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14.126 Game Theory

Mihai Manea and Muhamet Yildiz

TA Gabriel Carroll

Spring 2011

• Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1991. [Primary]
• Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1994. [Primary]
• Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press, 2006. [Supplementary]
• Weibull, J., Evolutionary Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1995. [Supplementary]
• Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine, The Theory of Learning in Games, The MIT Press, 1998. [Supplementary]
  

There will be approximately five problem sets (40% of the grade; tentative due dates are 2/22, 3/16, 4/6, 4/20, and 5/4), and a take-home final exam (60% of the grade; 24h during final exam week with some flexibility).

Tentative Outline

• 2/2-9   Review of Basic Concepts
  
  
  
  
  
  
  • Normal-form games (with or without complete information)
  • Dominance, rationalizability, Nash equilibrium (existence and continuity properties), Bayesian Nash equilibrium
  • Extensive form games with perfect information and multi-stage games
  • Backwards induction, subgame perfection, iterated conditional dominance
    

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps. 1, 2, 3.

Osborne and Rubinstein, Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 6.

• 2/14       Application: Bargaining with Complete Information
  

* Osborne and Rubinstein, Chap. 7.

Rubinstein, A. (1982) “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, 50, 97-109.

• 2/16      Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information
  
  
  
  
  
  
  • Sequential equilibrium
  • Perfect and proper equilibria
    

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 8.

Osborne and Rubinstein, Chaps. 11, 12.

Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982) “Sequential Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 50, 863-894.

• 2/22      Signaling and Forward Induction
  

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps. 8, 11.

Osborne and Rubinstein, Chap. 12.

Cho, I.-K. and D. Kreps (1987) “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 179-221.

Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (2002) “Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning,” Journal of Economic Theory 106, 356-391.

Govindan, S. and R. Wilson (2008) “On Forward Induction,” Econometrica, 77, 1-28.

• 2/23 Application: Signaling in Bargaining
  

* Admati, A. and M. Perry (1987) “Strategic Delay in Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies, 54, 345-364.

• 2/28-3/9 Repeated Games
  

Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 5.

Mailath and Samuelson, Chaps. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11.

Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1990) “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica, 58, 1041-1063.

Abreu, D., P. Milgrom, and D. Pearce (1991) “Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships,” Econometrica, 59, 1713-1733.

Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin (1986) “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, 54, 533-554.

Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin (1994) “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,” Econometrica, 62, 997-1039.

• 3/14      Reputation Formation
  

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 9.

Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982) “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253-279.

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1982) “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280-312.

Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982) “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245-252.

Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (1989) “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player,” Econometrica, 57, 759-778.

• 3/16      Application: Screening and Reputation in Bargaining
  

* Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 10.

Gul, F, H. Sonnenschein, and R. Wilson (1986), “Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture,” Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 155-190.

Abreu, D. and F. Gul (2000) “Bargaining and Reputation,” Econometrica, 68, 85-117.

• 3/28-30 Rationalizability
  

* Lecture Notes

Osborne and Rubinstein, Chap. 12.

Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps. 8, 9, 11.

Bernheim, D. (1984) “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica, 52, 1007-1028.

Pearce, D. (1984) “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,” Econometrica, 52, 1029-1050.

Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) “A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements”, Econometrica, 75(2), 365-400.