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2008-01-23

Evolutionary Game Theory, Natural Selection, and Darwinian Dynamics

by Vincent, Thomas L.; Brown, Joel S.

Publication: Cambridge, New York, Cambridge
   University Press, 2005.


 


Book Description

All of life is a game and evolution by natural selection is no exception. Games have players, strategies, payoffs, and rules. In the game of life, organisms are the players, their heritable traits provide strategies, their births and deaths are the payoffs, and the environment sets the rules. The evolutionary game theory developed in this book provides the tools necessary for understanding many of Nature’s mysteries. These include coevolution, speciation, and extinction as well as the major biological questions regarding fit of form and function, diversity of life, procession of life, and the distribution and abundance of life. Mathematics for the evolutionary game are developed based on Darwin’s postulates leading to the concept of a fitness generating function (G-function). The G-function is a tool that simplifies notation and plays an important role in the development of the Darwinian dynamics that drive natural selection. Natural selection may result in special outcomes such as the evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. An ESS maximum principle is formulated and its graphical representation as an adaptive landscape illuminates concepts such as adaptation, Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection, and the nature of life’s evolutionary game.


 


About the Author

Thomas L. Vincent is Professor Emeritus of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering at the University of Arizona. His main research interests are in the areas of nonlinear control system design, optimal control and game theory, and evolution and adaptation of biological systems. He has 153 publications including 79 journal articles and 8 books.

Joel S. Brown is a Professor of Biology at the University of Illinois at Chicago. His main research interests lie in applying concepts from natural selection to behavioral, population, and community ecology with applications to conservation biology. Specific interests include the ecology of fear that studies the ecological and evolutionary implications of the non-lethal effects of predators on prey. He has 102 publications, including 88 journal articles.


 


Contents

List of figures page x

Preface xv

1 Understanding natural selection 1

1.1 Natural selection 2

1.2 Genetical approaches to natural selection 7

1.3 Natural selection as an evolutionary game 10

1.4 Road map 21

2 Underlying mathematics and philosophy 26

2.1 Scalars, vectors, and matrices 28

2.2 Dynamical systems 33

2.3 Biological population models 39

2.4 Examples of population models 42

2.5 Classical stability concepts 49

3 The Darwinian game 61

3.1 Classical games 62

3.2 Evolutionary games 72

3.3 Evolution by natural selection 83

4 G-functions for the Darwinian game 88

4.1 How to create a G-function 89

4.2 Types of G-functions 91

4.3 G-functions with scalar strategies 92

4.4 G-functions with vector strategies 93

4.5 G-functions with resources 96

4.6 Multiple G-functions 99

4.7 G-functions in terms of population frequency 103

4.8 Multistage G-functions 106

4.9 Non-equilibrium dynamics 110

5 Darwinian dynamics 112

5.1 Strategy dynamics and the adaptive landscape 113

5.2 The source of new strategies: heritable variation and mutation 116

5.3 Ecological time and evolutionary time 119

5.4 G-functions with scalar strategies 120

5.5 G-functions with vector strategies 131

5.6 G-functions with resources 140

5.7 Multiple G-functions 141

5.8 G-functions in terms of population frequency 143

5.9 Multistage G-functions 144

5.10 Non-equilibrium Darwinian dynamics 145

5.11 Stability conditions for Darwinian dynamics 147

5.12 Variance dynamics 149

6 Evolutionarily stable strategies 151

6.1 Evolution of evolutionary stability 153

6.2 G-functions with scalar strategies 160

6.3 G-functions with vector strategies 168

6.4 G-functions with resources 170

6.5 Multiple G-functions 174

6.6 G-functions in terms of population frequency 180

6.7 Multistage G-functions 183

6.8 Non-equilibrium Darwinian dynamics 188

7 The ESS maximum principle 197

7.1 Maximum principle for G-functions with scalar strategies 198

7.2 Maximum principle for G-functions with vector strategies 205

7.3 Maximum principle for G-functions with resources 211

7.4 Maximum principle for multiple G-functions 213

7.5 Maximum principle for G-functions in terms of population frequency 219

7.6 Maximum principle for multistage G-functions 222

7.7 Maximum principle for non-equilibrium dynamics 225

8 Speciation and extinction 231

8.1 Species concepts 234

8.2 Strategy species concept 236

8.3 Variance dynamics 243

8.4 Mechanisms of speciation 251

8.5 Predator–prey coevolution and community evolution 264

8.6 Wright’s shifting balance theory and frequency-dependent selection 266

8.7 Microevolution and macroevolution 268

8.8 Incumbent replacement 272

8.9 Procession of life 273

9 Matrix games 275

9.1 A maximum principle for the matrix game 277

9.2 The 2 × 2 bi-linear game 284

9.3 Non-linear matrix games 295

10 Evolutionary ecology 304

10.1 Habitat selection 304

10.2 Consumer-resource games 309

10.3 Plant ecology 324

10.4 Foraging games 333

11 Managing evolving systems 343

11.1 Evolutionary response to harvesting 344

11.2 Resource management and conservation 350

11.3 Chemotherapy-driven evolution 359

References 364

Index 377


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[此贴子已经被angelboy于2008-7-23 13:32:38编辑过]

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全部回复
2008-1-23 10:07:00
生物or经济?
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2008-1-23 10:37:00
以下是引用guangguang83在2008-1-23 10:07:00的发言:
生物or经济?

演化博弈的很多思想和术语都来源于生物学。只怕生物学家对演化、对自然选择、对竞争的理解还更胜于经济学家呢,即便不是这样,至少也提供了一种生物学的视角。你说呢?

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2008-1-23 14:32:00

马歇尔似乎曾经说过,与物理学相比,经济学恐怕更接近于生物学。

这也是许多演化经济学家经常从生物学和生态学的学科中寻找相似的知识为自己的分析提供思路的原因。

古典博弈论中假设人是全知全能,而通常标准的"自然选择理论”中是假设“当事人”是“灵智商”。

而文化演化模型和演化博弈论中通常是建立在“适应性当事人”的基础之上的。

纳尔逊和温特在《经济变迁的演化理论》当中有不少描述。

萨缪尔.鲍尔斯在《微观经济学:行为,制度与演化》中对于演化博弈论和文化演化模型的运用更堪称经典。

同在桑塔菲研究中心的Gintis也写过一本《Game theory evolving》

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2008-6-7 18:38:00

好书啊,我怎么看不到呢?

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2008-6-8 13:27:00

我真的很需要这本书,楼主能够发一份给我吗?

我的邮箱:Eric0724@live.com

不胜感激!!

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