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中国经济发展的动力
read2010
14808 71
2012-11-15
一个国家的经济发展动力有出口（外需）、投资和消费（内需），中国自改革开放依赖主要的动力是出口和投资，而消费相对不足为民众所诟病，这里隐含了背后的分配问题，腐败和贫富分化是民众不满的核心。

每个国家都有自己独特的国情，所以不能完全照套其他国家的发展经验。中国当前的发展动力有中央集权和人口红利，这两个基点支撑了中国的出口和投资，由中央集权支撑的工业体系、国有企业、计划生育、国家产权（土地、矿产等诸多资源都归国家所有）和基础建设，这些成为近30年中国发展的核心推动力；同时还有人口红利，这种人口红利是相对于全球化而言的，如果没有全球化，人口暴增只能对一个国家产生不稳定和灾难，即使在全球化格局下，如果一个国家在全球竞争中没有抢占到足够的发展机遇的话，人口红利会变成人口负担，中国是一个巨体量的国家，这种体量使得中国哪怕以很低水平的人均水平对世界的影响也是惊人的，关键在于中国的人口和中央集权紧密结合的，中央集权推动了教育（扫盲）和卫生，使得中国在全球化的产业转移中具有竞争优势，印度缺乏足够的中央集权，使得印度在教育和卫生方面不能改善人口素质，也就是中国虽然在人均水平上任显不足，但是在整体上还是改善了人口素质，这是在解放后至改革开放时国家奠定的基础，这已经成为中国开放以后发展的基础面。


中央集权是中国目前经济发展的优势，但有利必有弊，中央集权或许对国家创新有一些不利的影响，同时还有分配问题，这些都会由中央集权支生出来隐疾，而当出口和投资达到极限的时候，则是由消费来拉动经济发展，而内需对应的是创新和分配问题，也就是产业升级和福利制度。

就出口而言，中国似乎已经触碰到某种瓶颈，发达国家市场开始萎缩，但是由于中国的政治扩张，中国在广大的亚非拉推进市场扩张，因而现在的出口仍然在增长，但是这个增长还是有极限的，发展中国家市场已经成为中国的新奶酪。

投资仍然是未来中国一二十年发展的核心支柱，因为中国的城市化还有相当大的空间，中国目前的城镇化率刚好超过50%，这个数据应该是显性的，如果考虑到隐形的数据，可能已经高达65%，而达到实质90%的城市化正是中国未来的发展空间，这是内生的发展空间，可以填补出口瓶颈，投资和城市化对应了后面的基础建设、商业化（第三产业就业）和农业工业化。而投资的潜力正是建立在中央集权基础之上的，很多国家在此不同于中国，事实上整个东亚经济体的发展都有极强的集权性，这也是东亚地区经济发展超越其他后发国家的关键。
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read2010
2012-11-15 23:57:49
目前中国的高速发展类似于苏联前期的发展，这里都体现了集权的优势性，但这是国家发展某一历史阶段的需要，而苏联由于理论的束缚，难以在国家发展到一定水平时需要自我变革时难以自我超越，在此中国又不同于苏联，中国引入了市场经济，这样从内在摆脱了苏联那种疾患。

创新和商业具有很强的相关性，中国的中央集权和计划经济有高度的自然契合，在中国追赶发达国家时，中央集权会是中国的优势，但是当中国需要依靠自己的创新能力来推动自身经济发展时，甚至推动人类文明发展时，可能中央集权会显现出体系上的弊端出来，这里并非否定中国人的创新能力，只是对由于中央集权和计划经济的影响使得中国的国家创新存在瓶颈产生隐忧，这里隐含了未来中国的又一次变革的可能性，在政治大一统和生态多样性上要有平衡。

分配制度的变革是推动消费的关键，欧洲、美国和日本的福利制度将是中国福利制度的学习基础，当然中国要在他们的经验基础上按照中国的国情进行改造，但是发达国家的福利理念对于中国应该是最核心的，此外还有腐败治理，而腐败治理背后有中央集权这个特殊国情，这里需要中国有超越先发国家的政治创新。但是不管是福利还是腐败，其背后都涉及到国家产权这个模糊的产权，当前国家产权更多被中央集权垄断，在官民之间有诸多矛盾，这里需要制度创新来均衡彼此的矛盾，很多经济问题其实都是由此支生的，国家资源和国有企业都是支生于国家产权基础之上的，从理论、到制度、到执行需要一系列的理论创新来解决现实问题。国家产权表面上很明晰简单，但是由于牵涉太多利益主体，而主体之间的利益分配使得共有产权产生的利益矛盾引发各种冲突，如何实现均衡同时又不影响国家发展动力，这需要政治智慧和理论创新能力。

