly regulated trust companies.
隐性负债已经成为了和楼市泡沫、通货膨胀、信托公司监管不力并驾齐驱的困扰中国观望者的四大隐忧之一。
6. big rock-candy mountain  巨石糖果山
7. accrue  vt. 获得；积累vi. 产生；自然增长或利益增加

16......16
个人认为，这次产生的不良贷款与之前的银行不良资产剥离是不同的。上一次的银行不良资产多产生于“拨转贷”过程中，是拨款变成贷款后产生的历史遗留问题，最后，由国家买单。这次不良贷款的产生则是不同，国家受到金融危机冲击，为刺激经济，需要在短期内放款，对于借款人的审核条件放松，产生不良贷款就再所难免。问题是，无论不良贷款的产生原因是什么，最终买单的始终是国家，进而转嫁到大众身上。

China’s public finances may not be as sweet as they appeared,
本文来自: 人大经济论坛 Follow Us 版，详细出处参考：https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread ... amp;from^^uid=2205946

24,24

To stimulate the economy, Chinese government has invested a lot druing 2008 to 2010 by means of lending, which results in huge debt burden  on local level. Some of them has become bad debts. Those most affected are state-owned financial institutions.

BANKS in Western countries dragged their economies into the great recession. Banks in China pulled the country out of it. Much of the Chinese government’s stimulus effort from 2008 to 2010 was left to financial institutions, which proved better at shoving money out of the door than America’s federal government.
西方国家经济受其银行体系所累陷入大衰退，中国的银行则使其经济走出困境。2008年至2010年中国ZF刺激经济的努力，很大一部分由金融机构承担，其结果表明，中国在松开货币闸门方面做的比美国ZF成功。
pull ... out of
把...拖出...
shove
1.推，乱推 2.推挤，猛推 3.硬推
collateral
抵押品,担保品
consolidate
结合；合并；强化；巩固
hive off
脱离ZF编制；转制
opacity
不透明
haunt
经常拜访；出没于
docile
温顺的，听话的
accrue
1.应累算；应计 2.增长，自然增殖

22，22
Banks in the West put the economy into recession while the ones in China pull it out of recession, what an insight point of the role banks had played in different economies. Again, this refers to the regulation of the banking industry.  A movie once said that deregulation of the banking industry in USA start in 1970s and this is absolutely an important element in causing today's financial crisis. When the Obama was on stage, he began to pull the way on the right track with a bit more tight regulations. And as the problem in this paper, some say that the current measures of China is pretty like deregulation of what the West did in 1970s, property bubble, inflation, non performing assets, among others, are inherent element in prompting these issues. China public finance in not good, but is it not sour?

lz辛苦了，谢谢

24,24

1. The exact details of how to handle China's Local government debt are still under discussion. The situation of local government debt is very complex and the central government won't start cleaning this mess until the situation is really clear.
2. Once the situation is clear, it's time to pay the debt. But who should pay for it? The taxpayers? Central government? Or the state banks?
3. Let's say that the debt is payed in time and the mess is cleaned somehow, how should the local government get enough money? Issuing bonds and non-governmental investment may be helpful.

24,24hive off
蜂群
shove
1.推，乱推 2.推挤，猛推 3.硬推
collateral
抵押品,担保品
consolidate
结合；合并；强化；巩固
opacity
不透明
liabilities
债务,负债n.
1．  倾向 2．  责任,义务









