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2009-11-16
Two pigs, one dominant and the other subordinate, are put in a box. There is a lever at one end of the box which, when pressed, dispenses food at the other end. Thus the pig that presses the lever must run to the other end; by the time it gets there, the other pig has eaten most, but not all, of the food. The dominant pig is able to prevent the subordinate pig from getting any of the food when both are at the food. Assuming the pigs can reason, which pig will press the level? Let's attach some numbers to the game:
  • 6 units of food are delivered whenever the lever is pushed
  • if the subordinate pig pushes the lever, the dominant pig eats all 6 units
  • if the dominant pig pushes the lever, the subordinate pig eats 5 units before the dominant pig pushes it away
  • suppose the subordinate pig can run faster so, if both press, it gets 2 units of food before the dominant pig arrives
  • suppose pressing the lever requires 1/2 unit of food of effort
The subordinate pig's bet response is "don't press" so the dominant pig presses the lever. This game shows that weakness can be a strength in bargaining.
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