中国未来十年的发展动力还是无虞的，但是十年之后，创新、产业升级、分配等问题将会决定中国，这些问题不能解决，内需将会陷入瓶颈，无法真正成为经济发展动力。
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read2010
2012-11-16 00:03:52
  Broken BRICs   （毁了的“金砖四国）”（转载）

全球经济中提到最多的趋势是所谓的“其它国家”的崛起。过去的几年见证了许多发展中国家经济迅速接近发达国家水平。此现象背后最重要的动力来自四个主要的新兴市场国家，即“金砖四国”。

Why the Rest Stopped Rising
By Ruchir Sharma
November/December 2012

为何“其它国家”停止增长？

Over the past several years, the most talked-about trend in the global economy has been the so-called rise of the rest, which saw the economies of many developing countries swiftly converging with those of their more developed peers. The primary engines behind this phenomenon were the four major emerging-market countries, known as the BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The world was witnessing a once-in-a-lifetime shift, the argument went, in which the major players in the developing world were catching up to or even surpassing their counterparts in the developed world.

全球经济中提到最多的趋势是所谓的“其它国家”的崛起。过去的几年见证了许多发展中国家经济迅速接近发达国家水平。此现象背后最重要的动力来自四个主要的新兴市场国家，即“金砖四国”：巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国。世界见证着一生一次的转变，持这种主张的人说：主要的发展中国家正在赶超主要的发达国家。

These forecasts typically took the developing world's high growth rates from the middle of the last decade and extended them straight into the future, juxtaposing them against predicted sluggish growth in the United States and other advanced industrial countries. Such exercises supposedly proved that, for example, China was on the verge of overtaking the United States as the world's largest economy-a point that Americans clearly took to heart, as over 50 percent of them, according to a Gallup poll conducted this year, said they think that China is already the world's "leading" economy, even though the U.S. economy is still more than twice as large (and with a per capita income seven times as high).

这些经济预测通常假设2005年左右发展中国家的高增长率会延续到将来。与之相并列的是预言美国和其它先进工业国增长疲缓。据说有例子可以证明。中国快要夺走美国最大经济体的宝座。这点美国人记住了--据今年的一次盖普洛民意调查，超过一半的美国人认为（中国已经是世界“最大”经济体），即使美国经济规模比前者的两倍还多（且美国人均收入是中国的七倍）。

As with previous straight-line projections of economic trends, however-such as forecasts in the 1980s that Japan would soon be number one economically-later returns are throwing cold water on the extravagant predictions. With the world economy heading for its worst year since 2009, Chinese growth is slowing sharply, from double digits down to seven percent or even less. And the rest of the BRICs are tumbling, too: since 2008, Brazil's annual growth has dropped from 4.5 percent to two percent; Russia's, from seven percent to 3.5 percent; and India's, from nine percent to six percent.

然而，正如过去的那些对经济趋势的直线投射（译注：指上文中，将当前增长率直接用于预测未来发展），例如八十年代有人预言日本将不久成为世界经济第一，后来的结果给那些夸张的预测浇一盆冷水。在世界经济处于自2009年以来最坏的一个年头，中国经济增长突然放缓，增长率从两位数降到7%或甚至更少。剩下的金砖三国也不好过：从2008年巴西年增长从4.5%降到2%；俄罗斯从7%跌至3.5%；印度则从9%落到6%。






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read2010
2012-11-16 00:05:15
None of this should be surprising, because it is hard to sustain rapid growth for more than a decade. The unusual circumstances of the last decade made it look easy: coming off the crisis-ridden 1990s and fueled by a global flood of easy money, the emerging markets took off in a mass upward swing that made virtually every economy a winner. By 2007, when only three countries in the world suffered negative growth, recessions had all but disappeared from the international scene. But now, there is a lot less foreign money flowing into emerging markets. The global economy is returning to its normal state of churn, with many laggards and just a few winners rising in unexpected places. The implications of this shift are striking, because economic momentum is power, and thus the flow of money to rising stars will reshape the global balance of power.

