2004 Economics, Finn E. Kydland Edward C. Prescott

2003 Economics, Robert F. Engle III Clive W.J. Granger

2002 Economics, Daniel Kahneman Vernon L. Smith

2001 Economics, George A. Akerlof A. Michael Spence Joseph E. Stiglitz

2000 Economics, James J. Heckman Daniel L. McFadden

1999 Economics, Robert A. Mundell

1998 Economics, Amartya Sen

1997 Economics, Robert C. Merton Myron S. Scholes

1996 Economics, James A. Mirrlees William Vickrey

1995 Economics, Robert E. Lucas Jr.

1994 Economics, John C. Harsanyi John F. Nash Jr. Reinhard Selten

1993 Economics, Robert W. Fogel Douglass C. North

1992 Economics, Gary S. Becker

1991 Economics, Ronald H. Coase

1990 Economics, Harry M. Markowitz Merton H. Miller William F. Sharpe

1989 Economics, Trygve Haavelmo

1988 Economics, Maurice Allais

1987 Economics, Robert M. Solow

1986 Economics, James M. Buchanan Jr.

1985 Economics, Franco Modigliani

1984 Economics, Richard Stone

1983 Economics, Gerard Debreu

1982 Economics, George J. Stigler

1981 Economics, James Tobin

1980 Economics, Lawrence R. Klein

1979 Economics, Sir Arthur Lewis Theodore W. Schultz

1978 Economics, Herbert A. Simon

1977 Economics, James E. Meade Bertil Ohlin

1976 Economics, Milton Friedman

1975 Economics, Leonid Vitaliyevich Kantorovich Tjalling C. Koopmans

1974 Economics, Gunnar Myrdal Friedrich August von Hayek

1973 Economics, Wassily Leontief

1972 Economics, Kenneth J. Arrow John R. Hicks

1971 Economics, Simon Kuznets

1970 Economics, Paul A. Samuelson

1969 Economics, Ragnar Frisch Jan Tinbergen

以上整理的近似于诺贝尔奖经济学史，大家可以看到他们获奖的理由，在颁奖典礼上所作的Prize Lectures，也可以看到他们的自传，等等。

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-23 21:54:00编辑过]

上贴中的年份和经济学家的名字都能直接打开链接。而且其链接非常丰富。

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-14 10:51:10编辑过]

