American banks 美国银行界 The triumph of low expectations 少抱期望,不会失望 A world of low growth, risk aversion and regulatory uncertaint 美国银行界——增长低迷,风险规避,法规不稳 Jul 20th 2013 | NEW YORK |From the print edition ![]() 1 “IT COULD have been worse” was the common refrain as American banks began reporting their second-quarter earnings. Indeed, the striking characteristic of the returns was their consistency. Big and small, local and national, lenders across the country have been benefiting from some common tailwinds. Legal settlements are becoming sparser; the economy is expanding, albeit feebly, and the housing market is recovering; auditors are pushing banks to keep releasing loan-loss reserves; and actual losses are trivial. 随着美国银行界纷纷开始发布第二季度盈利情况,市场一次又一次的反映就是“这不是最糟糕的”。的确如此,市场深感意外的是银行仍在继续盈利。纵观全国银行,不论规模大小,不论是地方银行,还是国家银行,都乘着共有的东风获益;法律诉讼越来越少;经济仍在扩张,即便势头微弱;房地产市场正在复苏;审计者正推动银行继续发放贷款损失准备金;实际损失也是微乎其微。 2 But avoiding disaster is not really cause for celebration. Consumers continue to shed debt; companies carry ever more cash. Banks’ pre-provision revenue growth is muted (see chart 1), and there has been no recovery in loan growth of the sort seen after previous recessions (see chart 2). This is so unusual that it may be unprecedented, says Michael Mayo, an analyst at CSLA, a securities firm, and it hardly suggests a good prognosis for the banking system. He predicts that the current decade will show the worst revenue growth for banks since the 1930s. Pricing and margins will inevitably tighten as a result.但是,不是说避过了灾难就该庆祝。如今消费者仍在继续减少负债;公司库存现金史上最高。银行拨备前利润增长减弱(见图一),却也没有出现像之前几次衰退后一样的贷款回升增速(见图二)。证券公司CSLA的一位分析师,米歇尔-马由表示这现象很反常,可能将是史无前例的,很难说这会是银行体系的好兆头。他预测,在这个十年的银行收入增长情况,将会自二十世纪三十年代以来最糟糕的。结果就是议价能力和利润将不可避免地收紧。 3 In as much as borrowing activity has shifted from banks’ balance-sheets to the capital markets, some have benefited. The investment-banking arm of perpetually troubled Citigroup did well in the second quarter, as did the investment-banking arm of infrequently troubled Goldman Sachs. Underwriting and advisory revenues rose at both firms. Goldman reaped large gains from its own investments. 借贷活动差不多都已从银行的资产负债表上转移至资本市场,有几家投行从中盈利。对于一直深陷困境的花旗集团,它的投资银行部门在第二季度表现不错;对于时不时被困境所扰的高盛集团,它投资银行部门的表现也不赖。两家公司的证券包销和咨询收入都见涨。高盛从自己的各项投资中获利颇丰。 4 But Goldman’s return on equity was still barely in double digits. Its headcount is shrinking, not expanding. That is typically the single best indicator of an investment firm’s perspective on its prospects. Citi’s return on equity was well below Goldman’s, at 6.5%. Investors will not tolerate that sort of performance for ever. A major source of Citi’s revenue is in emerging markets, where conditions are deteriorating.但是高盛股权收益仍是勉强凑够两位数。其人员编制越来越少,不是越来越多。员工数量通常是预测一家投行前景的最佳指标。花旗的股权收益低于高盛,为6.5%。投资者不可能永远容忍这种业绩。花旗收益的一个主要来源是状况正在恶化的新兴市场。 5 The likelihood that the overall banking environment will improve in the near future is low. Recent rises in interest rates, prompted by expectations that the Federal Reserve will start slowing the pace of asset purchases, will take a toll on mortgage refinancing, a source of revenue that has produced great gobs of money for banks in recent years. It is probably no coincidence that share prices for most financial institutions have flattened in recent weeks. 银行的综合境况在近期得以改善的可能性较低。由于市场预测美联储将开始放缓购买资产的步奏,近期利率有所上升。这将打击房贷再次融资,阻碍银行像近年来一样从中获取大量资金。而大多数金融机构的股价近几周处于持平状态可能不是巧合。 6 Regulators and politicians are still trying to suppress banks’ risk appetite, not whet it. American financial institutions are already expecting to hold more risk-weighted capital in order to conform with the international Basel 3 standards. Worried by the potential for banks to game the calculations that underpin these same risk weightings, regulators this month proposed a higher “leverage ratio”, a blunter measure of capital that reflects the overall size of a bank’s balance-sheet as well as its riskiness. The proposal calls for a 5% leverage ratio at the holding-company level, and 6% at the level of the bank, for the eight largest banks: Bank of America, BNY Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street and Wells Fargo. 银行界冒险的欲望仍被监管者和政治家们极力遏制,并没有得到鼓励。为了符合国际巴塞尔协议III的标准,美国金融机构已经在期待持有更高风险权重的资本。