这并不奇怪，因为很难在十多年间保持经济高速增长。过去十年不寻常的环境使郑州看起来简单：新兴市场从危机四伏的九十年代脱身，又收到全球巨额热钱的刺激。它们一下子集体高速增长，让每个经济体好像都是赢家。至2007年，全球只有三个国家经济负增长，萧条几乎从国际视野消失。而今，流入新兴市场的外汇大大减少。全球经济被打回原形，重回一团浆糊。大多数国家经济放缓，只有少数几个赢家出现在意想不到的地方。这种转变的含义引人注目，因为经济动力意味着权力，所以资金流向崛起的明星国家将重塑全球权力平衡格局。

FOREVER EMERGING

永远的新兴国家

The notion of wide-ranging convergence between the developing and the developed worlds is a myth. Of the roughly 180 countries in the world tracked by the International Monetary Fund, only 35 are developed. The markets of the rest are emerging-and most of them have been emerging for many decades and will continue to do so for many more. The Harvard economist Dani Rodrik captures this reality well. He has shown that before 2000, the performance of the emerging markets as a whole did not converge with that of the developed world at all. In fact, the per capita income gap between the advanced and the developing economies steadily widened from 1950 until 2000. There were a few pockets of countries that did catch up with the West, but they were limited to oil states in the Gulf, the nations of southern Europe after World War II, and the economic "tigers" of East Asia. It was only after 2000 that the emerging markets as a whole started to catch up; nevertheless, as of 2011, the difference in per capita incomes between the rich and the developing nations was back to where it was in the 1950s.

发达国家和发展中国家广泛的趋同是一个遥不可及的神话。在国际货币基金组织记录在案的大约180个国家中，只有35个是发达国家，其余的都是新兴市场，他们中大部分都已经“新兴”了几十年了，并且会一直”新兴“下去。哈佛经济学家 Dani Rodrik 敏锐的发现了这个现象。他指出，在2000年前，新兴市场整体表现完全达不到发达国家的水平。事实上， 从1950年到2000年 ，发展中国家和发达国家的人均收入差距一直在稳步扩大。期间有少部分达到了西方的水平，但是他们仅限于海湾地区的石油国家，二战后的南欧国家和亚洲的四小龙，而且，直到2000年后，新兴市场作为一个整体才开始迎头赶上。然而，截至2011年，发达国家和发展中国家的人均收入差距又重新回到上世纪50年代的水平。

This is not a negative read on emerging markets so much as it is simple historical reality. Over the course of any given decade since 1950, on average, only a third of the emerging markets have been able to grow at an annual rate of five percent or more. Less than one-fourth have kept up that pace for two decades, and one-tenth, for three decades. Only Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Hong Kong have maintained this growth rate for four decades. So even before the current signs of a slowdown in the BRICs, the odds were against Brazil experiencing a full decade of growth above five percent, or Russia, its second in a row.

这与其说是对新兴市场的消极解读，不如说是一个简单的历史事实。1950年以来任意十年中， 平均只有三分之一的新兴市场年增长率达到5%及以上。 能保持这个增长速度达20年 的不到四分之一，达到30年的不到十分之一，只有马来西亚，新加坡，韩国，台湾，泰国以及香港保持这个速度增长了四十年。所以，即使在金砖四国经济呈现放缓迹象之前，巴西能连续十年保持平均年增长5%以上的机会也不大。同理，俄罗斯能连续两个十年保持年增长5%以上的机会也十分渺茫。

Meanwhile, scores of emerging markets have failed to gain any momentum for sustained growth, and still others have seen their progress stall after reaching middle-income status. Malaysia and Thailand appeared to be on course to emerge as rich countries until crony capitalism, excessive debts, and overpriced currencies caused the Asian financial meltdown of 1997-98. Their growth has disappointed ever since. In the late 1960s, Burma (now officially called Myanmar), the Philippines, and Sri Lanka were billed as the next Asian tigers, only to falter badly well before they could even reach the middle-class average income of about $5,000 in current dollar terms. Failure to sustain growth has been the general rule, and that rule is likely to reassert itself in the coming decade.