Ronald Coase -- Autobiography from Nobel Prize.org

My father, a methodical man, recorded in his diary that I was born at 3:25 p.m. on December 29th, 1910. The place was a house, containing two flats of which my parents occupied the lower, in a suburb of London, Willesden. My father was a telegraphist in the Post Office. My mother had been employed in the Post Office but ceased to work on being married. Both my parents had left school at the age of 12 but were completely literate. However, they had no interest in academic scholarship. Their interest was in sport. My mother played tennis until an advanced age. My father, who played football, cricket and tennis while young, played (lawn) bowls until his death. He was a good player, played for his county and won a number of competitions. He wrote articles on bowls for the local newspaper and for Bowls News. I had the usual boy's interest in sport but my main interest was always academic. I was an only child but although often alone, I was never lonely. When I learnt chess, I was happy to play the role of each player in turn. Lacking guidance, my reading (in books borrowed from the local public library) was undiscriminating and, as I now realize, I was unable to distinguish the charlatan from the serious scholar. My mother taught me to be honest and truthful and although it is impossible to escape some degree of self-deception, my endeavours to follow her precepts have, I believe, lent some strength to my writing. My mother's hero was Captain Oates, who, returning with Scott from the South Pole and finding that his illness was hampering the others, told his companions that he was going for a stroll, went out into a blizzard and was never heard of again. I have always felt that I should not be a bother to others but in this I have not always succeeded. Aged 11, I was taken by my father to a phrenologist. What the phrenologist said about my character was, I feel sure, determined less by the shape of my skull than by the impressions he derived from my behaviour. Out of the various printed summaries of character in his booklet, that chosen for "Master Ronald Coase" started: "You are in possession of much intelligence, and you know it, though you may be inclined to underrate your abilities." This printed summary also included the following remarks: "You will not float down, like a sickly fish, with the tide... you enjoy considerable mental vigour and are not a passive instrument in the hands of others. Though you can work with others and for others, where you see it to your advantage, you are more inclined to think and work for yourself. A little more determination would be to your advantage, however." In the written comments, the pursuits recommended were: "Scientific and commercial banking, accountancy. Also, horticulture and poultry-rearing as hobbies." Added were some comments about my character: "More hope, confidence and concentration required - not suited for the aggressive competitive side of business life. More active ambition would be beneficial." It was also noted that I was too cautious. It was hardly to be expected that this timid little boy would one day be the recipient of a Nobel Prize. That this happened was the result of a series of accidents. As a young boy I suffered from a weakness in my legs, which necessitated, or was thought to necessitate, the wearing of irons on my legs. As a result I went to the school for physical defectives run by the local council. For reasons that I do not remember I missed taking the entrance examinations for the local secondary school at the usual age of 11. However, as the result of the efforts of my parents I was allowed to take the secondary school scholarship examination at the age of 12. The only thing I now remember is that at the oral examination I caused some amusement by referring to a character in Shakespeare's Twelfth Night as Macvolio. However, this lapse was not fatal and I was awarded a scholarship to go to the Kilburn Grammar School. The teaching there was good and I received a solid education. I particularly remember our geography teacher, Charles Thurston, who introduced us to Wegener's hypothesis on the movements of the continents long before it was generally accepted and who also took us to lectures at the Royal Geographical Society, one of which, on river meanders, discussed the effect of the earth's rotation on the course of rivers. I took the matriculation examination in 1927, which I passed, with distinction in history and chemistry. It was then possible to spend the two years after matriculation at the Kilburn Grammar School studying for the intermediate examination of the University of London as an external student, which covered the work which would have been taken during the first year at the University as an internal student. I then had to decide what degree to take. The answer was in fact determined by one of those accidental factors which seem to have shaped my life. My inclination was to take a degree in history, but I found that to do this I would have to know Latin and having arrived at the Kilburn Grammar School at 12 instead of 11, there had been no possibility of my studying Latin. So I turned to the other subject in which I had secured distinction and started to study for a science degree, specialising in chemistry. However, I soon found that mathematics, a requirement for a science degree, was not to my taste and I switched to the only other degree for which it was possible to study at the Kilburn Grammar School, one in commerce. Although my knowledge of the subjects on which I was examined was rudimentary, I managed to pass the intermediate examinations and went to the London School of Economics in October, 1929 to continue my studies for a Bachelor of Commerce degree. I took a hodgepodge of courses for Part I of the final examination, which I passed in 1930. For Part II, I specialised in the Industry Group. I then had an extraordinary stroke of luck, another accidental factor which would affect everything I was to do subsequently. Arnold Plant, who had previously held a chair at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, was appointed Professor of Commerce (with special reference to Business Administration) at the London School of Economics in 1930. I attended his lectures on business administration but it was what he said in his seminar, which I started to attend only five months before the final examinations, that was to change my view of the working of the economic system, or perhaps more accurately was to give me one. What Plant did was to introduce me to Adam Smith's "invisible hand". He made me aware of how a competitive economic system could be coordinated by the pricing system. But he did not merely influence my ideas. My encountering him changed my life. I passed the B. Com, Part II final examination in 1931, but having taken the first year of University work while still at school and three years residence at the London School of Economics being required before a degree could be awarded, I had to decide what to do in this third year. Among the subjects studied for Part II, the one I had found most interesting was Industrial Law and what I had decided to do was to study in this third year for the degree of B.Sc. (Econ), with Industrial Law as my special subject. Had I done so I would undoubtedly have gone on to become a lawyer. But that was not to be. No doubt as a result of Plant's influence, the University of London awarded me a Sir Ernest Cassel Travelling Scholarship and although I did not know it, I was on the road to becoming an economist. I spent the academic year 1931-32 on my Cassel Travelling Scholarship in the United States studying the structure of American industries, with the aim of discovering why industries were organized in different ways. I carried out this project mainly by visiting factories and businesses. What came out of my enquiries was not a complete theory answering the questions with which I started but the introduction of a new concept into economic analysis, transaction costs, and an explanation of why there are firms. All this was achieved by the Summer of 1932, as the contents of a lecture delivered in Dundee in October 1932, make clear. These ideas became the basis for my article "The Nature of the Firm", published in 1937, cited by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in awarding me the 1991 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The delay in publishing my ideas was partly due to a reluctance to rush into print and partly to the fact that I was heavily engaged in teaching and research on other projects. I held a teaching position at the Dundee School of Economics and Commerce from 1932 to 1934, at the University of Liverpool from 1934 to 1935 and at the London School of Economics from 1935 on. At the London School of Economics I was assigned a course on the economics of public utilities in Britain. In 1939, the Second World War broke out and in 1940 I entered government service doing statistical work, first at the Forestry Commission and then at the Central Statistical Office, Offices of the War Cabinet. I returned to the London School of Economics in 1946. I then became responsible for the main economics course, "The Principles of Economics", and also continued with my research on public utilities, particularly the Post Office and broadcasting. I spent nine months in 1948 in the United States on a Rockefeller Fellowship studying the American broadcasting industry. My book, British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly, was published in 1950. In 1951, I migrated to the United States. I went first to the University of Buffalo and in 1959, after a year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, I joined the economics department of the University of Virginia. I maintained my interest in public utilities and particularly in broadcasting and during my year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, I made a study of the Federal Communications Commission which regulated the broadcasting industry in the United States, including the allocation of the radio frequency spectrum. I wrote an article, published in 1959, which discussed the procedures followed by the Commission and suggested that it would be better if use of the spectrum was determined by the pricing system and was awarded to the highest bidder. This raised the question of what rights would be acquired by the successful bidder and I went on to discuss the rationale of a property rights system. Part of my argument was considered to be erroneous by a number of economists at the University of Chicago and it was arranged that I should meet with them one evening at Aaron Director's home. What ensued has been described by Stigler and others. I persuaded these economists that I was right and I was asked to write up my argument for publication in the Journal of Law and Economics. Although the main points were already to be found in The Federal Communications Commission, I wrote another article, The Problem of Social Cost, in which I expounded my views at greater length, more precisely and without reference to my previous article. This article, which appeared early in 1961, unlike my earlier article on "The Nature of the Firm", was an instant success. It was, and continues to be, much discussed. Indeed it is probably the most widely cited article in the whole of the modern economic literature. It, and The Nature of the Firm were the two articles cited by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences as justification for awarding me the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize. Had it not been for the fact that these economists at the University of Chicago thought that I had made an error in my article on The Federal Communications Commission, it is probable that The Problem of Social Cost would never have been written. In 1964, I moved to the University of Chicago and became editor of the Journal of Law and Economics. I continued as editor until 1982. Editorship of the journal was a source of great satisfaction. I encouraged economists and lawyers to write about the way in which actual markets operated and about how governments actually perform in regulating or undertaking economic activities. The journal was a major factor in creating the new subject, "law and economics". My life has been interesting, concerned with academic affairs and on the whole successful. But, on almost all occasions, what I have done has been determined by factors which were no part of my choosing. I have had "greatness thrust upon me".

