中国经济必将“硬着陆”美国人眼中的中国式“繁荣”... ...

Few countries are more important to the global economy than China. But its reputation as an unstoppable giant -- as a country with an unending supply of cheap labor and limitless capacity for growth -- masks some serious and worsening economic problems.

对于全球经济而言，在重要性上能与中国经济相比的国家寥寥无几。这个国家有着无穷廉价劳动力和无限增长空间，有“不停歇巨人”的美誉。但是，美誉的面具后掩盖的是一些严重的并且正在恶化的经济问题。

China’s labor force is aging. Its consumers save too much and spend too little. Its political and economic policy tools remain crude. Its state bureaucracy seems likely to curb spending just as exports weaken, and thus risks deflation. As U.S. consumers retrench, and as the global commodity bubble begins to dissipate, these fundamental weaknesses will combine in a way that’s unlikely to end well for China -- or for the rest of the world.

中国劳动力正在老化。中国消费者储蓄太多而消费太少。中国的政治和经济政策工具还比较原始。当出口下降时，国家官僚体制可能会限制消费，因此就会存在通货紧缩的风险。随着美国消费者收紧钱袋，同时全球消费品泡沫开始破裂，这些根本上的弱点会组合在一起发力，无论对于中国或是对于世界来说，都不可能会有好结果的。

To start, China is much more vulnerable to an international slowdown than is generally understood. In late 2007, my firm’s research found that too few people in China had the discretionary spending capability to support its economy domestically. Our analysis showed that it took a per-capita gross domestic product of about $5,000 to have meaningful discretionary spending power in China.

首先，中国在应对国际经济衰退的能力比人们预想的要脆弱的多。在2007年末，我公司研究发现，在中国，有可随意支配收入来支撑国内经济的人少得可怜。我们的分析显示，在中国，人均GDP约5000美元时才会产生有意义的随意购买力。1

About 110 million Chinese had that much or more, but they constituted only 8 percent of the population and accounted for just 35 percent of GDP in 2009, while exports accounted for 27 percent. Even China’s middle and upper classes had only 6 percent of Americans’ purchasing power.

大约有1.1亿或更多的中国人拥有可随意支配收入，但是仅占总人口的8%，2009年，这部分消费仅占GDP的35%，而出口却占了27%。甚至中国中高产阶级的购买力只是美国的6%。

Why Overconfidence Abounds

为何自信心过度膨胀？

With such limited domestic spending, why do so many analysts predict that China can continue its robust growth?

国内消费如此有限，为何还是有许多分析人士预测中国仍然会继续快速增长？

In part because they believe in the misguided concept of global decoupling -- the idea that even if the U.S. economy suffers a setback, the rest of the world, especially developing countries such as China and India, will continue to flourish. Recently -- after China’s huge $586 billion stimulus program in 2009; massive imports of industrial materials such as iron ore and copper; booms in construction of cement, steel and power plants, and other industrial capacity; and a pickup in economic growth -- the decoupling argument has been back in vogue.

一部分原因在于，一些人被“全球平衡”观点误导。该观点认为，即使美国经济发展受挫，世界其他地区，特别是发展中国家，如中国和印度，仍将继续繁荣。近来，也就是2009年，在中国实行了5860亿美元的经济刺激计划后，中国大量进口工业原料，如铁矿石和铜；水泥混凝土建造业，钢厂，发电厂猛增，其他行业也出现繁荣。经济也开始增长，“全球平衡”观点又重新流行起来。

This concept is flawed for a simple reason: Almost all developing countries depend on exports for growth, a point underscored by their persistent trade surpluses and the huge size of Asian exports relative to GDP. Further, the majority of exports by Asian countries go directly or indirectly to the U.S. We saw the effects of this starting in 2008: As U.S. consumers retrenched and global recession reigned, China and most other developing Asian countries suffered keenly.

但这个观点是错误的，原因很简单：几乎所有的发展中国家都是靠出口实现经济增长，持续的贸易顺差和大量亚洲出口与GDP相关。另外，大部分亚洲出口的产品都直接或间接得输入到美国。2008年， 这样产生的效果开始发力：由于美国消费者削减开支，全球经济衰退继续，中国和大部分发展中国家都严重受挫。

Overconfidence in China’s ability to keep its economy booming is also partly psychological. It reminds me of the admiration and envy (even fear) that many felt toward Japan during its bubble days in the 1980s. As Japanese companies bought California’s Pebble Beach, Iowa farmland and Rockefeller Center in New York, what was safe from their zillions? Then the Japanese stock and real-estate bubbles collapsed, and Japan entered the deflationary depression in which it’s still mired.