同时，许多新兴市场无力支撑经济增长的势头，其中一部分在达到中等收入水平后，经济进入停滞状态。之前马来西亚和泰国似乎有望成为发达国家，直至权贵资本主义、过度的债务以及过高的货币导致1997-98年的亚洲金融危机。从那以后，他们的经济增长令人失望。在60年代后期，缅甸，菲律宾和斯里兰卡被誉为下一批亚洲老虎，但尚未达到人均5千美元（今天的价值）这一中等收入水平就止步不前。难以维持经济持续增长已经成为通用的规律，这个规律可能在未来十年再一次体现出来。

In the opening decade of the twenty-first century, emerging markets became such a celebrated pillar of the global economy that it is easy to forget how new the concept of emerging markets is in the financial world. The first coming of the emerging markets dates to the mid-1980s, when Wall Street started tracking them as a distinct asset class. Initially labeled as "exotic," many emerging-market countries were then opening up their stock markets to foreigners for the first time: Taiwan opened its up in 1991; India, in 1992; South Korea, in 1993; and Russia, in 1995. Foreign investors rushed in, unleashing a 600 percent boom in emerging-market stock prices (measured in dollar terms) between 1987 and 1994. Over this period, the amount of money invested in emerging markets rose from less than one percent to nearly eight percent of the global stock-market total.

在二十一世纪开始的十年里，新兴市场成为全球经济重要的支柱，这让人很容易忽视“新兴市场”是一个全新的概念。新兴市场首次出现要追溯到1980年代中期，当时华尔街把它们作为一个独立的资产类别。一开始贴上的标签是＂新奇＂，很多新兴市场是首次对外开放股票市场：台湾于1991年开放，印度是1992年，韩国是1993年，俄罗斯是1995年。外国投资者的大量涌入，引发了1987-1994年新兴市场股票价格600%的增长（以美元计算）。在此期间，投入新兴市场的资金从最初低于全球股市总和的1%上升到近8%。



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read2010
2012-11-16 00:06:00
This phase ended with the economic crises that struck from Mexico to Turkey between 1994 and 2002. The stock markets of developing countries lost almost half their value and shrank to four percent of the global total. From 1987 to 2002, developing countries' share of global GDP actually fell, from 23 percent to 20 percent. The exception was China, which saw its share double, to 4.5 percent. The story of the hot emerging markets, in other words, was really about one country.

这个阶段结束于1994-2002年从墨西哥至土耳其的经济危机。发展中国家的股市市值损失了近一半，降至全球总量的4%。1987至2002年间，发展中国家占全球GDP总值的份额从23%下降至20%。中国是个例外，其市场份额翻倍，达到4.5%。关于新兴市场火热的故事，换句话说，只表现在一个国家。

The second coming began with the global boom in 2003, when emerging markets really started to take off as a group. Their share of global GDP began a rapid climb, from 20 percent to the 34 percent that they represent today (attributable in part to the rising value of their currencies), and their share of the global stock-market total rose from less than four percent to more than ten percent. The huge losses suffered during the global financial crash of 2008 were mostly recovered in 2009, but since then, it has been slow going.

第二个繁荣期始于2003年，新兴市场作为一个整体开始腾飞。他们在全球GDP中份额迅速攀升，从20%升至现在的34%（部分由于本国货币价值的上升），所占全球股市总值从低于4%上升至高于10%。
在2008年全球金融危机中蒙受巨大损失，虽然在2009年大部分新兴市场得到恢复，但至此之后，经济发展一直处于缓慢状态。


The third coming, an era that will be defined by moderate growth in the developing world, the return of the boom-bust cycle, and the breakup of herd behavior on the part of emerging-market countries, is just beginning. Without the easy money and the blue-sky optimism that fueled investment in the last decade, the stock markets of developing countries are likely to deliver more measured and uneven returns. Gains that averaged 37 percent a year between 2003 and 2007 are likely to slow to, at best, ten percent over the coming decade, as earnings growth and exchange-rate values in large emerging markets have limited scope for additional improvement after last decade's strong performance.

