Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future
A promising recent modeling approach is “quasi-Bayesian”
—viz., assume that people misspecify a set of hypotheses, or encode
new evidence incorrectly, but otherwise use Bayes’rule. For example,
Rabin and Schrag(1999) model “confirmation bias” by assuming
that people who believe hypothesis A is more likely than B will never
encode pro-A evidence mistakenly, but will sometimes encode
pro-Bevidence as being supportive of A. Rabin (2002) models
the “law of small numbers”in a quasi-Bayesian fashion by assuming
that people mistakenly think a process generates draws from a hypothetical
“urn”without replacement, although draws are actually independent
(i.e., made withreplacement). He shows some surprising implications of
this misjudgment. For example,investors will think there is wide variation
in skill of, say, mutual-fund managers, even if there isno variation at all. (A
manager who does well several years in a row is a surprise if performanceis
mistakenly thought to be mean-reverting due to “nonreplacement”, so quasi-
Bayesians conclude that the manager must be really good.
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) adopt such a quasi-Bayesian
approach to explain why the stock market under-reacts to information in the
short-term and overreacts in the long term.In their model, earnings follow a
random walk but investors believe,mistakenly, that earnings have positive
momentum in some regimes and regress toward the mean in others. After
one or two periods of good earnings, the market can’t be confident that
momentum exists andhence expects mean-reversion; but since earnings
are really a random walk, the market is toopessimistic and is underreacting
to good earnings news. After a long string of good earnings,however, the
market believes momentum is building. Since it isn’t, the market is too
optimistic and overreacts.
[此贴子已经被作者于2005-12-23 12:54:54编辑过]