[下载]Princeton《社会演化的基础》（Foundations of Social Evolution）

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收藏 2008-08-09

<h1 class="parseasinTitle">Foundations of Social Evolution (Paperback)</h1>by <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;search-type=ss&amp;index=books&amp;field-author=Steven%20A.%20Frank">Steven A. Frank</a> (Author)<a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0691059349/ref=sib_dp_pt#reader-link"><img id="prodImage" height="240" alt="Foundations of Social Evolution" src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41rXpnqbz6L._SL500_BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-dp-500-arrow,TopRight,45,-64_OU01_AA240_SH20_.jpg" width="240" border="0"/></a><li>Paperback: 280 pages </li><li>Publisher: Princeton University Press (July 1, 1998) </li><li>Language: English </li><li><div class="content">Product Description This is a masterly theoretical treatment of one of the central problems in evolutionary biology, the evolution of social cooperation and conflict. Steven Frank tackles the problem with a highly original combination of approaches: game theory, classical models of natural selection, quantitative genetics, and kin selection. He unites these with the best of economic thought: a clear theory of model formation and comparative statics, the development of simple methods for analyzing complex problems, and notions of information and rationality. Using this unique, multidisciplinary approach, Frank makes major advances in understanding the foundations of social evolution.Frank begins by developing the three measures of value used in biology--marginal value, reproductive value, and kin selection. He then combines these measures into a coherent framework, providing the first unified analysis of social evolution in its full ecological and demographic context. Frank also extends the theory of kin selection by showing that relatedness has two distinct meanings. The first is a measure of information about social partners, with close affinity to theories of correlated equilibrium and Bayesian rationality in economic game theory. The second is a measure of the fidelity by which characters are transmitted to future generations--an extended notion of heritability.Throughout, Frank illustrates his methods with many examples, including a complete reformulation of the theory of sex allocation. The book also provides a unique "how-to" guide for constructing models of social behavior. It is essential reading for evolutionary biologists and for economists, mathematicians, and others interested in natural selection.About the Author Steven A. Frank is Professor of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at the University of California, Irvine. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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</div></li><li><div class="content">Contents Preface xi 1 Introduction 3 2 Natural Selection 7 2.1 Aggregate Quantities 8 Covariance of a Character and Fitness; Dynamic Sufficiency 2.2 Partitions and Causal Analysis 11 The Price Equation; Causal Analysis; Predictors and Additivity; Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem; Kin Selection 2.3 Genotypes and Phenotypes 25 Phenotypes and Market Share; Genetics: Constraints on Paths of Phenotypic Evolution; Resolution: The Spectrum of Mutations 2.4 Comparative Statics and Dynamics 31 The Importance of Comparison; Dynamic Assumptions in Comparative Statics 2.5 Maximization and Measures of Value 33 Reproductive Value; Kin Selection; Game Theory, ESS; Difficulties 3 Hamilton’s Rule 45 3.1 Overview 46 3.2 Hamilton’s 1970 Proof 47 Direct Fitness; Inclusive Fitness; Hamilton’s Rule 3.3 Queller’s Quantitative Genetic Model 50 3.4 Exact–Total Models 53 Exact Hamilton’s Rule; Example: Rebellious Child Model vi CONTENTS 3.5 Coefficients of Relatedness 56 3.6 Prospects for Synthesis 58 4 Direct and Inclusive Fitness 59 4.1 Modified Price Equation 60 4.2 Regression