1 论文标题

盗铸——铸币价值稳定的真正捍卫者：以中国为例
2 作者信息

钱    盛

香港科技大学人文社会科学学院社会科学部

吴乐旻

3 出处
Sheng Qian, Lemin Wu. Who Defended Monetary Stability in a Specie Regime? Evidence from the Chinese History[J]. Front. Econ. China, 2018, 13(3): 397-435.

链接
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/10.3868/s060-007-018-0020-0
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/Y2018/V13/I3/397

4 摘要

鲜少政治问责体制的古代政权，其铸币币值的稳定性却不逊于现代国家。本文提出假说：在铸币经济里，是盗铸的威胁约束了ZF的滥铸倾向。在没有滥铸时，盗铸无利可图。盗铸之兴，必由滥铸所致。ZF预期到盗铸者会侵占极大部分的铸币税，所以滥铸动机大大削弱，除非财政状况陷入绝境，否则绝不会轻启贬值。我们构建了一个中国历代铜币数据库（从秦代到民国），以揭示古代铸币币值的稳定性。我们又用晚清1900年开铸机制铜元这一自然实验来检验盗铸假说。进口蒸汽铸币机铸造的铜元纹理精致，民间盗铸者在短期内难以仿造，因此蒸汽铸币事实上解除了ZF的盗铸威胁。正如理论所预测的那样，盗铸威胁的解除引发了清朝历史上最严重的铸币贬值。

Who Defended Monetary Stability in a Specie Regime?

Evidence from the Chinese History

Sheng Qian

Division of Social Science, School of Humanities and Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Lemin Wu

Abstract: Despite the lack of political accountability, ancient autocracies maintained a level of monetary stability that rivals modern democracies. This paper hypothesizes that it is the threat of counterfeiting that has constrained currency debasement. Unwilling to share seigniorage with counterfeiters, who are active only if currency is debased, the government refrains from debasement unless in extreme fiscal situations. To document the facts, we build a database of historical Chinese copper coins that covers the period from the Qin dynasty (221-207BC) to the Republic of China. We also use the introduction of the steam press in late Qing China as a natural experiment to test the theory. The steam press produced coins of fine patterns that counterfeiters were unable to mimic. As the theory predicts, the removal of the threat of counterfeiting triggered the most serious debasement in the history of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912).