我的几点看法：
1. 美联储的QE和欧洲央行购买大量欧洲国家债券的公开市场操作（我听到的版本是欧洲央行向欧洲本地银行海量收购金猪五国的债券），是两个目的不同的行为。 美国和欧洲面临不同的问题。美国已经过了最危险的阶段，美国国债需求从来没有跌过，事实上标普下调美国国债评级以后收益率居然还降了，QE目的是刺激本土制造业和创业投资，以拉动经济回升，从而带来就业，就业就业就业，这是QE的主题，这是最简单最教科书的货币政策，利用美元无耻的世界货币地位，来减缓债务，实现通胀和就业。欧洲就苦逼了，他们的银行摇摇欲坠，如果我的养老基金经理和我说他打算买点西班牙，或者希腊，或者爱尔兰的国债，我会宰了他的。金猪五国别说什么刺激投资了，他们的融资成本高的离谱，失业率高到经济学家都懒得来谈论它了，欧洲央行是定向的海量买国债，以保证这五头猪的国债收益不会通天了，欧洲现在就是莱曼兄弟倒闭后的美国，国家都要倒闭了，先稳定住全世界人民对欧洲的信心是关键。要保证五个国家，主权信用不能倒闭（希腊估计不行了），要保证持有大量欧债多头的银行（德银，瑞银）能通过Solvency II，要保证要命的养老基金不破产，这是欧洲央行的目的，所以他是有目的的收购五个国家债券的，不是广义上发放欧元（虽然也的确导致了欧元供给上升）。欧洲央行的行为配合着政治上五头猪财政改革的进程，控制在德法手上的欧洲央行是强迫金猪五国接受财政改革的筹码。悲伤的是，欧元在全球范围内的储备不够，所以欧洲的债务是不会随着欧元超发而自动降低的（美帝就不同了，中国外汇的缩水就是他们的幸福），所以欧洲央行要组建那个欧洲金融稳定基金，求爷爷求奶奶的要中国，日本去购买。一个为了就业，一个为了五头猪不倒闭，这是关键区别。
2.职员的薪酬是股东说了算的，但是，是由就业市场决定的。让我们来看看华尔街的就业市场，高盛半年财报据说亏损20%，但是光头布朗查德还是拿着大把把的money，这到底是为甚么？！首先，投资银行业的薪酬是没有下降的，已经回复金融危机前的水平，但是利润率下降了？怎么办呢，裁员，是的，裁员，或许我们不该盯着那几个CEO，渣打，花旗，摩根的欧美业务都快裁得只剩孕妇了，进一步的你该知道，更多更多的中小投行都倒闭了，全部雇员遣散了，这是投资银行就业市场的全貌，你所希望的实实在在发生着，经济定律也在发挥作用，媒体不来报道而已。那些CEO是特例，他们一直就高得离谱，你不得不承认投资银行是人脉行业，那些CEO的就业市场和普通雇员是隔离的，光头布朗查德在金融危机之后去见巴菲特要钱，居然要到了，稳住了高盛的股价，这就是人脉，利润率下降，行业不景气，没关系，边际成本等于边际收入，你不雇佣布朗查德我无所谓，但高盛的股东会亏损得更多
3.巴塞尔三的细节我一无所知，我本人是个精算师，对养老金的行业标准是Solvency II，也是金融危机之后出来的监管条例，之前版本自然是 Solvency I。Solvency II出来以后所有在市场上有点名头的哥们都跳出来说，好牛逼啊好牛逼，好碉堡啊好碉堡，但是这其中有很多细节，比如资本充足率里，核心资本的定义，比如资本缓冲率的计算，允许各大养老基金采用内部的模型，再比如那永远都数不完的表外资产。让我们来读读历史，巴塞尔二是怎么来的，互联网泡沫之后和东南亚金融危机之后，02年推出的巴塞尔二（实际筹备工作98年就开始了），　“与1988年资本协议相比，新资本协议的内容更广、更复杂。这是因为新协议力求把资本充足率与银行面临的主要风险紧密地结合在一起，力求反映银行风险管理、监管实践的最新变化，并尽量为发展水平不同的银行业和银行监管体系提供多项选择办法。巴塞尔委员会彻底修改资本协议的工作是从1998年开始的。1999年6月，巴塞尔委员会提出了以三大支柱——资本充足率、监管部门监督检查和市场纪律为主要特点的新资本监管框架草案第一稿，并广泛征求有关方面的意见”
眼熟吧，现在这一切又开始了，更广更复杂，把资本充足率和银行风险更更更更加紧密结合的巴塞尔协议第三季就要来了，现在开始广泛的征求意见咯，亲。我没有质疑协议制定者专业能力的意思，他们所提出的新的资本充足率“银行的核心资本充足率将由目前的4%上调到6%，同时计提2.5%的防护缓冲资本和不高于2.5%的反周期准备资本”肯定是基于反复推敲的假设和专业化的设计的，但这不是关键。之所以引起这么多的讨论是因为，这一假设对银行赢利有直接影响，考虑到杠杆率，这意味着银行得损失很多本来能赚钱的资本，而且这一数字本身很容易引起争论，很多细节假设可以修改（你知道，那些大的原则从来没人反驳的，而算出来的数字就容易攻击多了）。来，回忆一下金融危机，莱曼，AIG是因为没有足够的风险边际而隔屁的吗？开玩笑，当时莱曼大多数资本都是表外的信用违约掉期，压根和上一期的4%无关，不加入计算，AIG的风险头寸因为评级机构科幻小说般的全A评级，怎么算都是合规的，是的，和那些数字无关，怎么执行才是关键。事实上，如果标普把所有垃圾债券都评成AAA, 那什么资本充足率根本是浮云，当金融市场坍塌的时候，多出个4%的现金持有有个屁用。