Equations 62 Direct Fitness; Inclusive Fitness; Comparison of Direct and Inclusive Fitness; Comparison with Queller’s Analysis; Nonadditive Models 4.3 Maximization 69 Marginal Direct and Inclusive Fitness; Marginal Hamilton’s Rule 4.4 Coefficients of Relatedness 74 Example: Sex Ratio; Transmitted Breeding Value 5 Dynamics of Correlated Phenotypes 79 5.1 Games with Saddles: Peak Shifts 79 5.2 Correlated Phenotypes 82 Small Deviations; Large Deviations; Comparative Dynamics 5.3 Strategy Set 88 Mixed Strategies; Pure Strategies; Two Species, Mixed Strategies 6 Relatedness as Information 94 6.1 Interpretation of Relatedness Coefficients 95 6.2 Conditional Behavior 98 Help Only When Weaker of Pair; Both Weaker and Stronger Can Help; One Trait for Each Condition; Conditional Response Surface 6.3 Kin Recognition 104 Indicator and Behavioral Traits; Common Genealogy; Context and Indicators: Bayesian Analysis; Polymorphism at Matching Loci 6.4 Correlated Strategy and Information 113 CONTENTS vii 7 Demography and Kin Selection 114 7.1 Viscous Populations 114 7.2 Dispersal in a Stable Habitat 116 Hamilton and May’s Model; Mendelian Analysis; Analysis by Kin Selection; Demographic Analysis; Summary of Dispersal Analysis; Primacy of Comparative Statics 7.3 Joint Analysis of Demography and Selection 123 Cytoplasmic Incompatibility; Demography Independent Case; Fixed Demography; Variable Demography; Comparative Predictions: Variables and Parameters 7.4 Components of Fitness 129 Tragedy of the Commons; Parasite Virulence 8 Reproductive Value 134 8.1 Social Interactions between Classes 134 Reproductive Value of Each Class; Life History: Technical Details; Example One: Direct and Inclusive Fitness; Example Two: Sex Ratio; Summary of Maximization Method 8.2 Child Mortality in Social Groups 145 Simplest Models; Population Growth: Variable or Parameter?; Cycle Fitness; Maternal Control; Actors in More Than One Class 8.3 Parasite Virulence 163 8.4 Social Evolution in Two Habitats 166 Conditional Behavior: Different Traits in Different Habitats; Unconditional Behavior: Same Trait in Different Habitats 8.5 Review of the Three Measures of Value 170 9 Sex Allocation: Marginal Value 172 9.1 Fisher’s Theory of Equal Allocation 173 viii CONTENTS 9.2 The Three Measures of Value 174 Reproductive Value; Kin Selection Coefficients; Marginal Value 9.3 Variable Resources and Conditional Adjustment 178 All Male or All Female by Constraint; All Male or All Female Favored by Selection; Mixed Allocation Favored in Some Classes 9.4 Returns per Individual Offspring 183 Definition of Investment Period; Fisherian Equal Allocation for High Fecundity per Investment Period; Complexities of Low Fecundity per Investment Period 9.5 Critique of the Costs of Males and Females 187 9.6 Multiple Resources 189 10 Sex Allocation: Kin Selection 191 10.1 Haplodiploidy 192 Relatedness and Reproductive Value; Mechanism of Conditional Sex Ratio Adjustment 10.2 Competitive and Cooperative Interactions among Relatives 194 10.3 Sex Ratio Games 199 Simultaneous Game; Sequential Game; Sequential Game with Variable Brood Size and Dispersal 10.4 Social Topics 207 Conflict between Queen and Workers; Split Sex Ratios and the Origins of Social Behavior 11 Sex Allocation: Reproductive Value 214 11.1 Current versus Future Reproduction 214 11.2 Shifts in Sex Allocation with Age 218 11.3 Perturbation of Stable Age Structure 222 CONTENTS ix 11.4 Cyclical Age Structure with Male–Female Asymmetry 224 Alternative Demographic Matrices; Abundance; Reproductive Value; Fitness; Alternative Life Histories and Biological Consequences 11.5 Transmission of Individual Quality 231 11.6 Juveniles of One Sex Help Parents 235 11.7 Multigeneration Colonies 238 General Formulation; Social Spider Example 12 Conclusions 243 12.1 Statics 243 Maximization and Measures of Value; Statics Is a Method 12.2 Dynamics 244 Technical Issues; Conflict and Power References 249 Author Index 261 Subject Index 264</div></li>