金融抛售的悖论:套利资本在决定流动性方面的作用，2018年发表在the journal of finance上的研究金融危机下流动性紧缩，套利资本对流动性的影响。
How can fire sales for financial assets happen when the economy contains well capitalized but nonspecialist investors? Our explanation combines rational expectations equilibrium and “lemons” models. When specialist (informed) market participants
are liquidity-constrained, prices become less informative. This creates an adverse selection problem, decreasing the supply of high-quality assets, and lowering valuations by nonspecialist (uninformed) investors, who become unwilling to supply capital to support the price. In normal times, arbitrage capital can “multiply” itself by making uninformed capital function as informed capital, but in a crisis, this stabilizing mechanism fails.