haunt

经常拜访；出没于
docile
温顺的，听话的
accrue
1.应累算；应计 2.增长，自然增殖

follow 24 24 试了翻译下，有很多自己认为翻译得不好的地方，希望大家多多指正！
I finished this passage at 11：00，and try to translate it. But I haven't realize that it would cost me 90mins. This is the translation:
中国正在清理ZF债务
——中国面对着地方ZF的隐藏债务
西方国家的银行拖垮它们的经济，而在中国，则刚好相反。在08到10年，ZF为了刺激经济而产生的债务现在多流向了金融机构，这可比美国联邦ZF处理货币过多要高明得多。
地方ZF由于不能以自己的名义向银行借贷，但却通过自己投资的数以千计的公司向银行借贷。在原始资本和抵押品的帮助下，如土地等，这些投资工具成功地将资金引向了当地的桥梁，隧道以及其他不动产的建设，可是，这大部分债务却变成了坏账，严重威胁到借出这些资金的银行的资产负债平衡。
根据这星期被路透采访的一个不愿透露姓名的官员所说，中央银行终已下定决心来清理这一团糟的债务。中国ZF将会保证这些投资机构的稳定以及逐渐将这些债务分离到设立的公司里并向私人投资者开放投资市场。这将会强迫银行勾销另一片呆账，同时在ZF的预算里向银行支付大部分的呆账。最终，大部分在08到10年刺激经济的借贷又会流向公共支出。
中国ZF从未公开过地方ZF投资时的欠下了多少债务。尽管有这信息不对称，也有可能是因为信息不对称，这些未浮于水面的债务和房地产泡沫，通胀以及信贷公司的疏于管制一起成为了困扰中国观察家的四大担忧。西北大学的Victor Shih 将这些债务描述为“一座岩糖果山”（个人认为是苦忧参半的意思），在2010年六月，他指出中国的ZF债务在2012年末可能达到24万亿人民币（3.7万亿美元），超出中国GDP的一半。
但根据另一名路透网采访的官员所说，中央却认为这些债务仅有10万亿，占GDP的四分之一。这也高过美国联邦ZF和州ZF的债务占GDP18%比例，但和印度的25%持平。
并非所有的10万亿债务都会变成呆账。严格意义上说，部分地方ZF的投资将会被认为是银行可接受范围内的，这是因为借款人可以从这些投资中获取更大的回报以支付贷款。另一个来自于《世界经济报道》分析称，只有28%的债务不大可能再产生新的收益。在其他情况下，一个项目的社会收益将会超过它的成本，即使这些收益并不会被当地ZF获得，尤其会导致ZF人员的闲置。
但是中国有能力支付这些债务吗？中央ZF的官方债务在2010年末仅占GDP的19%。根浴北京的一家咨询公司GaveKalDragonomics的分析人员 Andrew Batson 和Janet Zhang的分析，中央的债务， 加上地方ZF的债务，不良贷款以及其他债务，如央行票据等，这些公共债务的总数大概占到了GDP的80%。对于一个发展中国家来说，这听起来似乎很高。但印度的公共债务也达到了GDP的73%。但这些债务多是以本国货币计算并在国内持有的，大多是隶属机构，如国有银行等等。他们说：“能引发信任危机的只有ZF自己对自己的持债而已”。中国的财政可能不如表面看起来那么甜，但至少也不会是酸苦的。（个人认为言下之意是“中国的财政虽不如表面看起来那么美好，但至少短期内不会出现大问题。”）
端午节因为要参加数模培训~可能没时间啦

24,24
liability 负债

21,21
The banks lent to thousands of investment corporations set up by local governments, which cannot borrow in their own name. With the help of some initial capital and collateral, like land, these investment vehicles directed the lending into local bridges, tunnels and real-estate ventures. But many of the loans have turned bad, threatening the balance-sheets of the banks that made them.翻译：银行贷款是为地方ZF设立的，银行不能以自己的名义借了数以千计的投资公司。随着一些初始资本担保的帮助下，例如土地，这些直接成为了当地借款桥梁的投资工具，（例如）隧道和房地产企业贷款。但是，许多贷款变坏，这些变坏的的投资威胁银行的平衡。
The government has never revealed how much debt the local-government vehicles took on. Despite this opacity, or perhaps because of it, these hidden liabilities have become one of the four big worries haunting China-watchers, along with the property bubble, inflation and lightly regulated trust companies. Victor Shih of Northwestern University has described the debts as a “big rock-candy mountain”. In June 2010, he projected it might reach as high as 24 trillion yuan ($3.7 trillion) by the end of 2012, or over half of China’s GDP.
翻译：ZF从来没有透露多少债务在当地ZF车辆上。中国观察家发现：尽管这个不透明度，也许是因为这个，这些隐藏的债务已成为四大隐忧之一，伴随出现了楼市泡沫，通货膨胀和轻度监管信托公司产生。维克多西北大学士形容为一个“大岩石糖果山”的债务。 2010年6月，他预计可能高达24万亿元（3.7万亿美元）持续到2012年底，也超过中国国内生产总值的一半。

今天时间充足，多翻译一段，继续坚持
在这里我也坚持二十几期了，每天来这里看文章和学习，都已经成为习惯了，哪天没来，心里还老惦记着~在有条件的时候我会一直坚持，也祝这个活动越办越好~感谢楼主提供这个平台，使我形成了这样的好习惯