[2013.07.06]What caused China's cash crunch? 为什么中国闹起了钱荒？
http://www.ecocn.org/thread-193426-1-1.html
(出处: ECO中文网)
The Economist explains 经济学人解答
What caused China's cash crunch? 为什么中国闹起了钱荒？
Jul 4th 2013, 23:50 by S.C. | HONG KONG


LAST month some Chinese banks found it excruciatingly difficult to borrow the money they required from their fellow banks. The interest rate for an overnight loan from one bank to another briefly hit 30% on June 20th, compared with a typical rate of about 2.5% earlier in the year. This cash crunch or “Shibor shock” (Shibor stands for Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate, a benchmark interest rate) raised immediate fears of bank defaults. It also highlighted broader concerns about financial excesses in China, where the supply of credit has been growing faster than the economy. What caused the sudden cash crunch?

上月一些中国银行发现向同类银行借款难如登天。6月20日隔夜银行间贷款利率短期内飙升至30%，而今年先前几个月的一般利率仅为2.5%。钱荒或是“上海同业拆借利率冲击”（上海同业拆借利率是基准利率）立即引发了对银行违约的恐慌。这也引起了对于中国经济过度的广泛关注，因为在中国信贷供应速度已超过了经济增长速度。为什么中国突然闹起了钱荒？

Banks keep cash in reserve both to satisfy regulatory requirements and to meet their obligations to customers, creditors and each other. If a bank runs short of money, it typically borrows cash from other banks that have more than they need. Although banks can run out of money, China cannot. Its central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), can “print” all the yuan it needs. It transfers this freshly created money to the banks by buying something from them, such as foreign currency, bonds or other safe financial assets. It can also lend it to them. But when China’s banks ran short of cash last month, the central bank surprised everyone by refusing to help. Instead of adding more money to the banking system it sat on its hands, causing the crunch. Exactly why it did so is still in dispute.

为符合监管要求和履行对客户、债权人和债务人的义务，银行会储备现金。如果银行资金不足，通常可以向其他资金充足的银行借款。其他银行可能会资金亏空，但是中国不会。中国的央行可以按需“印钞”。央行可以通过购买外汇、国债或其他安全金融资产等而向商业银行扩大货币发行量。当然央行也可以拆借。但是上个月中国各大银行资金不足，央行却拒绝援助，令人大跌眼镜。央行非但没有向银行系统加注资金，反而冷眼旁观，引发了钱荒。而央行为什么做的真实原因仍有争议。

A central bank may be reluctant to print money if it fears inflation. But inflation in China is quite low. The PBOC was instead worried about something else. In its public statements, it argued that the banks as a group had plenty of money between them. If one or two of them were running short that was because they were behaving badly. Perhaps they had lent too much, in one form or another. Or perhaps they were taking out a lot of short-term loans from their fellow banks in order to make a lot of longer-term ones. Banks can get away with this kind of overstretch and mismatch if they know they can always borrow easily and cheaply. Perhaps the PBOC wanted to shake their complacency by creating a cash squeeze. But instead it caused an unexpectedly severe crunch. As interest rates spiked, the central bank was slow to react or to clarify its intentions. That allowed fear and uncertainty to spread. Eventually the central bank did intervene, ordering big banks to lend to smaller ones and promising to stabilise the market. But the banks remain shaken by its hesitation.

央行可能是因为担心通货膨胀所以才不愿印钞。但是中国的通货膨胀率相当低。央行担心的反而是别的事。央行曾公开声明银行业内各大银行资金充裕。如果是一两家银行资金紧缺，那是因为经营不善。可能是各大银行以某种方式放贷过多，也可能是各大银行向同类银行借入大量短期贷款以增加长期贷款。如果银行懂得如何巧妙地低息借款就能摆脱过度依赖贷款业务和失衡状态。央行或许是想造成资金周转困难的局面来灭灭各大银行的威风。但是万万没想到却引发了严重的钱荒。随着利率攀升，央行迟迟未作出回应或是澄清意图。这样就导致恐慌和怀疑不断蔓延。最终央行出来干预，规定大型银行放贷给小型银行，并保证会恢复市场稳定。央行裹足不前，余波影响各大银行。

What will be the lasting consequences for China’s economy? The direct damage will be limited. The shock was sharp but short. Interest rates have fallen a lot (although they remain higher than they were pre-crunch). The stockmarket, which plunged on June 24th and 25th, has risen by more than 7% from its lowest point. But the indirect consequences could be profound. The central bank’s foot-dragging shows that China’s leadership is worried about rapid credit growth. This excess lending is contributing little to the economy. Instead of financing consumer spending or business expansion it appears to be financing the purchase of existing assets instead. That adds nothing to growth. The government’s efforts to curb lending could, however, subtract quite a lot from growth. The director of GK Dragonomics, a consultancy in Beijing, has predicted that China will grow by little more than 6% in 2014 at best. Barclays Capital argues that quarterly growth could briefly fall to 3% at some point in the next few years. Neither outfit is known for its bearishness. China has not run out of money, but its double-digit growth model has run out of steam.

这对于中国经济会产生什么持续性后果呢？造成的直接损失可能很有限。冲击剧烈但时间很短。尽管利率仍比闹钱荒前要高，但已大幅下降。6月24日和25日，股市暴跌，之后从最低点上涨超过了7%。但是其间接影响是深远的。央行优柔寡断正说明了中国领导人对信贷快速增长的忧虑。超额贷款对经济无甚裨益。政府不为消费性支出和业务扩张提供融资，似乎反而在为购买现有资产提供融资。这对于经济增长毫无意义。政府努力遏制贷款反而会大幅削弱经济增长。北京研究机构龙洲经讯董事已经预测2014年中国经济增长充其量也不过是6%多一点。而英国巴克莱银行则认为未来几年某些阶段季度增长可能会暂时回落至3%。大家知道这两家机构从不进行空头预测。中国还有资金，但是两位数的增长模式已失去势头。

本人不是金融专业的，很多专业术语把握不准，希望大家批评指正