game tree omitted
indicating the Jerry's choice is b(hide in bedroom), d(hide in den), k(hide in kitchen)
(a)
Jerry has three choices: b, d, k.
Tom has 27 different strategies, because he has three decision nodes which have three choices respectively. The number of strategies of Tom's is 3*3*3=27.
There are three subgame perfect eq. in pure strategy:
Sj={b} St={b in b, d in d, k in k}
Sj={d} St={b in b, d in d, k in k}
Sj={k} St={b in b, d in d, k in k}
(b)
Tom has three strategies, while Jerry has 27 strategies.
St={b} Sj={d in b, b in d, b in k}
St={b} Sj={k in b, b in d, b in k}
St={d} Sj={d in b, b in d, b in k}
St={k} Sj={d in b, b in d, b in k}
There are totally 24 pure-strategy subgame perfect eq.
(c)
This is a game of imperfect information. Tom and Jerry both have three strategies, which are b, d and k.
It is apparent that there is no NE in pure strategies. And neither of them will randomize two of their strategies, because the other one will certainly deviate to a pure strategy immediately. There exists mixed-strategy eq, when both randomize all of their strategies with the same probabilities. It is indifferent for both of them between to choose a pure a strategies and to choose a mixed strategy.