相信中国有能力保持经济繁荣，这种过度自信还来源于心理因素。这令我想起了20世纪80年代日本出现经济泡沫时的情形，当时许多国家都对日本的经济羡慕，嫉妒，甚至感到恐惧。当日本公司买下加州的圆石滩，爱荷华州的农场和纽约洛克菲勒中心的时候，这种巨大财富背后安全吗？紧接着，日本的股市和楼市泡沫破裂，日本进入紧缩衰退期，直到现在还深陷其中。2

Success and Complacency

成功与自满

What’s more, China’s recent successes have been so pronounced that they’ve led many to conclude that its economy is a juggernaut. And, indeed, the Chinese have much to be proud of: Last year, China passed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy, a huge achievement considering China started in the late 1970s with a tiny pre-industrialized economy.

不仅如此，中国近来的成功是这样报道的：中国的成功事例在许多方面都处于领先地位。因此，得出结论，中国的经济力量强大，坚不可摧。确实中国人有很多值得骄傲的成绩：去年，中国赶超日本，成为世界第二大经济体，相比上世纪70年代起步的中国前工业化经济，巨大的成就证明了中国的成功。

But this success may have led to complacency. I suspect that the 2007-2009 global recession, and the dramatic transformation by U.S. consumers from gay-abandon borrowers-and- spenders to Scrooge-like savers, caught Chinese leaders flat- footed. They probably planned to encourage consumer spending and domestic-led growth, but later -- much later.

但是这成功可能带来骄傲自满。我怀疑，2007至2009年的全球经济衰退，美国消费者发生了巨大的转变，从借钱消费者变成了吝啬的储蓄者。这一切都曾令中国领导人手足无措。他们很可能已经计划鼓励国内消费，但是，晚了，太晚了。
Growth Machine
增长机器

They were enjoying a well-oiled growth machine. Growing exports, especially to American consumers, stimulated the capital spending needed to produce yet more exports and jobs for the millions of Chinese streaming from farms to cities. Wages remained low, due to ample labor supplies, and held down consumer spending. So did the high Chinese consumer saving rate. Because Chinese could not invest offshore, much of that saving went into state banks at low interest rates. The money was then lent to the many inefficient government-owned enterprises at subsidized rates.

中国人正为这架运转流畅的增长机器感到欣喜。日益增长的出口，特别是对美国消费者的出口，刺激了资金投入，用来生产更多的出口产品，为亿万中国人民创造更多的工作机会，大量人从乡村涌向城市。由于劳动力供应过剩，劳动者报酬仍然很低，从而限制了消费者的消费能力。因此，导致了中国的高储蓄率。由于中国人不能进行海外投资，大多数的储蓄以低利率流进了国内的银行。然后这些钱作为补贴被借给效能低下的国有企业。

In a country where stability is almost worshipped, why would any leader want to disrupt such a smoothly running economy?

在一个稳定压倒一切的国家，领导人为何要打破运行如此良好的社会经济呢？

But before you worry about China’s becoming No. 1 any time soon, consider the remaining gap between its economy and the U.S. economy. In 2009, China’s GDP was $4.9 trillion, only 34 percent of the U.S.’s $14.3 trillion. Because China has 1.32 billion people, or 4.3 times as many as the U.S. has, the gap in per-capita GDP was even bigger: China’s $3,709 was only 8 percent of the U.S.’s $46,405.

但是在你担心中国很快会成为世界第一之前，请先比较中美两国经济上的现存的差距。2009年，中国GDP为4.9万亿，而美国为14.3万亿，中国仅是美国的34%。中国有13.2亿人口，是美国人口的4.3倍，因此，人均GDP上的差距更加明显。中国人均GDP3709美元，美国为46405美元，中国仅是美国的8%。

A Wide Gap

一道鸿沟1

Just to maintain this gap at current levels, Chinese GDP will need to grow at double-digit rates for four years before tapering off, or rise sixfold in three decades (assuming that U.S. real GDP increases 2 percent per year on average for the next 30 years, and using government population projections). To close the per-capita GDP gap in 30 years, Chinese GDP would need to grow about 10 percent per year for three decades, or expand to 17.8 times its current size in that period.

仅是为了保持当前这个差距，中国GDP增速放缓前，需要连续四年保持两位数增长，或者说需要在10年中翻六番（假定在今后30年中，在ZF人口增长预期下，美国经济年增速平均保持在2%）。

Such rates of growth seem close to impossible if the global economy slows.

如果全球经济发展放缓，中国保持这种增速近乎不可能。

As the announcer for the Cleveland Indians used to say when the Tribe was hopelessly behind, “They have their work cut out for them!”

正如克利夫兰的印第安人为部落落后感到失望是所说的：“他们的工作是为其量身订做的。”

(A. Gary Shilling is president of A. Gary Shilling & Co. and author of “The Age of Deleveraging: Investment Strategies for a Decade of Slow Growth and Deflation.” The opinions expressed are his own. This is the first in a five-part series.)

（作者A.格里。希林是格里希林公司的懂事长，并且是《去杠杆化的时代：十年慢增长期和通缩条件下的投资战略》一书的作者。以上言论系作者本人，是五部分中的第一部分。）1