Hémous, David (E) hemous@fas.harvard.edu

International Trade, Macroeconomics, Environmental Economics

Paper Title: “Environmental Policy and Directed Technical Change in a Global Economy: Is there a Case for Carbon Tariffs?”

Philippe Aghion, Daron Acemoglu, Pol Antràs, Elhanan Helpman

Kamada, Yuichiro (E) ykamada@fas.harvard.edu

Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy, Market Design

Paper Title: “Multi-Agent Search with Deadline”

Drew Fudenberg, Attila Ambrus, Alvin Roth, Tomasz Strzalecki

Kaur, Supreet (PEG) kaur@fas.harvard.edu

Development Economics

Paper Title: “Nominal Wage Rigidity in Village Labor Markets: Evidence from Demand Shocks”

Sendhil Mullainathan, Michael Kremer, Lawrence Katz, Rohini Pande

Leshno, Jacob (BE) jleshno@fas.harvard.edu

Microeconomic Theory, Market Design

Paper Title: “Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems”

Alvin Roth, Susan Athey, Drew Fudenberg, Ariel Pakes

Li, Hongyi (BE) hongyili@mit.edu

Organizational Economics

Paper Title: “Developing Shared Knowledge”

Robert Gibbons, Oliver Hart, Philippe Aghion, Eric Van den Steen

Mericle, David (E) mericle@fas.harvard.edu

Macroeconomics, Computational Economics

Paper Title: “Uncertainty, the Liquidity Trap, and Social Insurance”

N. Gregory Mankiw, Emmanuel Farhi, David Laibson

Pflueger, Carolin (BE) pflueger@fas.harvard.edu

Asset Pricing, Macroeconomics

Paper Title: “Inflation Risk in Corporate Bonds”

Luis Viceira, John Campbell, Erik Stafford, James Stock

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[url=http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Erao/]Rao, Neel (E) rao@fas.harvard.edu

Labor Economics, Organizational Economics
Paper Title: “Social Learning in the Labor Market”

Lawrence Katz, Raj Chetty, Oliver Hart

Rotz, Dana (E) drotz@fas.harvard.edu
Labor Economics, Economic Demography, Applied Econometrics

Paper Title: “Why Have Divorce Rates Fallen? The Role of Women's Age at Marriage”

Claudia Goldin, Lawrence Katz, Roland Fryer

Rouzet, Dorothee (E) drouzet@fas.harvard.edu

International Trade, Political Economy, Financial Markets, Macroeconomics

Paper Title: “Improving ‘National Brands’: Quality Reputation and Export Promotion Strategies”

Philippe Aghion, Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz

Sinkinson, Michael (BE) msinkins@fas.harvard.edu

Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics, Econometrics

Paper Title: “Pricing and Entry Incentives with Exclusive Contracts: Evidence from Smartphones”

Ariel Pakes, Bharat Anand, Matthew Gentzkow, Guido Imbens

Stella, Andrea (E) astella@fas.harvard.edu

Macroeconomics, Monetary Economics, Political Economics, Applied Time Series

Paper Title: “The Magnitude of Menu Costs: A Structural Estimation”

Alberto Alesina, N. Gregory Mankiw, James Stock

Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth (E) sstephen@fas.harvard.edu

Political Economy, Labor Economics

Paper Title: “The Effects of Racial Attitudes on Voting: Evidence Using Google Search Data”

Alberto Alesina, David Cutler, Edward Glaeser

Veuger, Stan (E) veuger@fas.harvard.edu

Political Economy, Public Finance, Applied Microeconomics, International Finance
Paper Title: "Do Political Protests Work? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement"

Martin Feldstein, Alberto Alesina, Jeff Frieden

Kishore, Avinash (PP) avinash_kishore@hksphd.harvard.edu

Environment Economics, Development Economics, Health Economics

Paper Title: “Clean Cooking Fuel, Women’s Intra-household Status, and Son Preference in Rural India”

Dale Jorgenson, James Hammitt, Robert Stavins

Meeks, Robyn (PP) robyn_meeks@hksphd.harvard.edu

Development Economics, Environmental Economics

Paper Title: "Water Works: The Economic Impact of Water Infrastructure"

Michael Kremer, Rema Hanna, Rohini Pande, Robert Stavins

Ranson, Matthew (PP) matthew_ranson@hksphd.harvard.edu

Environmental and Natural Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Behavioral Economics

