Q. 2 (331.1) There are three players 1, 2 and 3. Player 1 moves first and chooses between L and R. If 1chooses L, 2 moves and chooses between T and B. If 2 plays T, the game ends. If 1 chooses R and 2chooses B, player 3 moves and chooses between U and D. However player 3 cannot tell if the history is Ror B. That is, player 3 cannot tell if he/she gets to play because of 1’s choice or 2’s choice. The payoffsare: (RU) → (3,3,2), (RD) →(0,0,0), (LT) →(1,1,1), (LBU) →(4,4,0), (L,B,D) → (0,0,1).a. (5 marks) Draw the game tree.
b. (6 marks) Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibria.
c. (9 marks) Which of the Nash equilibria you found in part b are weak sequential equilibria?


图片是我的分析，麻烦看一下对不对，另外纯战略纳什均衡需要用数学公式之类的表达么，还是文字表达就可以了？谢谢！