Evolutionary Game Theory
Jörgen W. Weibull
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Second printing, 1996
© 1995 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Contents
Foreword
by Ken Binmore
Introduction
Acknowledgments
Mathematical Notation
1
Elements of Noncooperative Game Theory
1.1 Strategies and Payoff Functions
1.2 Dominance Relations and Best Replies
1.3 Nash Equilibrium
1.4 Refinements of Nash Equilibrium
1.5 Symmetric Two-Player Games
2
Evolutionary Stability Criteria
2.1 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
2.2 Characterizations of ESS
2.3 Weaker Evolutionary Stability Criteria
2.4 Setwise Evolutionary Stability Criteria
2.5 Social Efficiency in Doubly Symmetric Games
2.6 Preplay Communication
2.7 Role-Conditioned Behaviors
3
The Replicator Dynamics
3.1 Preliminaries
3.2 Dominated Strategies
3.3 Nash Equilibrium Strategies
4
Other Selection Dynamics
4.1 Discrete-Time Versions of the Replicator Dynamics
4.2 The Replicator Dynamics in Cheap-Talk Games
4.3 General Selection Dynamics
4.4 Replication by Imitation
5
Multipopulation Models
5.1 Evolutionary Stability Criteria
5.2 The Standard and Adjusted n-Population Replicator Dynamics
5.3 Replication by Imitation
5.4 Replication by Contamination
5.5 Classes of Selection Dynamics
5.6 Implications of Evolutionary Dynamics for Noncooperative Solution Concepts
5.7 Robust Criteria for Evolutionary Dynamic Stability
5.8 Appendix
6
Elements of the Theory of Ordinary Differential Equations
6.1 Differential Equations and Vector Fields
6.2 The Induced Solution Mapping
6.3 Invariance and Stationarity
6.4 Stability Concepts
6.5 Lyapunov's Direct Method
6.6 Liouville's Formula
Bibliography
Index