The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in

Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991

Presentation Speech by Professor Lars Werin of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Translation of the Swedish text.

Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen, The economic system has an institutional structure, which we often regard as self-evident because we observe it around us every day. But it is actually peculiar and intricate. For instance, people make agreements among themselves in many different ways, ranging from simple purchases to complex contracts; what determines the pattern? Economic activity takes place within a framework of legal rules: contract law, tort law, etc; why are these laws formulated as they are? And why do we have firms at all?

These and other components of the institutional structure must certainly be essential elements in the functioning of the economic system. Nevertheless, economic theory could not answer these questions. This state of affairs annoyed a young economist who had just received his first degree in London in the 1930s. He wrote an essay with the perhaps untactically pretentious title The Nature of the Firm. He provided a strong and productive answer to the last question, why firms exist, although hardly anyone bothered to listen. He gradually added building blocks to his theoretical construction, and had eventually - in the early 1960s - set forth the principles for answering all of the questions. It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the breakthrough for his ideas occurred. Astonishingly, basic economics had to be revised, managerial economics received a new foundation and research in economic history new impulses, a new discipline, law and economics, was established on the borderline between economics and legal science, and traditional jurisprudence itself became unsettled. It is for this achievement that the originator, Ronald Coase, is rewarded; no longer an angry young man, but still a most active researcher.

Coase pointed out that a large proportion of the total use of resources takes place within firms. Thus, it has deliberately been withheld from the price mechanism - the market system - in order to be coordinated administratively instead. A general theory has to be able to explain this phenomenon; traditional theory could not.

Someone has aptly described Coase's problems as follows. A firm may be regarded as an island of administration in a sea of contracting, in "the sea of markets". If we look out across the economy, we find that it is an archipelago. But why is it an archipelago ? Why is it not an open sea of simple contracts between separate individuals? And why are there so many small islands, that is, why are they islets rather than a few large continents?

Coase's answer was that traditional theory disregarded what he called transaction costs, i.e., the time, work and other resources used in order to enter into contracts and manage firms and similar institutions. His relatively simple - but, as it turned out, highly viable - thesis was that a firm arises if the costs of achieving a certain use of resources are lower when carried out administratively as compared to purchases and sales on the market. If it did not cost anything to enter into contracts, then there would be no need for firms.

This was not only a new view of the firm; from now on a searchlight would be aimed at the abundance of variation inherent in the patterns of contracts which comprise what we usually call "markets".

As a next step, Coase showed that whatever is bought and sold or otherwise becomes the object of a contract does not actually consist of goods and other resources, but of rights to the disposal of goods and resources. Rights such as ownership rights, usership rights, etc. are fundamental components of the economy. Of course, rights are also a basic component of the legal system.

In an influential study, Coase began with a now famous hypothetical experiment. He examined a court which has to determine whether a certain right should be awarded to one or the other of two subjects, each of whom is engaged in a particular type of activity. This, in fact, is a very common decision situation in the legal system. If no resources whatsoever would be consumed in contracting, as economists and perhaps even lawyers carelessly used to presuppose, then - according to Coase - it does not really matter how the court decides. The right will still end up with the party who can achieve the largest output. If she does not receive the right directly from the legal or judicial authority, then she will buy it from the other party, who stands to gain by selling it.

The conclusion of the experiment is that if, in reality, transaction costs were zero, then a great deal of legislation would obviously be pointless and unnecessary. Earlier, Coase had found that firms do not serve any purpose if transaction costs are zero. Supported by empirical studies, such as legal cases, he could now draw his fundamental conclusion: that not only firms and large bodies of the law, but the entire institutional structure of the economy can be explained by transaction costs. Transaction costs and a formulation in terms of rights: two relatively simple ideas - but with the power to propel all the economic sciences, and legal science as well, in new directions.

Professor Coase, By your refusal to take anything for granted, and your skepticism toward conventional wisdom, you have succeeded in explaining the principles behind the institutional structure of the economy. You have remarkably improved our understanding of the way the economic system functions - although it took some time for the rest of us to realize it. On behalf of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, I congratulate you warmly and sincerely. May I ask you to receive, from the hands of His Majesty the King, this year's Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.