而决定这些风险权重的计算方法,很有可能被银行操纵,所以出于此担心,监管者于本月建议提高“杠杆率”。“杠杆率”是衡量资本的更粗略指标,能够同时反映银行资产负债表的总体规模和其风险系数。该提议要求八家银行的控股公司执行5%的杠杆率,银行自身执行6%的杠杆率。这些银行分别为:美国银行,纽约梅隆,花旗集团,高盛,摩根大通,摩根士丹利,美国道富银行和美国富国银行。 7 The new numbers will require institutions to fund themselves with more equity, further diluting returns (at least in the short term). Although the notion of a strict capital ratio has its detractors, it has a good chance of being instituted, says Michael Poulos of Oliver Wyman, a consultancy, if only because it is simple. But by increasing the cost of funding for the big institutions, he warns, the rule may push them away from safer, low-priced products and towards riskier, higher-margin ones. 新指标将要求金融机构增加对各自资产净值的投资,以进一步稀释利润(至少在近期而言)。奥纬咨询公司的迈克尔-保罗表示,虽然有人不看好执行严格的资本率,但是因为它便于操作,还是很有可能被列入制度。但是他提醒道,如果提高了大型金融机构的融资成本,这一规定可能促使它们放弃更安全、更低价的理财产品,而选择更高风险,更高利润的产品。 8 Bankers have not reacted vocally to the leverage-ratio proposal. That may be because they feared even harsher limits, or because they are keeping their powder dry for other fights. Lawmakers continue to circle the industry. In April two senators, Sherrod Brown and David Vitter, introduced a bill that would require the largest banks to increase their equity capital to 15% of assets. It was loudly applauded, and subsequently quietly ignored. On July 11th four senators proposed bringing back a version of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 that separated commercial banking from investment banking. This idea has also garnered lots of praise and is also likely to be ignored, if only because of the practical difficulties involved. 银行家目前还未回应杠杆率提案。可能是因为他们担心这样会迎来更严厉的限制,或因为他们在储存实力准备其他“战斗”。立法者仍继续围绕着该行业建言献策。四月,夏洛德-布朗和大为-维特尔两位议员提出了一项法案,要求各大银行将权益资本提高到资产的15%。该法案曾深受推崇,继而被默默忽视。7月11日,四位议员提议,要像1933年《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》那样,重新分离商业银行和投资银行。这一想法得到了众多赞许,却也很可能被淡忘,也许就仅仅因为实际操作太过困难。 9 Even if these legislative proposals go nowhere, the regulatory environment is poised to become tougher with the Senate’s approval on July 16th of Tom Perez as secretary of labour and Richard Cordray as head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). In his prior position at the Department of Justice Mr Perez was an influential advocate of the principle of “disparate impact”—the idea that lending policies can be discriminatory because of their outcomes, even if there is no intent to discriminate. His approval is a congressional endorsement of uneconomic lending. 即便这些立法提案都不了了之,随着汤姆-佩雷斯和理查德-科尔德雷于7月16日经议会批准,分别被任命为劳动部秘书和消费者金融保护局(CFPB)局长,监管大环境也势必会变得更为严格。佩雷斯曾在司法部门任职,当时他宣传“差别效果”原则,颇具影响力。“差别效果”原则是说,可以因不同的放贷结果而采取差别化借贷政策,即便银行无意歧视。他能上任也是因为美国国会许可了非经济借贷。 10 Mr Cordray’s appointment unlocks broad powers for the newly established CFPB, including the ability to investigate and regulate the price and scope of financial products under a new and undefined “abusive” standard. Senate Republicans had vowed to refrain from approving Mr Cordray until changes were made to the CFPB’s underlying structure, so that less power was concentrated in a single director and its budget was made subject to congressional approval. Whatever concerns they had were abruptly waived. Perhaps, like many of America’s banks, they concluded that however bad things are, they could always be worse. 消费者金融保护局是新成立的部门,它拥有的广泛权力随着科尔德雷的上任而得以释放,其中一项权力让该局能够调查并规范金融产品的价格和规模,这些金融产品涉及新型且未经确定的“争议”标准。议会共和党人曾表示,誓不批准科尔德雷上任,除非CFPB改变根本结构,降低单一领导者权力的集中度,预算必须经过国会批准才得通过。 不过无论他们有什么顾虑,都突然间动摇了。也许就像很多美国银行那样,市场都这么总结,无论情况多么糟糕,这总不是最糟糕的。 From the print edition: Finance and economics [翻译笔记] 1、refrain 作名词 释义之一为:“a comment or complaint that is often repeated: “Poor Tom” had become the constant refrain of his friends.” 2、拨备前利润(Pre-Provision Operating Profi/pre-provision revenue):指尚未扣除风险准备金的利润,它等于净利润与风险准备金之和。所谓拨备,指银行业按五级分类标准所提取的风险准备金。 3、证券包销(Securities underwrite) 是指证券公司将发行人的证券按照协议全部购入或者在承销期结束时将售后剩余证券全部自行购入的承销方式。 4、《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》,也称《1933年银行法》第16、20、21、32条款作出了严格的分业规定:商业银行不能进行企业股票((相关:理财 财经))、债券等的承销、承购业务,除了购买政府债券以外,也不能经营证券投资等长期性投资业务。 推荐http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2005-11/08/content_3749479.htm |
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