第三个时期才刚开始，其特点为：发展中世界的温和增长、再现繁荣与萧条的交替轮回、以及新兴市场国家羊群效应的崩溃。过去十年里推动投资热潮的宽松货币政策和盲目的乐观情绪已经不存在了，发展中国家股市的回报收益可能会表现得更为谨慎和不均。在最好的情况下，2003-2007年37%的平均年收益在未来十年将放慢到10%，在过去十年经济的强劲表现之后，新兴市场的收入增长和汇率值将会遏制其进一步的发展。

PAST ITS SELL-BY DATE

超过了“保质期”

No idea has done more to muddle thinking about the global economy than that of the BRICs. Other than being the largest economies in their respective regions, the big four emerging markets never had much in common. They generate growth in different and often competing ways-Brazil and Russia, for example, are major energy producers that benefit from high energy prices, whereas India, as a major energy consumer, suffers from them. Except in highly unusual circumstances, such as those of the last decade, they are unlikely to grow in unison. China apart, they have limited trade ties with one another, and they have few political or foreign policy interests in common.

在世界经济理论中，没有比金砖四国概念更能混淆视听的了。除了各自是本地区的最大经济体外，这四个大的新兴市场没有更多的共同点。他们通过不同甚至相互竞争的方式促进经济增长，例如：巴西和俄罗斯，作为主要的能源生产国受益于高昂的能源价格，而印度作为主要的能源消费国则因此受损。除了像过去十年那样的非凡情形，它们不大可能会共同增长。除开中国，其它国家之间的贸易联系相当有限，而在政治和外交政策上，金砖四国也几乎没有共同利益。

A problem with thinking in acronyms is that once one catches on, it tends to lock analysts into a worldview that may soon be outdated. In recent years, Russia's economy and stock market have been among the weakest of the emerging markets, dominated by an oil-rich class of billionaires whose assets equal 20 percent of GDP, by far the largest share held by the superrich in any major economy. Although deeply out of balance, Russia remains a member of the BRICs, if only because the term sounds better with an R. Whether or not pundits continue using the acronym, sensible analysts and investors need to stay flexible; historically, flashy countries that grow at five percent or more for a decade -- such as Venezuela in the 1950s, Pakistan in the 1960s, or Iraq in the 1970s -- are usually tripped up by one threat or another (war, financial crisis, complacency, bad leadership) before they can post a second decade of strong growth.

使用首写字母缩简词思考问题的缺陷在于，一旦这个缩写词流行起来，它倾向于将分析师们锁定在一个或许会很快过时的世界观里。近年来，俄罗斯的经济和股市作为新兴市场中最薄弱的部分，被资产占GDP20%的石油亿万富豪阶层所控制，这也是迄今为止所有主要经济体中超级富豪持有的最大份额。尽管极度不平衡，俄罗斯仍然作为金砖四国的成员之一，或许仅仅是因为加上一个“R”听起来更好罢了。无论专家们是否继续使用BRlCs一词，明智的分析师何投资者也需要保持灵活；从历史上看，增长率保持在5%及以上长达十年的光鲜国家（例如50年代的委内瑞拉、60年代的巴基斯坦和70年代的伊拉克）通常在第二个强劲增长的十年到来之前，由于这样或那样的威胁（战争、金融危机、自满、糟糕的领导阶层）而导致经济增长受阻。

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read2010
2012-11-16 00:07:01
The current fad in economic forecasting is to project so far into the future that no one will be around to hold you accountable. This approach looks back to, say, the seventeenth century, when China and India accounted for perhaps half of global GDP, and then forward to a coming "Asian century," in which such preeminence is reasserted. In fact, the longest period over which one can find clear patterns in the global economic cycle is around a decade. The typical business cycle lasts about five years, from the bottom of one downturn to the bottom of the next, and most practical investors limit their perspectives to one or two business cycles. Beyond that, forecasts are often rendered obsolete by the unanticipated appearance of new competitors, new political environments, or new technologies. Most CEOs and major investors still limit their strategic visions to three, five, or at most seven years, and they judge results on the same time frame.