楼上很热心

文章一会儿看，先看了7楼的回帖，哥们儿很热心，我也想说两句。。。
我感觉核心资本率之类的东西对银行还是有帮助的，其实这一部分主要是防范Liquidity Risk，对于solvency之类的问题，只要爆发，一般无解。CDS这种看着没几个钱的投资，背后是巨大的notional value和 MTM 的结算方式，也就是说这一类的投资表外部分完全不可预测。你知道是CDS，还是CDS的N次方呢。我觉得Basel III对这方面的风险暴露的系数应该再加压力。对VaR的压力也应该提到99.99%。问题是，压力严了，银行怎么赚钱。至于评级么，都是针对基础资产的，对衍生品的杠杆效应，有谁做过。7楼说的梦幻般的全A级，你说风险怎么样，我觉得风险并不大。至少惠誉针对3年前的，A的置信度应该在1%左右。问题就出在他们是衍生品。好吧，一会儿看了帖子说点跟帖子有关的。

衍生品不能评级吗，我见过文章说 CDS打包再打包以后，分branch怎么评级的，不知道市场上怎么用；VaR提到99.99%很多银行要挂吧，花旗这波就挂了，我觉得多测试，测试不通过予以警戒比较重要；银行肯定会在资本充足率上和监管者死磕的，多少银子啊

Banks are holding large amount of capital searching for profit. The traditional save and lend cannot satisfy those bankers' appetite. So the capital began to go to high-yield field via investment banks. The loss starts when the economy goes down and when the structure of those financial products goes beyond control. In China, banking is still one of the top profitable industries. But how the risk monitoring and relative regulations are developing?