From Nobel Lectures, Economics 1991-1995, Editor Torsten Persson, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 1997

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The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 1991, to Professor Ronald Coase, University of Chicago, USA, for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy. Breakthrough in Understanding the Institutional Structure of the Economy Until recently, basic economic analysis concentrated on studying the functioning of the economy in the framework of an institutional structure which was taken as given. Efforts to explain the institutional structure were usually considered unnecessary or futile. For instance, the existence of organizations of the type we call firms seemed almost self-evident. Observed variations in contract forms in the economic sphere were also regarded as a given fact, and the laws and rules of the legal system were perceived as an externally imposed setting for economic activity. By means of a radical extension of economic micro theory, Ronald Coase succeeded in specifying principles for explaining the institutional structure of the economy, thereby also making new contributions to our understanding of the way the economy functions. His achievements have provided legal science, economic history and organization theory with powerful impulses and are therefore also highly significant in an interdisciplinary context. Coase's contributions are the result of methodical research work, where each segment was gradually added to the next over a period of many years. It took a long time for his approach to gain a foothold. When the breakthrough finally occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, it was all the more emphatic. Today Coase's theories are among the most dynamic forces behind research in economic science and jurisprudence. Coase showed that traditional basic microeconomic theory was incomplete because it only included production and transport costs, whereas it neglected the costs of entering into and executing contracts and managing organizations. Such costs are commonly known as transaction costs and they account for a considerable share of the total use of resources in the economy. Thus, traditional theory had not embodied all of the restrictions which bind the allocations of economic agents. When transaction costs are taken into account, it turns out that the existence of firms, different corporate forms, variations in contract arrangements, the structure of the financial system and even fundamental features of the legal system can be given relatively simple explanations. By incorporating different types of transaction costs, Coase paved the way for a systematic analysis of institutions in the economic system and their significance. Coase also demonstrated that the power and precision of analysis may be enhanced if it is carried out in terms of rights to use goods and factors of production instead of the goods and factors themselves. These rights, which came to be called "property rights" in economic analysis, may be comprised of full ownership, different kinds of usership rights or specific and limited decision and disposal rights, defined by clauses in contracts or by internal rules in organizations. The definition of property rights and their distribution among individuals by law, contract clauses and other rules determine economic decisions and their outcome. Coase showed that every given distribution of property rights among individuals tends to be reallocated through contracts if it is to the mutual advantage of the parties and not prevented by transaction costs, and that institutional arrangements other than contracts emerge if they imply lower transaction costs. Modifications of legal rules by courts and legislators are also encompassed by these arrangements. Property rights thus constitute a basic component in analyses of the institutional structure of the economy. In perhaps somewhat pretentious terminology, Coase may be said to have identified a new set of "elementary particles" in the economic system. Other researchers, to some extent under the influence of Coase, have also made pioneering contributions to the study of property rights. Coase's Contributions: First Stage In his first major study entitled, The Nature of the Firm, Coase posed two questions which had seldom been the objects of strict economic analysis and, prior to Coase, lacked robust and valid solutions, i.e. , why are there organizations of the type represented by firms and why is each firm of a certain size? A key result in traditional theory was to show the ability of the price system (or the market mechanism) to coordinate the use of resources. The applicability of this theory was diminished by the fact that a large proportion of total use of resources was deliberately withheld from the price mechanism in order to be coordinated administratively within firms. This is the point at which Coase introduced transaction costs and illustrated their crucial importance. Alongside production costs, there are costs for preparing, entering into and monitoring the execution of all kinds of contracts, as well as costs for implementing allocative measures within firms in a corresponding way. If these circumstances are taken into account, it may be concluded that a firm originates when allocative measures are carried out at lower total production, contract and administrative costs within the firm than by means of purchases and sales on the market. Similarly, a firm expands to the point where an additional allocative measure costs more internally than it would through a contract on markets. If transaction costs were zero, no firms would arise. All allocation would take place through simple contracts between individuals. An important element in the model is that there are two types of contracts: those which stipulate the parties' total obligations (or, the reverse, rights) and those which are deliberately made incomplete by not specifying all obligations, but intentionally allow a free margin for unilateral decisions by one of the parties. Such "open" agreements may be exemplified by employment contracts, which usually leave room for direction and giving orders. According to Coase's theory, the firm is characterized by the latitude for decision created by a particular cluster of such open contracts. The firm in fact consists of this array of contracts and is related to the rest of the world by other fully specified contracts regarding purchases of inputs, sales of products, and loans under prescribed terms. Coase's formulation has proved to be exceedingly practicable and has given rise to intensive examination of the contract relations which characterize firms. It is now clear that every type of firm is comprised of a distinctive contract structure and thereby a specific distribution of rights and obligations (property rights). Coase's work on the firm has become the basis for rapidly expanding research on principal-agent relations. It has also influenced vital aspects of financial economics, such as the lively research devoted to explaining the pattern of financial intermediaries. Coase's Contributions: Second Stage In retrospect, it is easy to realize that these examinations of firms' basic characteristics would provide a basis for more general conclusions regarding the institutional structure of the economic system. Coase himself laid the groundwork in a subsequent stage. In another major study entitled, The Problem of Social Cost , Coase introduced the set-up in terms of rights or property rights. He postulated that if a property right is well defined, if it can be transferred, and if the transaction costs in an agreement which transfers the right from one holder to another are zero, then the use of resources does not depend on whether the right was initially allotted to one party or the other (except for the difference which can arise if the distribution of wealth between the two parties is affected). If the initial holding entailed an unfavorable total result, the better result would be brought about spontaneously through a voluntary contract, as it can be executed at no cost and both parties gain from it. In other words, all legislation which deals with granting rights to individuals would be meaningless in terms of the use of resources; parties would "agree themselves around" every given distribution of rights if it is to their mutual advantage. Thus, a large amount of legislation would serve no material purpose if transaction costs are zero. This thesis is a direct parallel to the conclusion in The Nature of the Firm that firms under the same conditions are superfluous. All allocations could be effectuated through simple, uncomplicated agreements without administrative features, i.e. , through frictionless markets. This led Coase to conclude that it is the fact that transaction costs are never zero which indeed explains the institutional structure of the economy, including variations in contract forms and many kinds of legislation. Or, more exactly, the institutional structure of the economy may be explained by the relative costs of different institutional arrangements, combined with parties' efforts to keep total costs at a minimum. Alongside price formation, the formation of the institutional structure is regarded as an integral step in the process of resource distribution. Hence, economic institutions do not require a "separate" theory. It is sufficient to render existing theory complete and formulate it in terms of the primary components, i.e., property rights. These conclusions concerning the radical effects of ever prevalent transaction costs are thus the main result of Coase's analysis. Somewhat paradoxically, circumstances have ordained that it is the preceding conclusion about the consequences of overlooking transaction costs which has come to be called the "Coase Theorem". Of course, the situation without transaction costs is only a hypothetical norm of comparison. However, it can facilitate the analysis of real-world conditions. It may also inspire studies of contracting which can actually be observed, in areas where earlier theory prematurely took it for granted that transaction costs are so high that contracts are inconceivable. Further examinations by Coase himself or students and others inspired by him have shown that in some such cases, transaction costs are not so high as to preclude a contract. Such contracts are found to have strong peculiarities, created by the parties in order to alleviate the drawbacks of high transaction costs. These observations are wholly in line with Coase's main conclusion. In cases where transaction costs absolutely prevent a contract, there is - as inferred by the theorem - a tendency for other institutional arrangements to arise, for example a firm or amended legislation. The circle is closed; this is exactly the message conveyed by The Nature of the Firm.