如今的经济预测都喜欢做的很长远，可是这样做的结果是，没有人会真正相信你做的预测。回顾这种趋势就是，在17世纪，当中国和印度占据全球GDP一半，“亚洲时代”即将来临的时候，兴盛被再次断言。事实上，从长期而言，可以清晰的发现全球经济的周期大约是十年。典型的商业周期大约是5年，从一个经济衰退的最低点到下一个衰退的最低点，大多实际的投资者把他们的预测控制在一到两个商业周期。超过这个时间，预测通常被预料之外的新竞争者，新的政治环境或者新科技证实是过时的。大多CEO和主要投资者仍然将他们的战略控制在3,5至多7年，并且他们基于相同的时间架构来判断成果。

THE NEW AND OLD ECONOMIC ORDER

新老经济规则

In the decade to come, the United States, Europe, and Japan are likely to grow slowly. Their sluggishness, however, will look less worrisome compared with the even bigger story in the global economy, which will be the three to four percent slowdown in China, which is already under way, with a possibly deeper slowdown in store as the economy continues to mature. China's population is simply too big and aging too quickly for its economy to continue growing as rapidly as it has. With over 50 percent of its people now living in cities, China is nearing what economists call "the Lewis turning point": the point at which a country's surplus labor from rural areas has been largely exhausted. This is the result of both heavy migration to cities over the past two decades and the shrinking work force that the one-child policy has produced. In due time, the sense of many Americans today that Asian juggernauts are swiftly overtaking the U.S. economy will be remembered as one of the country's periodic bouts of paranoia, akin to the hype that accompanied Japan's ascent in the 1980s.

在即将来临的10年，美国，欧洲和日本会发展缓慢。这些国家的迟缓发展和中国相比，似乎让人舒心一点，中国的经济发展会降低3%至4%——事实上已经发生了，随着经济的成熟可能下降得更厉害。中国的人口数量太大以及不断加快的老龄化速度使得中国很困难像之前那样发展的那么迅速。由于超过50%的人口居住在城市，中国正接近被称之为”lewis转折点“的经济情况：一个国家的农村富余劳动力被大量地消耗。这个结果是由过去20年大量的城市移民和独生子政策带来的收缩工人力量导致的，在适当的时候，很多美国人认为亚洲霸主（中国）将很快超越美国经济的想法会被当做国家的周期性妄想，和二十世纪90年代伴随日本腾飞的炒作类似。


As growth slows in China and in the advanced industrial world, these countries will buy less from their export-driven counterparts, such as Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, and Taiwan. During the boom of the last decade, the average trade balance in emerging markets nearly tripled as a share of GDP, to six percent. But since 2008, trade has fallen back to its old share of under two percent. Export-driven emerging markets will need to find new ways to achieve strong growth, and investors recognize that many will probably fail to do so: in the first half of 2012, the spread between the value of the best-performing and the value of the worst-performing major emerging stock markets shot up from ten percent to 35 percent. Over the next few years, therefore, the new normal in emerging markets will be much like the old normal of the 1950s and 1960s, when growth averaged around five percent and the race left many behind. This does not imply a reemergence of the 1970s-era Third World, consisting of uniformly underdeveloped nations. Even in those days, some emerging markets, such as South Korea and Taiwan, were starting to boom, but their success was overshadowed by the misery in larger countries, such as India. But it does mean that the economic performance of the emerging-market countries will be highly differentiated.

随着中国和其他发达工业国增长放缓，它们会减少从其他出口导向型经济体（如巴西、墨西哥、俄罗斯、台湾等）的进口。在过去十年的发展中，新型市场每年的贸易顺差在GDP中所占的份额几乎翻了三倍，达到了6%。但从2008年起，贸易已经跌回了2%的旧份额。出口导向型新兴市场需要寻找其他能带来强劲经济增长的方法，投资者认识到很多新兴国家将无法做到这一点：2012上半年，主要新兴股市上最佳表现价值和最差表现价值的价差从10%猛涨到35%。因此接下来的几年里新兴市场的情形会非常接近1950年代和1960年代，那时平均增长率在5%左右，许多国家在激烈的竞争中败下阵来。这并不表示1970年代的第三世界（包括所有非发达国家）会再度出现。即使在那时，一些新兴市场（如韩国和台湾）已经开始繁荣，但是它们的成功被一些更大国家，如印度，的悲惨状况所掩盖。但这至少表明各个新兴市场国家的经济表现将会差异悬殊。



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