哈佛大学经济学系秋季课程已经开始,其中Laiboson和Shlaifer等人合开了本科的行为经济学课程,同时该系几大行为经济学高手又联手开设了研究生行为经济学课程。现在陆续上传这些,共爱好者们系统学习之用。期盼各位阅读后写上一些体会,也不枉俺一片苦心。呵呵
心理学和经济学本科教案:
第五讲
待续。这样有助于读者逐步学习消化。以免全部下载后却封存起来
其中第一到第七讲是关于行为决策的基本思想和模型的表述。第八讲到第14讲是史莱佛的并非有效市场的压缩版,并在后几讲补充了一些关于行为金融的内容。从第15讲开始都是专题,其中有些没有ppt,只有相关文献,有些有ppt建成的pdf。大家请耐心等待。
以下是关于课程的整体描述和内容安排:
[此贴子已经被admin于2008-5-22 15:21:00编辑过]
Spring 2005 Undergraduate Courses
Economics 1030. Psychology and Economics
Catalog Number: 4709 Enrollment: Limited to 80. David I. Laibson and Andrei Shleifer Half course (spring term). Tu., Th., 10–11:30, and a one-hour weekly section to be arranged. EXAM GROUP: 12, 13 Integrates psychological and economic analysis of behavior. Psychological topics include social preferences, impulsivity, bounded rationality, loss-aversion, over-confidence, self-serving biases, hedonics, and neuroscience. Discusses how psychological experiments have been used to learn about preferences, cognition, behavior. Economic topics include arbitrage, equilibrium, rational choice, utility maximization, Bayesian beliefs, game theory. Integrates these psychological and economic concepts to understand behavioral phenomena such as credit card borrowing, portfolio choice, retirement saving, procrastination, addiction, asset pricing, auction bidding, labor supply, cooperation. Prerequisite: Economics 1010a or 1011a, and knowledge of multivariate calculus.
http://my.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?course=fas-ec1030
模型化时间偏好
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DANIEL KAHNEMAN
1.Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
2.A Psychological Perspective on Economics
3."Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,"
(Econometrica 47:2 (March), 263-292.)
[此贴子已经被作者于2004-11-4 12:40:09编辑过]
The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game Alan G. Sanfey,1,3* James K. Rilling,1* Jessica A. Aronson,2 Leigh E. Nystrom,1,2 Jonathan D. Cohen1,2,4 Technology, Information Production, and Market Efficiency Gene D’Avolio, Efi Gildor, and Andrei Shleifer
价格不仅受到信息和预期的影响,而且也受到噪音交易者的影响,作者通过股价的非线性变化检验了这一思想
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds Paul G. Mahoney University of Virginia School of Law 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 Phone: 434-924-3996 e-mail: pmahoney@virginia.edu Second draft: February 9, 2004
Mutual funds present a paradox. They give unsophisticated investors the benefit of diversification and professional money management. But how can the unsophisticated know whether they are paying a reasonable price for those services? A premise of current mutual fund regulation is that the market should set fees, but those fees should be transparent. In the mutual fund scandals of 2003, mutual fund managers secretly obtained extra compensation by selling the right to trade at stale prices. The appropriate policy response turns on the answers to contested questions. Was the improper trading a result of insufficient regulatory and corporate governance controls on mutual fund managers? Alternatively, was it the result of overly intrusive regulatory
limits on fee structures that made it more difficult to align the interests of fund managers and investors and deter excessive trading? Did the extra returns earned by favored investors who traded at stale prices come mostly out of the profits of long-term investors, or did reductions in demand for the affected funds shift a substantial part of the loss back to the mutual fund managers? These are useful starting points for future research.
European Option Pricing with Behavioral parameters
Cao Huangjin, Jin Zhiming
National University of Defense Technology , Changsha ,China
Abstract
This paper presents a discrete-time and a continuous time model for valuing options with behavioral parameters. Be differ from prospect theory, investors in our model derive utility from relative changes in the value of his financial wealth of his mental account, and the investor has a particular weight for each mental account. For the problem of the market efficiency, we consider, we mustn’t talk about the logos of securities-price, but we can describe our behavior by the logos, and we should try our best to describe the securities-price. Some investors may overcome the market by proper methods, others can’t, because they have the warp of perceiving the market. We also accept rational prices only reflects riskless profitable arbitrage, not investor’s value-expres-sive, but we will introduce the investor’s value-expres-sive in our model, so that we can exactly describe the securities-price.
We propose a new framework for the fundamental economic principles of European option pricing with behavioral finance, introduce mental accounts( Kahneman and Tversky ,1979) and on the influence of prior outcomes on risky choice(Nicholas Barberis, Ming Huang, Tano Santos,1999). In the discrete-time model, we give a simple to illustrate our hypothesis that investors derive utility from relative changes. In the continuous time model, we present European option pricing in a single mental account and a sort of behavioral parameter version (EOP-AMA), two mental accounts and a sort of behavioral parameter version (EOP-TMA), and two mental accounts and two sorts of behavioral parameters version (EOP-TMT).
这是我最近的习作,只给出了摘要,文章已做完。不知哪位搞行为金融学的有兴趣可以交流一下,qq:507251
ccording to PDE (6-6) with regard to
Subject to the terminal condition:
In fact, we denote
Then
Obviously, according to (6-6) we have
It satisfies the condition of Theorem 2.2, we will get a solution by the “separate” method. Then stochastic differential equation with respect with
Let
Let
Then
Where
Owing to
Let
很可惜,公式上不来,这只是其中的一部分
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