Primary Field是主要研究方向，Secondary Field(s)是副研究方向

MIT规定经济系博士至多有2个主要研究方向，至多有两个副研究方向

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这23人最耀眼的明星应该是下面这个小伙

Gabriel Carroll
[url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/grad/gdc]http://econ-www.mit.edu/grad/gdc[/url]


[img]http://econ-www.mit.edu/timages/164[/img]


主要研究方向：微观经济理论   副研究方向：政治经济学（千万别理解成国内意义上的政治经济学！！），行为经济学

导师： Prof. Parag Pathak，Prof. Daron Acemoglu，Prof. Glenn Ellison

博士论文：DISSERTATION: “Non-Equilibrium Approaches to Mechanism Design”   （机制设计的非均衡方法）


本科： Harvard University, B.A., summa cum laude, Mathematics and Linguistics, 2005

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Job Market Paper
[url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/7161]A Quantitative Approach to Incentives: Application to Voting Rules[/url]
[Note: this paper refers to an online appendix file, which will be posted in early November 2011.  A preliminary draft is available on request.]
Abstract:  We present a general approach to quantifying a mechanism’s susceptibility to strategic manipulation, based on the premise that agents report their preferences truthfully if the potential gain from behaving strategically is small. Susceptibility is defined as the maximum amount of expected utility an agent can gain by manipulating. We apply this measure to anonymous voting rules, by making minimal restrictions on voters’ utility functions and beliefs about other voters’ behavior. We give two sets of results. First, we offer bounds on the susceptibility of several specific voting rules. This includes considering several voting systems which have been previously identified as resistant to manipulation; we find that they are actually more susceptible than simple plurality rule by our measure. Second, we give asymptotic lower bounds on susceptibility for any voting rule, under various combinations of efficiency, regularity, and informational conditions. These results illustrate the tradeoffs between susceptibility and other properties of the voting rule.



Publications
[url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5629]When are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?[/url] / [url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/6907]Online appendix[/url] (Econometrica, forthcoming)
Abstract: We study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive-compatibility, in a variety of mechanism design settings, allowing for probabilistic mechanisms. We give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces. On many common preference domains — including any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences, single-peaked ordinal preferences, and successive single-crossing ordinal preferences — local incentive-compatibility (suitably defined) implies full incentive-compatibility. On domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition, local incentive-compatibility is not sufficient. Our sufficiency results hold for dominant-strategy and Bayesian Nash solution concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences.

[url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5630]An Efficiency Theorem for Incompletely Known Preferences[/url](Journal of Economic Theory 145 (6) (2010), 2463-2470)
Abstract: There are n agents who have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions on a finite set of alternatives A. Each agent i’s utility function is known to lie in the nonempty, convex, relatively open set Ui. Suppose L is a lottery on A that is undominated, meaning that there is no other lottery that is guaranteed to Pareto dominate L no matter what the true utility functions are. Then, there exist utility functions uiin Uifor which L is Pareto efficient. This result includes the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem as a special case.

[url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/7135]Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions[/url] / [url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/7136]Online appendix[/url] (with James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4) (2009), 1639-1674)
Abstract: Defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions. We identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults: requiring individuals to make explicit choices for themselves. We study such “active decisions” in the context of 401(k) saving. We find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401(k) enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt-in enrollment procedure, producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take thirty months to achieve under standard enrollment. We also present a model of 401(k) enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment (i.e., default enrollment), standard enrollment (i.e., default nonenrollment), or active decisions (i.e., no default and compulsory choice). Active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous. Financial illiteracy, however, favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment.

Working Papers
Papers not posted here are expected to appear over the course of Fall 2011.


The Efficiency-Incentive Tradeoff in Double Auction Environments [Please email gdc@mit.edu for a preliminary draft]
Abstract: We consider the tradeoff between efficiency and incentives in large double auction environments. No mechanism simultaneously gives agents perfect incentives to be truthful and ensures first-best efficiency under truthfulness; but if agents are willing to be truthful when the gains to strategic behavior are sufficiently small, then the optimal mechanism should compromise between these two criteria. We give a first stab at quantifying the tradeoff between the two, providing asymptotic lower bounds on either the inefficiency or the susceptibility to manipulation that any mechanism must possess.

On Direct Mechanisms with Ordinal Preferences [Please email gdc@mit.edu for a preliminary draft]
Abstract: We consider dominant-strategy implementation of social choice correspondences, where the set of acceptable outcomes depends only on the agents’ ordinal preferences, and where mechanisms may prescribe lotteries over outcomes. We investigate the possibility of providing theoretical foundations for restricting attention to mechanisms that only elicit ordinal preferences. Specifically, we address the following question: if a social choice correspondence is implementable for all possible preferences over lotteries that the agents may have, is it necessarily implementable by a mechanism that only elicits ordinal preferences? We can obtain affirmative answers if there is a single agent and the social choice correspondence takes a simple form; or if there are multiple agents, each agent’s cardinal preferences are subjectively correlated with others’ preferences, and either all ordinal preferences are strict or agents are allowed to have non-expected-utility preferences over lotteries. Under weaker combinations of assumptions, the answer to our question is negative.

[url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5628]A General Equivalence Theorem for Allocation of Indivisible Objects[/url]
Abstract: We consider markets in which n indivisible objects are to be allocated to n agents. A number of recent papers studying such markets have shown various interesting equivalences between randomized mechanisms based on trading and randomized mechanisms based on serial dictatorship. We prove a very general equivalence theorem from which many previous equivalence results immediately follow, and we give several new applications. Our general result also sheds some light on why these equivalences hold by presenting the existing serial-dictatorship-based mechanisms as randomizations of a general mechanism which we call serial dictatorship in groups. The proof technique, a hybrid of explicit bijective and enumerative methods, is cleaner than previous bijective proofs.

[url=http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5631]Efficient Random Assignment with Constrained Rankings[/url]

占楼

你回到国内的还那么晚睡觉啊。。。

Niubilility....