The not-for-profit sector
非营利行业

NARY a cucumber sandwich was thrown and the heckling was rather subdued. But the genteel rebellion over executive pay at the Barclays shareholders’ meeting in London last month, an echo of similar disquiet at annual meetings in America (see article), shows how fed up bank investors have become with their returns.
连一个青瓜三明治都没被扔掷，诘问也被相当地抑制了。但上个月在伦敦举行的巴克莱银行股东会议上有节制地对高管薪酬的反对--美国年度会议上的类似不安的回声--表明银行投资者对他们的回报是有多么的不满。
No wonder. Between 2007 and the end of last year shareholders in banks globally have lost almost 10% of their investment each year, according to the Boston Consulting Group (see chart 1). Behind this international average lie some truly horrible losses. Investors who stuck it out in Dutch banks saw the value of their holdings fall by almost 28% a year. Holders of French, German and Swiss banks suffered average annual losses of close to 20%. Those in American and British banks lost 14% and 16% a year respectively. “The little secret to doing well…has been ‘just don’t hold banks’,” says Jacob de Tusch-Lec, a fund manager at Artemis.
不足为奇。根据波士顿咨询公司数据， 从2007年到去年年底，全球银行股东每年损失大约10%的投资（见表一）。除此之外，国际平均收益展现了一些真正的可怕的损失。荷兰银行的坚定投资者所持股份的价值每年大约贬值28%。法国、德国和瑞士的银行持股人平均每年遭受接近20%的损失。美国和英国银行分别损失14%和16%。“怎样做好的小秘密就是...‘别持银行股票就对了’”。Artemis的基金管理人 Jacob de Tusch-Lec说。
A fall in the price of an asset is usually a good signal to consider buying it. But those investors who thought that they had timed the bottom of the market have been proved wrong again and again. “I’ve been dipping in and out of Italian banks but am keeping very quiet about it,” says one fund manager. “Last year when I told an investor [in my fund] that I was holding some he got up and left the room.”
一种资产价格的下跌通常是考虑购买的一个好的信号。但那些认为成功瞄准市场谷底的投资者被一次又一次证明是错的。“我买进卖出意大利银行股票，但我对此缄默不言”，一位基金管理人说。“去年当我告诉一个投资者（在我的基金里）我持有一些（银行股票）时，他站起来离开了房间。”
Such sharp falls in shareholder value are not just distressing for investors. They should also worry the businesses and households that need a healthy banking system to keep credit flowing. If the shares and debt issued by banks are uninvestible, then over time the banking system will have to shrink or be nationalised.
股东利益如此暴跌不仅对投资者来说是种悲痛，那些需要一个健康的银行系统来维持信贷流动的商业和家庭也对此感到担忧。如果银行发行的股份和债券是不可投资的，那么随着时间的推移，银行系统必将萎缩或者国有化。
There are three reasons why the banks have been such a bad bet. The first is weakness in Western economies, which has led to elevated losses, subdued demand for credit and deleveraging by the banks themselves. With returns on assets remaining largely unchanged (this is a tough time to charge customers more), the industry’s total profits are likely to keep falling.
有三个原因导致银行成为坏的赌注。首先是西方经济的疲软，这导致了亏损上升、贷款需求减缓以及银行自身的减债。由于资产收益很大程度上是不变的（这是一个向消费者要更高价的艰难时期），整个行业的总体利润可能继续下滑。
A second reason is worries about sovereign defaults. In the second half of last year European banks sold virtually none of the long-term bonds that they use, alongside deposits, to finance loans. These markets have thawed slightly since the European Central Bank (ECB) provided more than 1 trillion Euro ($1.3 trillion) in three-year loans to European banks. But they are still fragile, partly because banks have pledged collateral to the ECB, leaving less to repay bondholders if a bank were to go bust. Simon Samuels, an analyst at Barclays, points out that almost five years since the start of the financial crisis, European banks are more dependent on state support than ever. “What we have, in effect, is nationalisation via the debt markets,” he says. “If you can’t get a private-sector debt model to work then there is no real investible equity.”
第二个原因是对主权违约的担忧。去年的下半年，欧洲银行事实上没有售出任何长期债券，这些债券和存款一道，被用于吸收贷款。市场从欧洲中央银行向欧洲各银行提供超过1万亿欧元（1.3万亿美元）的三年期贷款以后，得到了适度的缓解。但它们（银行）仍然很脆弱，部分原因在于各银行对欧洲央行质押担保，使得如果银行破产的话，留给股东的资产更少了。巴克莱银行分析师塞蒙•萨缪尔指出，金融危机开始后的大约五年时间后，欧洲的银行比任何时候对国家支持都更依赖。“实际上，我们在做的是通过债务市场使之（银行）国有化”，他说，“如果你无法获得一个可行的私营部门债务模型，那么没有股票是真正值得投资的。”
The weak economy and worries over the euro area are, with some luck, transient problems. Yet weighing on investors’ minds is a third concern: the impact that regulation will have on banks’ long-term profitability and the safety of their debt. Returns on equity have fallen precipitously, from about 15% before the crisis to below 10% now. British banks’ returns have slipped from almost 20% to about 5% last year (see chart 2).
经济低迷以及对欧元区的担忧，如果幸运的话，只是暂时性的问题。然而使投资者心烦意乱的是第三个原因：监管对银行长期盈利性和债务安全性的影响。权益回报率急剧下滑，从危机前15%到现在的低于10%。去年英国银行回报率从大约20%下滑到5%左右。（见表二）
A big reason is that banks have to hold much more equity as a buffer against losses. Simple arithmetics dictates that returns must fall. Other regulations to make banks safer also have a cost. Banks will have to hold many more liquid assets, which can be quickly sold. They are also being forced to stop profitable (if risky) activities such as proprietary trading.
一个重要的原因是，银行必须持有更多的权益作为对抗亏损的缓冲区。简单的算术就知道回报必定下降。其他是银行更安全的监管同样是有代价的。银行将必须持有更多的可以快速出售的流动资产。银行还被迫停止盈利性行为（如果是有风险的），比如自营交易。
Rules aimed at ring-fencing retail banks, “bailing in” bondholders and making banks easier to wind up if they fail are also pushing up banks’ funding costs and depressing returns. They are doing little to encourage investors to buy bank bonds. “If regulators told European banks to raise bail-in debt there would be a resounding clatter of pennies at the bottom of the tin but no folding money at all,” says the chairman of a large bank.
规定旨在用“围栅法”防护商业零售银行和bailing in股票持有者，以及使银行更易结束如果它们失败的话。这些规定也推升了银行集资成本并压制了回报。他们没做什么举措去鼓励投资者购买银行股票。“如果监管者告诉欧洲银行提高自救负债，那里会有响亮的硬币的响声从罐头的底部发出来，但一张纸币都没有”，一个大银行的主席这样说。
For all the gloom, most big banks are still forecasting (or at least aiming for) returns on equity of 12-15%, which would handily cover the cost of their capital. That would also be respectable by historical standards: Autonomous Research reckons that over the long term banks’ returns have averaged 10% in Britain and 9% in America. But it invites two questions.
对这些阴暗面，大部分大银行仍然将股票收益率预测（或者至少目标是）在可以方便地支付资金成本的12-15%。这从历史性标准来看也是具有相当数量的：“Autonomous Research测算英国长期银行回报平均在10%，美国在9%。但这导致两个问题。

