Acemoglu是一位多产的经济学家，在宏观经济学、制度经济学、新政治经济学、劳动经济学等多领域都有研究成果。
这是他的《制度作为长期增长的根本原因》英文文献。

Daron Acemoglu：Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth

Abstract：
This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic
institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first
document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two “quasi-natural ex-
periments” in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic
institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the
fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about
why economic institutions differ across countries.  Economic institutions determine the
incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As
such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences.  Because different groups
and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally
a conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater
political power.  The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by
political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de
jure political power, while groups with greater economic might typically possess greater
de facto political power.  We therefore view the appropriate theoretical framework as
a dynamic one with political institutions and the distribution of resources as the state
variables. These variables themselves change over time because prevailing economic in-
stitutions affect the distribution of resources, and because groups with de facto political
power today strive to change political institutions in order to increase their de jure po-
litical power in the future. Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge
when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based prop-
erty rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and
when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders.  We illustrate the
assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of
historical examples.