As regards legislation, in The Problem of Social Cost , Coase developed a hypothesis concerning the behavior of courts in rather frequent cases where two (or more) parties dispute rights and where agreements are impossible or extremely difficult because of high transaction costs. Coase found that courts probably try to distribute the rights among the parties so as to realize the solution which would have been the outcome of an agreement, if such an agreement had been possible. The underlying idea is that this is a natural and rational way for a court to reason if it is more intent on setting a precedent to generate expedient incentives for the future than solving a particular dispute. This means that common pleas courts serve as an extension of the market mechanism to areas where it cannot function due to transaction costs. This hypothesis has become immensely important because, along with the general formulation in terms of rights or property rights, it has become the impetus for developing the new discipline of "law and economics" and, in prolongation, for renewal of many aspects of legal science.

Ronald H. Coase – Banquet Speech

Ronald H. Coase's speech at the Nobel Banquet, December 10, 1991

Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have been deeply moved by the honour paid to me by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and by the recognition thus given to the study of the institutional structure of the economy. By drawing attention to the importance of this subject, the Academy has in effect honoured all economists who work in this field. It is my expectation that their researches will greatly increase our understanding of the institutional structure and, by so doing, will aid businessmen in their choice of business practices, will improve government economic policy and in consequence will lead to a more productive economy. It is fashionable in some circles to denigrate greater production but as Arthur Lewis, a Nobel Laureate who, to our great loss, died earlier this year, once reminded us, it is only recently and only in some countries that as a result of the greater productivity of the economy, that women have ceased to be little more than beasts of burden. The task of economists is a humble one but nonetheless essential. Maynard Keynes once said that economists are the trustees not of civilisation but of the possibility of civilisation. If we economists succeed in our task, let us hope that the rest of society will take advantage of the opportunities thus afforded and that a civilised life will be achieved in all countries of the world.

FromLes Prix Nobel 1991.

Curriculum Vitae

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Ronald H. Coase Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics 1111 East 60th Street Chicago, IL 60637 phone: 773-702-7342

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Education Kilburn Grammar School, 1923-1929. London School of Economics, 1929-1931. University of London, B. Com. 1932, D.Sc. (Econ.) 1951. University of Cologne, Dr. Rer. Pol. h.c., 1988. Yale University, D. So. Sc., (honorary) 1989. Washington University in St. Louis, LL.D., (honorary) 1991. University of Dundee, Scotland, LL.D., (honorary) 1992. University of Buckingham, England, D.Sci, (honorary) 1995. Beloit College, D.H.L., (honorary) 1996. Universite de Paris?I, docteur, (honoris causa) 1996.

