Equity investing
股票投资

Too much risk, not enough reward
风险过大，回报不足

Investors are betting that high returns from equities will pay for decent pensions. They are kidding themselves
投资者都指望着股市的高回报来为养老金买单，别自欺欺人了

People saving for their pensions and other long-term commitments tend to assume they should put a lot of their money in the stockmarket. Over the long run, goes the theory, equities will always produce higher returns than safer assets such as government bonds and cash because they are riskier (more volatile, in other words) and because shareholders benefit from economic growth whereas bondholders do not. That excess return is known as the “equity risk premium”.
为养老金和其他未来保障费心思的人总倾向于大手笔投资股市。根据理论来看，股票回报率的确是大大高于低风险投资，比如ZF债券或现款交易。高风险（或者说是高动荡性）是高回报的一个原因，但更多的是因为股东能从经济增长中获益，这是股东有别于债券持有人之处。这种随着经济增长而增长的额外收益则被称作“股票风险溢价”。

Experience during the second half of the 20th century seemed to bear out the theory. The premium was sizeable, and investors therefore poured a large proportion of their assets into equities.
二十世纪后半时期的情形似乎是这个理论一个很好的证明。溢酬十分可观，于是无数投资者大举进军股市。

Yet in retrospect it looks as though the circumstances of the times, rather than the immutable laws of finance, may have been responsible for the size of the premium. Government-bond returns were savaged by inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, while equities benefited from the absence of the wars and depression that had marked the first half of the century.
不过彼时溢价的高涨更多是由于当时的时代局势所致，而不是一成不变的金融规律。上世纪上半期充斥着战争与萧条，当局势稳定下来后，和平来临，股市乘着东风呈现一片欣欣向荣之象。而与此同时，在上世纪六十年代和七十年代，ZF债券受却因为通胀的影响，回报大打折扣。

In recent years the premium seems to have evaporated. The Tokyo stockmarket is 75% below the peak it reached at the end of 1989. Treasury bonds easily outperformed American equities over the ten years to the end of 2011. The addiction to equities may itself have been part of the reason for the premium’s decline. Just as the belief that American house prices could never fall fuelled the subprime lending boom, so the cult of equity pushed share prices to stratospheric levels. With values so high, future returns were bound to be low.
近年来溢价又似一落千丈。东京证券交易市场繁华不再，较之1989年的巅峰状态，现在的交易值已经降了75%；截至2011年底，美国国债年已连续十年超越了美国股市的运行。股民们对溢价的过渡沉溺很可能就是导致股市一蹶不振的原因之一，这和次贷危机的产生是一个道理：认为美国房价永远不会跌的错误概念助长了次贷抵押的热潮，从而促发悲剧。股民对股票狂热的追捧把股价推上了惊人的高度，有了如此高的市值，未来回报率也就无从高起。

Time to pay up
该清帐了
Surely, after ten fairly dismal years for stockmarkets, returns from equities should be healthier in future? Not necessarily. The key measures determining future returns are the current dividend yield and prospective dividend growth. The dividend yield is now far below its historic average and dividend growth has struggled to keep pace with GDP. Equities may offer better future returns than government bonds (which were selling off this week), but a reasonable estimate of the premium is only four percentage points a year (see article).
在连续五年的股市低潮后，未来股票回报无疑该向好处发展了吧？这可未必。未来的股票收益还取决于当下的股息收益率和未来的股息增长，而现在的股息收益率大大低于历史平均水平，股息增长也是好不容易才能跟上GDP的涨幅。较于ZF债券（已在这周低价抛售），股票收益也许更为可观，但对溢价率的合理估算也只是一年百分之四左右（见另文）。

That is a problem for savers. Many pension funds were counting on equities to keep rising, and—notwithstanding dodgy accounting which, in the public sector, is hiding some of the holes—are now in deficit as a result. The problem is widespread, but sharpest in American local-government pension funds, most of which assume that their investment portfolios will earn 8% a year and fund their schemes accordingly. They invest in a mixture of equities, Treasury bonds (which currently yield 2%) and corporate bonds (which yield 3-4%). If the risk premium is four percentage points, then equities will earn 6%, and pension funds will fall well short of their target. Those pension funds will either have to increase contributions sharply, which means raising taxes or cutting services, or reduce benefits, which may mean prolonged battles with the trade unions and in some cases may require changes in state constitutions.
对储户来说这是个大问题。许多养老基金都指望着股市增长，而现在却因为股市造成赤字。即便精明的会计们为了遮掩损失在公共账务上做尽手脚，现实还是无法改变。同样的问题还困扰着多方，最为严重的要数美国当地ZF的养老基金。大多数当地ZF养老基金对自身的投资组合都是抱着每年百分之八的预期，并以此来运作其相应的计划，而股市现状显然无法满足这一预期。他们的投资组合包括多只股票、ZF债券（现期收益约为2%）以及企业债券（收益约为3-4%）。若风险溢价为四个百分点，则股市收益仅能达6%，远达不到基金的目标。如此一来这些ZF基金为了大力弥补空缺，不是增加税务就是削减服务，或者降低福利，从而不得不拉长与工会的战线，甚至有可能导致州宪法的修正。

Companies also face a bind. Many have moved away from expensive pension promises linked to salaries and adopted schemes where the employee takes the investment risk. Even so, S&P 500 companies still have a $450 billion, or 25%, shortfall in their pension funds. In Britain the figure is £92 billion ($144 billion), or around a sixth, for FTSE 350 companies.
企业面临的状况也不乐观。许多企业取消了与工资挂钩的养老保险，改用他策，让员工自负投资风险。即便如此，标准普尔下的五百强在养老基金中的差额仍旧高达25%，总值四千伍佰亿美元；英国富时指数350强的企业的养老基金差额约为六分之一，达920亿英镑（合一千四百四十亿美元）。

Policymakers are under pressure from businesses to lengthen the period over which they must eliminate the deficit. But if they get more leeway, they risk an even bigger shortfall in later years. And if, on the other hand, companies are forced to pay up now, they could be diverting cash away from projects that might create jobs and boost the recovery.
决策者们不得不延长削减赤字的计划时间，为此他们也不得不面对来自企业方面的巨大压力。他们决策中的任何细小差错都会导致来年更大的差额。从另一方面来看，若企业立马补上这个洞，那么用于创造就业以及刺激经济复苏的资金就得减少。

Individuals who are funding their own pensions, or who are members of less generous defined-contribution schemes from their employers, also need to take note. They should save more. If they want a comfortable retirement their contributions need to be more than 20% of current salary, rather than the current average of just 10% or so.
为养老自我负责的投资者们也要注意了，其中包括采用固定缴费机制的公司的雇员们。这些人亟需做的事情便是加大储蓄。若想退休时过的潇洒一点，他们必须将养老保险增加到工资的百分之二十以上，现期百分之十左右的投入率是远不够的。

The high returns from equities in the late 20th century made investors lazy. Such returns may not come back. If employees want a decent retirement income (or if employers are to keep their promises), they must put more money aside.
二十世纪末期股票的高回报率导致了投资者的惰性，彼时的的高回报已一去不复反了。雇员们若是渴望有个潇洒的退休生活（雇主们若想能够兑现养老承诺），大家现在都必须少花点了。