Paper Title: “What are the Welfare Costs of Coastal Shoreline Loss? Housing Market Evidence from a Discontinuity Matching Design”

Richard Zeckhauser, Robert Stavins, Martin Weitzman

Rostapshova, Olga (PP) olga_rostapshova@hksphd.harvard.edu

Development Economics, Experimental Economics, Environmental Economics, Applied Microeconomics

Paper Title: “Disentangling Drivers of Cooperation: Public Good Experiments in Kenyan Communities”

Michael Kremer, Alvin Roth, Richard Zeckhauser

Ye, Maoliang (PP) mye@fas.harvard.edu

Public Economics, Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Political Economics

Paper Title: “Does Gradualism Build Coordination? A Theory and Experiments”

Raj Chetty, Alberto Alesina, Iris Bohnet, Brigitte Madrian

Zajonc, Tristan (PP) tzajonc@fas.harvard.edu

Econometrics, Labor Economics, Development Economics, Economics of Education

Paper Title: “Bayesian Inference for Dynamic Treatment Regimes: Mobility, Equity, and Efficiency in Student Tracking”

Guido Imbens, Alberto Abadie, Dale Jorgenson, Asim Khwaja

Richardson, Samuel (HP) richard5@fas.harvard.edu

Health Economics

Paper Title: “Integrating Pay-for-Performance into Health Care Payment Systems”

Thomas McGuire, Amitabh Chandra, Meredith Rosenthal, Christopher Avery, Michael Chernew

Ye, Maoliang (PP) mye@fas.harvard.edu

Public Economics, Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Political Economics

Paper Title: “Does Gradualism Build Coordination? A Theory and Experiments”

Raj Chetty, Alberto Alesina, Iris Bohnet, Brigitte Madrian

  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Emye/

这位看了一下，本科是中山大学的，硕士在清华，然后香港中文大学读了经济学硕士，然后博士申到哈佛肯尼迪ZF学院的公共政策项目

  