Experience University of Chicago Law School Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics, and Senior Fellow in Law and Economics, since 1982- present. Clifton R. Musser Professor of Economics, 1971-81. Professor of Economics, 1964-70. University of Kansas Distinguished Professor (visiting) of Law and Economics, 1991. University of Virginia Professor, 1958-64. University of Buffalo Professor, 1951-58. London School of Economics Reader, 1947-51. Lecturer, 1938-47. Assistant Lecturer, 1935-38. University of Liverpool Assistant Lecturer, 1934-35. Dundee School of Economics and Commerce Assistant Lecturer, 1932-34. Sir Ernest Cassel Travelling Scholar, 1931-32.

Professional Affiliations Distinguished Fellow, American Economic Association Honorary Fellow, London School of Economics Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Corresponding Fellow, the British Academy. Membre Titulaire, The European Academy. Law and Economics Center Prize, University of Miami, 1980. D. Francis Bustin Prize, University of Chicago, 1988. Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 1991.

Publications, Presentations and Works in Progress

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Ronald H. Coase Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics 1111 East 60th Street Chicago, IL 60637 phone: 773-702-7342

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(Books and Pamphlets | Articles | Criticism and Discussion | Position Papers | Videos)

Books and Pamphlets

The Firm, the Market and the Law (Foreign editions: Japanese, 1992, Swedish, 1992, Spanish, 1994, Chinese, 1995, Italian, 1995, French, 1997).

Essays on Economics and Economists (University of Chicago Press, 1994).

Essays on the Institutional Structure of Production (Chinese translation, Shanghai, 1990).

The Firm, the Market, and the Law (University of Chicago Press, 1988).

Educational TV. Who Should Pay? Rational Debate Seminars, American Enterprise Institute (1968) (with Edward W. Barrett).

British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly (Longmans Green, Great Britain; Harvard University Press, United States, 1950).

The Iron and Steel Industry 1926?1935: An Investigation Based on the Accounts of Public Companies, Special Memorandum No. 49 of the London and Cambridge Economic Service (1939) (with R.S. Edwards and R.F. Fowler).

Published Balance Sheets as an Aid to Economic Investigation-Some Difficulties (Accounting Research Association 1938) (with R.S. Edwards and R.F. Fowler).

Articles

"Why Economics Will Change," Remarks at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, April 4, 2002. International Society for New Institutional Economics Newsletter, Volume 4, Number 1, (2002).

"The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors," 43 Journal of Law and Economics 15 (2000).

"The Task of the Society," Opening Address to the Annual Conference, September 17, 1999. International Society for New Institutional Economics Newsletter, Volume 2, Number 2, (Fall 1999).

Interview, International Society for New Institutional Economics Newsletter, Volume 2, Number 1, (1999).

Interview, Context, (Fall 1998).

Comment on Thomas W. Hazlett, "Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?" 41 Journal of Law and Economics (1998).

"The New Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings Volume 88, Number 2, pp.72?74, (May, 1998).

"Aaron Director," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Paul Newman, ed., 1998).

Foreword, The Theory of Committees and Elections, by Duncan Black and Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation by Duncan Black and R.A. Newing, revised second editions (Kluwer, 1998).

Interview, Reason, (January, 1997).

Foreword, Firms, Organizations and Contracts, (Peter J. Buckley and Jonathan Michie ed., 1996).

"Law and Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson," 25 Journal of Legal Studies 103, (1996).

"The Problem of Social Costs: The Citations," 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review 809, (1996).

"The Present State of Economics," Lecture given at the University of Buckingham 1995.

"My Evolution as an Economist," in Lives of the Laureates, 227 (1995).

"Law and Economics at Chicago," 36 Journal of Law and Economics 239 (1993).

"Duncan Black 1908?1991," Proceedings of the British Academy 82 (1993).

"Coase on Posner on Coase and Concluding Comment," 149 Zeitschrift fur die gesamte StaatSwissenschaft (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics) 96, 360 (1993).

"The Institutional Structure of Production: The 1991 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economic Sciences," Les Prix Nobel and American Economic Review, (September, 1992) and elsewhere.

"Contracts and The Activities of Firms," 34 Journal of Law & Economics 451 (1991).

"George J. Stigler," in Remembering the University of Chicago (Edward Shils ed. 1991).

"Accounting and the Theory of the Firm," 12 Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 (1990).

"Alfred Marshall's Family and Ancestry," in Alfred Marshall in Retrospect, Rita McWilliams Tullberg ed. (1990).

"How Should Economists Choose?" in Ideas, Their Origins and Their Consequences: Lectures to Commemorate the Life and Work of G. Warren Nutter 63 (Thomas Jefferson Center Foundation ed. 1988).

"Blackmail," 74 Virginia Law Review 655 (1988). Also as Occasional Paper No. 24, The Law School, University of Chicago (1988).

"The Nature of The Firm, 1. Origin, 2. Meaning, 3. Influence," 4 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 3-47 (1988). Reprinted in The Nature of the Firm (Oliver Williamson and Sidney Winter, eds., Oxford University Press, 1990).

"Arnold Plant," in 3 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 891 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds. 1987).

"Professor Sir Arnold Plant: His Ideas and Influence," in The Unfinished Agenda, Essays in Honour of Arthur Seldon, 79 (1986).