The first is whether banks can attract investors with a combination of utility-like returns and bank-like volatility. Regulators hope better-capitalised banks will be less volatile and more attractive. More pragmatically, index-tracking investors may have little choice but to hold them.
第一，银行是否可以利用实用型的回报率和银行型的波动率相结合的方式来吸引投资者。监管者希望资金雄厚的银行能少点波动性、更有吸引力。更务实地说，追踪指数表现的投资者没有选择，除了持有它们。
The second is whether banks can juice their returns by managing costs better. There is plenty of room to do so, particularly in wholesale banking. The Boston Consulting Group reckons that investment banks can quickly cut 10-15% of fat in areas such as market data and exchange fees. Deeper savings can be made by reducing layers of management and title creep: it found that almost half of the staff in second-tier investment banks had the title of director or managing director compared with 20-30% among the better firms.
第二，银行是否可以通过更好地管理成本来增加回报。这里有很大的空间可以做，特别是批发银行业务。波士顿咨询集团估计投资银行可以快速在诸如市场数据和兑换费用这些领域削减10-15%的成本。更进一步的节约可以通过减少管理层级和头衔的怪现象来做到：二级投资银行接近一半的员工拥有经理或总经理的头衔，与之相比，更好的公司只有20-30%。
But banks do not have a great record as beancounters. European lenders have managed to reduce their overall cost-to-income ratio only to about 62% from 69% since the mid-1990s, an average improvement of 0.3% a year. Their current targets assume an average improvement of 2.7% a year over the next three years, a figure Mr Samuels thinks looks “far too ambitious”. To keep shareholders and creditors interested, they may have little choice.
但银行不是缺乏远见的官僚。欧洲银行从90年代中期开始，成功以平均每年0.3%的速度将总成本/收入比率从69%削减到62%。目前的目标是未来三年以平均每年2.7%的速度削减，萨缪尔先生认为这是一个“太过雄心”的数字。但为了使股东和债权人感兴趣，他们别无选择

哇，厉害，楼主，你靠这个就可以吃饭了，工作没问题了

看看

1. increase sales revenue
2. decrease cost
3. keep more funds
4. enhance confidence
That's panacea in recessions.

好的 谢谢！

NPE, interest.