Papers

• Does Gradualism Build Coordination? A Theory and Experiments (Job Market Paper, to be posted shortly)
  Abstract: This paper studies how gradualism -- increasing required levels ("stakes") of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -- affects group coordination on high-stake projects. I explore the effect of gradualism in two laboratory binary-choice weakest-link coordination games (games in which each player' payoff depends on her own contribution and the lowest contribution of all group members) under two different information structures: a limited information structure when participants are only informed whether all group members contribute, and a richer information structure when they are informed exactly how many group members contribute. In each case, I randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, and starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stake over time (the "gradualism" treatment). I find that with limited information, groups coordinate most successfully at the high stake in the gradualism treatment; with a richer information structure, the advantage of gradualism shrinks because a richer information structure facilitates later coordination for the other two treatments when a group is close to success. These results show that gradualism works in weakest-link games via guaranteeing a high success rate at the beginning and providing the information about how far a group is from success in a higher-stake coordination project. I propose a behavioral game theory model based on belief updating to explain why and when gradualism works in weakest-link games. However, in a third experiment I find that allowing free riding worsens the coordination in all treatments, and gradualism alone does not perform better.
• One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? (with Sam Asher, Lorenzo Casaburi and Plamen Nikolov)
  (First author, under review)
  Abstract: Using a multiple-period binary-choice minimum-effort coordination experiment, we study how gradualism -- increasing required levels ("stakes") of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -- affects group coordination performances on a high-stake project. We randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, and starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stake over time (the "gradualism" treatment). We find that groups coordinate most successfully at the high stake in the gradualism treatment relative to the other two treatments. We propose a belief-based learning framework to explain the results, and discuss other theoretical explanations. Our findings point to a simple, voluntary mechanism to promote successful coordination when the capacity to impose sanctions is limited.
• Does Gradualism Build Trust? Evidence from A Multi-round Trust Game (coming soon)
  Abstract: This paper examines the effect of gradualism -- increasing the stake of investment slowly over time rather than requiring a high stake of investment immediately -- in trust building using a multi-round trust (investment) experiment. I randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake (the "High Start" treatment), starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few rounds (the "Big Jump" treatment), and starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stake over time (the "Gradualism" treatment). In each round, two players of each group make their decisions sequentially. The first ("trustor") makes a binary decision whether to pass the stake to the second one ("trustee"), which measures her trust. If she passes, the stake triples and the trustee then makes a binary decision: to return a low unfair amount or a high fair amount to the trustor, which measures her trustworthiness. I find that at the beginning the degree of trust is the same for all treatments, but trustworthiness is lower for the "High Start" treatment; as a result, the "High Start" treatment has a lower level of subsequent trust and a lower rate of successful cooperation (here cooperation is defined as "successful" if and only if both of the following conditions hold: the trustor is trusting and the trustee is trustworthy.). However, trustworthiness and trust for all treatments sharply decrease in the end ("end-of-game" effect).
• Does Money Buy Happiness? Evidence from Twins in Urban China (with Hongbin Li, Pak-wai Liu and Junsen Zhang)
  (under review)
  Abstract: This paper estimates the effect of income on self-reported happiness using unique Chinese twins data. We address three key challenges: omitted variable bias, measurement error bias, and reverse causality. To control for omitted genetic factors and family background, we use a within-monozygotic-twin-pair fixed-effects model. The instrumental variable fixed-effects method is used to correct measurement error bias. Finally we employ industry average income as an instrumental variable and suggest that the causality runs from income to happiness. The results are robust after we address concerns about potential biases of within-monozygotic-twin-pair estimates, use various measures of income and wealth, and consider the potential cross effect of the twin sibling's income. This paper adds to the literature on the causal effect of income on happiness, and to the best of our knowledge, it is the first such study which draws on twins data to correct both omitted variable bias and measurement error bias.
• Communism, Homo Economicus, or Fairness? Preferences for Redistribution in China (coming soon)
  Abstract: Rigid political control by the Communist Party, vigorous economic performance and increasing income inequality following thirty years of market-oriented reforms make China an excellent case to enrich the literature on preference for redistribution to the poor. Using the World Value Survey, I find that on average the Chinese prefer less redistribution than the rest of the world, which suggests that egalitarianism is no longer popular in China. Using the 2006 Chinese General Social Survey, I find that Communist Party members do not favor more progressive taxation; they even prefer lower expenditures on redistributive programs such as poverty relief, unemployment relief and pensions. Moreover, those with higher incomes and those expecting their incomes to increase in subsequent years favor less redistribution. On the other hand, the perception of fairness matters. These results suggest a combination of self-interest and fairness, rather than communism, is the key ideological factor associated with preferences for redistribution in China. This study adds to the social and political science studies on perceptions of inequality in China, and to the best of my knowledge, it is the first economics study systematically examining the determinants of preferences for redistribution in China, which has implications for China's next decades of social policy and a more balanced development strategy.
  

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和张俊森以及李宏斌两位教授合作了几篇文章。

YUICHIRO KAMADA

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Eykamada/

YUICHIRO KAMADA Ph.D. Candidate
Economics
Harvard University



Office Address
Department of Economics
Littauer Center 310
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138

Research Interests:
Game Theory, Political Economy, Market Design, Social Network, Decision Theory


Revise/Resubmit Papers
Improving Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program (joint with Fuhito Kojima), December 2010, Revise and Resubmit, American Economic Review. (A non-technical introduction to this paper (written in Japanese) is here (written with Fuhito Kojima and Jun Wako))
Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games (joint with Takuo Sugaya), June 2010, Revise and Resubmit, Theoretical Economics. (To be merged with Preopening and Equilibrium Selection by Riccardo Calcagno and Stefano Lovo)

Published/Accepted Papers

Hierarchical cheap talk (joint with Attila Ambrus and Eduardo Azevedo), July 2011, accepted subject to revision, Theoretical Economics.        Online supplementary note
Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Matching and Its Solution (joint with Fuhito Kojima), September 2011, Forthcoming, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings.
Matching Theory and Its Applications: "Regional Imbalance of Medical Residents" and Its Solutions (in Japanese) (joint with Fuhito Kojima and Jun Wako), September 2011, Forthcoming, Iryo-Keizai Kenkyu (Research in Health Economics).
Information Can Wreck Cooperation: A Counterpoint to Kandori (1992), 2010, Economics Letters, 107 (2): 112-114 (joint with Scott D. Kominers).

Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium, 2010, Econometrica 78(2): 823-832.

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日本人喜欢搞纯微观理论的真多

占楼