"Alfred Marshall's Mother and Father," 16 History of Political Economy 519 (1984).

"The New Institutional Economics," 140 Zeitschraft fur die gesamte Staat-Swissenschaft (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics) 229 (1984).

"George J. Stigler: An Appreciation," 6 Regulation 21 (1982).

"How Should Economists Choose?" G. Warren Nutter Lecture in Political Economy (American Enterprise Institute, 1982).

"Economics at LSE in the 1930s: A Personal View," 10 Atlantic Economic Journal 31 (1982).

"Duncan Black: A Biographical Sketch," in Toward a Science of Politics 1 (G. Tullock ed. 1981).

"The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment," 24 Journal of Law & Economics 183 (1981).

"Should the Federal Communications Commission Be Abolished?" in Regulation, Economics and the Law 41 (Bernard H. Siegan ed. 1979) (with Nicholas Johnson).

"Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting," 22 Journal of Law & Economics 269 (1979).

"Economics and Biology: A Comment," 68 American Economic Review 244 (1978).

Introduction, in Armen Alchian, Economic Forces at Work (1977).

"Economics and Contiguous Disciplines," in The Organization and Retrieval of Economic Knowledge (Mark Perlman ed. 1977). Also in 7 Journal of Legal Studies 201 (1978).

"Advertising and Free Speech," 6 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1977). Also in Advertising and Free Speech (Allen Hyman & M. Bruce Johnson eds. 1977).

"The Wealth of Nations. An Address by Professor R.H. Coase," Los Angeles, Foundation for Research in Economics and Education, 1976. Also 15 Economic Inquiry 309 (1977).

Introduction to Francis A. Allen, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with Legal Education. International Institute for Economic Research, (Reprint Paper 3, 1977.)

"Adams Smith's View of Man," 19 Journal of Law & Economics 529 (1976)

"Marshall on Method," 18 Journal of Law & Economics 25 (1975).

"The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment," 17 Journal of Law & Economics 493 (1974).

"The Lighthouse in Economics," 17 Journal of Law & Economics 357 (1974) Also in The Theory of Market Failure 255 (Tyler Cowen ed. 1988).

"Economists and Public Policy," in Large Corporations in a Changing Society (J. Fred Weston ed. 1974).

"The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas," 64 American Economic ,Review, Papers & Proceedings 384 (1974). Also in Price Theory 559 (Harry Townsend ed. 2nd edition 1980).

"The Appointment of Pigou as Marshall's Successor," 15 Journal of Law & Economics 473 (1972).

"Durability and Monopoly," 15 Journal of Law & Economics 143 (1972).

"Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research," in Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization (Victor R. Fuchs ed. 1972).

"The Auction System and North Sea Gas: A Comment," 13 Journal of Law & Economics 45 (1970).

"The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and its Application," 1 Bell Journal of Economics 113 (1970).

"Social Cost and Public Policy," in Exploring the Frontiers of Administration (George A. Edwards ed. 1970).

"Consumer's Surplus," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968).

"The Theory of Public Utility Pricing," in The Economics of Regulation of Public Utilities (1966).

"The Economics of Broadcasting and Government Policy," 56 American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings 440 (1966). Also in The Crisis of the Regulatory Commissions (P.W. McAvoy ed. 1970).

"Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and Economic Issues," 41 Land Economics 161 (1965).

"The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee," 5 Journal of Law & Economics 17 (1962).

"The Outreach of Government: At What Point Peril?" Analysis (October 1962).

"The British Post Office and the Messenger Companies," 4 Journal of Law & Economics 12 (1961).

"Why Not Use the Pricing System in the Broadcast Industry?" The Freeman (July 1961).

"The Problem of Social Cost," 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1 (1960). Also in Readings in Microeconomics (William Breit and Harold M. Hochman eds. 1968) and elsewhere.

"The Federal Communications Commission," 2 Journal of Law & Economics 1 (1959). Also in the Yearbook of Broadcasting Articles, Anthology edition (1980) and elsewhere.

"The Postal Monopoly in Great Britain: An Historical Survey," in Economic Essays in Commemoration of the Dundee School of Economics, 1931?55 (J.K. Eastham ed. 1955).

"The Development of the British Television Service," 30 Land Economics 207 (1954).

"The Beveridge Report and Private Enterprise in Broadcasting," The Owl (1951).

"Report on the B.B.C.," Time and Tide (January 20, 1951).

"The B.B.C. Monopoly," Time and Tide (October 7, 1950).

"British Television Policy: Questions of Control and Finance," The [London] Times (September 9, 1950).

"The Nationalization of Electricity Supply in Great Britain," 26 Land Economics 1 (1950).

"Wire Broadcasting in Great Britain," 15 Economica (n.s.) 194 (1948).

"The Origin of the Monopoly of Broadcasting in Great Britain," 14 Economica (n.s.) 189 (1948). Also in Reader in Public Opinion and Communication (1950).

"The Economics of Uniform Pricing Systems," 15 The Manchester School Economics and Social Studies 139 (1947).

"The Marginal Cost Controversy: Some Further Comments," 14 Economica (n.s.) 150 (1947).

