The lessons the rest of the world should—and should not—take from Germany
德国给世界的经验和教训


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MUCH of the rich world is fascinated by Germany. Despite being at the heart of sclerotic Europe, its GDP per head has risen by more than any other G7 country’s over the past decade. Unemployment in the troubled euro zone is at its highest since the single currency’s birth; in Germany it is at a record low. In most rich countries manufacturing exports have been hammered by foreign competition; in Germany they remain powerful drivers of growth. No wonder hard-pressed political leaders in France, Spain, Italy and Britain are talking wistfully of becoming more like Germany.

许多经济强国都被德国而深深的折服。先暂且不论德国位于僵化的欧洲的中心，它的人均GDP在过去十年的增长幅度也比任何G7成员国的都大。现在欧元区的失业率是欧元统一后历史上最高的；而在德国，失业率却是历史的低水平。在许多经济强国的制造业出口受外国竞争负面影响的同时，德国的制造业出口却一直占经济增长很大的一部分。难怪身处困境的法国、西班牙、意大利和英国的领导人都急切的表示需要在更多方面效仿德国。

Germany’s recent success has both new and old roots. Only a decade ago, still struggling with the costs of unification, it was a basket-case. It has since bounced back to show that a high-wage country can succeed in top-end manufacturing, not least by holding down unit labour costs. The Germans have long since repaired their public finances—the budget deficit is barely 1% of GDP, public spending as a share of GDP is well below the European average and German bond yields are at record lows. Thanks mainly to the Agenda 2010 reforms begun by the Social Democrat-led government of Gerhard Schröder in 2003, Germany has liberalised many of its labour-market rules, one reason for today’s enviably low unemployment

德国近日的成功可以归根于许多现代和历史因素。仅仅十年以前，德国仍然在为统一付出的代价而苦苦挣扎，经济近乎瘫痪。但它现在又充满了活力，显示了一个高新国家也可以再简短制造业上有所成就，特别是通过降低边际劳动力成本的情况下。德国人很早就开始恢复公共财政——财政赤字仅为1%，ZF开支在GDP中所占比例远远低于欧洲平均水平并且德国的债券收益率也保持着创纪录的低水平。这一切都归功于社会民主党主席格哈德 施罗德（Gerhard Schröde）领导ZF时在2003年推行的“2010年议程”改革方案。德国将许多劳动力市场的法律放宽，这是现在德国享受令人羡慕的低失业率的原因之一。

Yet Germany’s cutting edge has an ancient blade. The country’s Mittelstand clusters of firms, which often specialise in niche areas of manufacturing, developed in the late 19th century. Impressively resilient and versatile, they have benefited from rocketing demand for high-quality capital and consumer goods in emerging markets. Germany’s corporatist Mitbestimmung model, which gives workers a say in management, has made it easier both to push through structural reforms and to hold down wages. And the German system of apprenticeships and vocational training, divided into some 350 trades, has helped keep youth unemployment lower than elsewhere in Europe (see article).

然而德国的现状也有历史原因。德国成立于19世纪晚期的中小企业集群，这些集群都专门从事制造业中对自己有利的一个领域。这些中小企业集群以惊人的有弹性的和灵活易变的优点从高质量投资和消费者对商品的猛增的需求中极大的获利。德国中小企业集群模式，给予了工人在管理层面上的发言权，这使推行结构改革和降低工资更加容易。德国为350个行业的实习生制度和职业培训制度，也在一定程度上帮助德国在青年失业率上低于欧洲其它国家。


The sincerest form of flattery

So what should Europe’s weaker countries be trying to copy? The relaxation of labour-market rules, certainly. That is beginning to happen, though as Italy has been discovering (see article), liberalising labour markets is harder in tough economic times. Germany freed up its job market when demand was strong in the rest of Europe. There is also much to be said for emphasising vocational training instead of producing more and more graduates with often useless university degrees. But many of the things that work well in Germany—its corporatism, its business clusters, its manufacturing prowess—are part of a traditional culture that would be hard, if not impossible, to transplant from one country to another.

那么欧洲经济弱国应当如何复制德国模式呢？当然是德国宽松的劳动力市场规则。德国在欧洲其他国家的需求很旺盛的时候将放了劳动力市场，虽然意大利发现在经济困难时期放宽劳动力市场更加困难，但是也逐渐在开始做。还有一点需要强调，就是德国用职业培训代替了制造一批又一批毫无意义的大学毕业生。但是，所有这一切在德国运转如此良好，包括德国的企业、商业集群、制造工艺，是他们传统文化的一部分，而这是很难从一个国家移植到另外一个国家的。

Nor should Germany’s neighbours try to import the model wholesale. Its corporatist industrial relations, for instance, help companies hold wages down, but they can also be bad for shareholders. And while the country’s manufacturing sector may be productive, its service sector is not; and services now account for some two-thirds of GDP. The financial industry is relatively unprofitable and has a record of investing in dodgy foreign assets (including rotten American mortgages). Germany’s demographic outlook is lousy. Its native population is shrinking and ageing fast, and the country does not welcome immigrants

不仅是很难，欧洲其他国家也不应该全盘引进德国模式。例如德国的企业劳资关系使企业降低工资水平，但是这却损害了股东的利益。但是国家制造业生产力很高的同时，占GDP三分之二的服务业却并不如制造业那么景气。金融产业的盈利能力也相对不高并且也投资危险的外国资产（包括美国不良的抵押贷款）。德国人口的愿景也不容客观：德国原生人口正在急剧下降并且老龄化，而且德国也不欢迎外国移民。

Above all, the country’s hair-shirt philosophy that favours austerity over growth, saving over spending, and foreign over domestic demand has often been damaging. It has held down Germans’ living standards (despite faster growth, personal consumption has risen by less than in the rest of Europe over the past decade). And it has been catastrophic for the rest of the euro zone as Germany has acted, in effect, as a drag on demand. Investors who sold off Spanish and Italian bonds this week were worried as much about the effects of excessive austerity as about public-debt levels (see article). Germany’s reliance on exports has led to huge current-account surpluses that have been matched by deficits elsewhere, a big contributor to the euro crisis.

最重要的是，德国的节俭主义哲学就是喜欢节俭甚过浪费，节省开支，超过国内的国外需求就会被遏制。这种哲学降低了德国人的生活水平（除去快速增长，个人消费近十年的增长低于欧洲其他国家水平）。这对于欧元区其他国家来说却是灾难，因为德国这样做导致了需求水平的下降。这一周将手中的西班牙和意大利债券抛售的投资者们对这种紧缩需求的担心与对公债水平的担心相比，有过之而无不及。德国对出口的以来也导致了经常项目上的巨大顺差，相应的导致了其它国家的赤字，这是欧洲危机的一大原因。

German policymakers who urge only austerity and wage restraint on the rest of Europe forget that the goal of growth is to raise personal incomes (and spending), and that the real benefit from higher exports is to pay for more imports. The rest of Europe would do well to copy the best features of the German model. But Germany too should learn from its partners about the importance of raising and sustaining domestic demand. Then everybody would be better off.

德国的那些赞同紧缩和限制欧洲其他国家工资水平的的政策制定者们忘记了增长的目标之一即使提高个人收入（包括支出），高出口的真正益处在于高进口。欧洲其他国家应该复制德国模式中的有益的一面。但是德国也需要想它的伙伴学习提高和保持国内需求的重要性。这样，所有人都会更好。