英文标题：
《Do Informational Cascades Happen with Non-myopic Agents?》
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作者：
Ilai Bistritz, Nasimeh Heydaribeni and Achilleas Anastasopoulos
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最新提交年份：
2020
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英文摘要：
  We consider an environment where players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a technology) or not. The product is either good or bad but its true value is not known to the players. Instead, each player has her own private information on its quality. Each player can observe the previous actions of other players and estimate the quality of the product. A classic result in the literature shows that in similar settings information cascades occur where learning stops for the whole network and players repeat the actions of their predecessors. In contrast to the existing literature on informational cascades, in this work, players get more than one opportunity to act. In each turn, a player is chosen uniformly at random and can decide to buy the product and leave the market or to wait. We provide a characterization of structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (sPBE) with forward-looking strategies through a fixed-point equation of dimensionality that grows only quadratically with the number of players. In particular, a sufficient state for players\' strategies at each time instance is a pair of two integers, the first corresponding to the estimated quality of the good and the second indicating the number of players that cannot offer additional information about the good to the rest of the players. Based on this characterization we study informational cascades in two regimes. First, we show that for a discount factor strictly smaller than one, informational cascades happen with high probability as the number of players increases. Furthermore, only a small portion of the total information in the system is revealed before a cascade occurs. Secondly, and more surprisingly, we show that for a fixed number of players, as the discount factor approaches one, bad informational cascades are benign when the product is bad, and are completely eliminated when the discount factor equals one.
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中文摘要：
我们考虑的环境是，玩家需要决定是否购买某种产品（或采用某种技术）。产品有好有坏，但玩家并不知道它的真正价值。相反，每个玩家都有自己关于其质量的私人信息。每个玩家都可以观察其他玩家之前的行为，并评估产品的质量。文献中的一个经典结果表明，在类似的环境中，信息级联会发生，整个网络的学习都会停止，玩家会重复前人的动作。与现有关于信息级联的文献相比，在这项工作中，玩家可以获得不止一次的行动机会。在每一轮中，都会随机选择一名玩家，他们可以决定购买产品并离开市场或等待。我们通过一个只随参与者数量二次增长的维数固定点方程，描述了具有前瞻性策略的结构化完美贝叶斯均衡（sPBE）。尤其是，玩家策略在每个时间点的充分状态是一对两个整数，第一个对应于商品的估计质量，第二个表示无法向其他玩家提供商品附加信息的玩家数量。基于这一特征，我们研究了两种情况下的信息级联。首先，我们证明了当贴现因子严格小于1时，随着参与者数量的增加，信息级联发生的概率很高。此外，在级联发生之前，系统中只有一小部分信息被显示出来。其次，更令人惊讶的是，我们表明，对于固定数量的参与者，当贴现因子接近1时，当产品不好时，坏信息级联是良性的，当贴现因子等于1时，坏信息级联被完全消除。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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