"Monopoly Pricing with Interrelated Costs and Demands," 13 Economica (n.s.) 278 (1946).

"The Marginal Cost Controversy," 13 Economica (n.s.) 169 (1946).

"B.B.C. Enquiry?" 176 Spectator 446 (1946).

"Price and Output Policy of State Enterprise: A Comment," 55 Economic Journal 112 (1945).

"The Analysis of Producers' Expectations," 7 Economica (n.s.) 280 (1940) (with R.F. Fowler).

"Rowland Hill and the Penny Post," 6 Economica (n.s.) 423 (1939).

"Business Organization and the Accountant," (a series of 12 articles) The Accountant (October-December 1938). Also in Studies in Costing (David Solomons ed. 1952); and in a shortened form under the title "The Nature of Costs," in Studies in Cost Analysis (David Solomons ed. 1968), and elsewhere.

"The Nature of the Firm," 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937). Also in American Economic Association, Readings in Price Theory, selected by a Committee of the American Economic Association (1952), and elsewhere.

"Some Notes on Monopoly Price," 5 Review of Economic Studies 17 (1937).

"The Pig?Cycle in Great Britain: An Explanation," 4 Economica 55 (1937) (with R.F. Fowler).

"The Pig?Cycle: A Rejoinder," 2 Economica (n.s.) 423 (1935) (with R.F. Fowler).

"Bacon Production and the Pig?Cycle in Great Britain," 2 Economica (n.s.) 142 (1935) (with R.F. Fowler).

"The Problem of Duopoly Reconsidered," 2 Review of Economic Studies 137 (1935).

Criticism and Discussion

Roundtable Discussion, “The Future of Law and Economics,” 64 The University of Chicago Law Review 1132, (Fall 1997).

Comment on Cheung "On the New Institutional Economics" and Panel Discussion Remarks in Contract Economics (Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander eds. 1992).

Comment on "The Muted Voice of the Consumer in Regulatory Agencies," by Colston E. Warne, in A Critique of Administrative Regulation of Public Utilities (W.J. Samuels & H.M. Trebing eds. 1972).

Participation in a discussion by University of Chicago faculty members, Center for Policy Study, "The Legal and Economic Aspects of Pollution," University of Chicago, 1970.

Discussion of "Achieving Efficient Regulation of a Fishery," in Economics of Fisheries Management: A Symposium (A.D. Scott ed 1970). Vancouver, University of British Columbia.

Discussion of "Direct Regulation and Market Performance in the American Economy," by Richard E. Caves; and "The Effectiveness of Economic Regulation: A Legal View," by Roger C. Cramton, 54 American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings 194 (1964). Also reprinted in revised form in The Crisis of the Regulatory Commissions (P.W. McAvoy ed. 1970).

Comments on "Full Costs, Cost Changes and Prices," and "Characteristics and Types of Price Discrimination," in Universities' National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, Business Concentration, and Price Policy (1955).

Discussion of "The Trend of Public Employment in Great Britain and the United States" by Moses Abramovitz and Vera Eliasberg, 43 American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings 234 (1953).

Position Papers

United States Policy Regarding the Law of the Seas, in Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, part 2, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., at 1160 (March 5, 6, and 11, 1974).

Working Paper for the Task Force on Productivity and Competition: The Conglomerate Merger 115 Congressional Record 15932, 15938 (June 16, 1969). Also in 1 Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business, 91st Cong., 1st sess., appendix (October 7?9, 1969).

Report by President Nixon's Task Force on Productivity and Competition (George Stigler, chairman 1969).

Videos

Centennial Coase Lecture (April 1, 2003)

"Ronald H. Coase," the Intellectual Portrait Series, Liberty Fund, 2002. "Transition in Eastern Europe," Idea Channel, 1995 (with Gary Becker).

"Consumer Behavior," Idea Channel, 1995 (with Gary Becker).

Additional Activities

---

Ronald H. Coase Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics 1111 East 60th Street Chicago, IL 60637 phone: 773-702-7342

---

Consulting Director and Academic Advisory Chair, Contracting and Organizations Research Institute, University of Missouri, Columbia, since 2002.

Research Advisor, Ronald Coase Institute, since 2000.

President, International Society for New Institutional Economics, 1997.

Chairman, Advisory Board, Center for Research on Contracts and the Structure of Enterprise, Katz School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, 1991-2002.

Editor, Journal of Law and Economics, 1964-82.

Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, 1977.

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, 1958-59.

Rockefeller Fellow, 1948.

Acting British Director of Statistics and Intelligence, Combined Production and Resources Board and Representative of Central Statistical Office (United Kingdom) in Washington, 1945-46.

Statistician, later Chief Statistician, Central Statistical Office, Offices of the War Cabinet, (United Kingdom), 1941-46.

Head of Statistical Division, Forestry Commission, (United Kingdom) 1940-41.

好东西

出手不凡，似乎在开专栏！谢谢了

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-15 12:20:48编辑过]

到目前为止，所有的Nobel Lectures in Economic Sciences除2004年的外已全部上传。希望对各位xdjm有用。也请斑竹加精并加分。有的帖子要求800分，我还差一点点儿。请斑竹帮忙！谢谢！因为最后发的文件里包含几个经济学家的Nobel Lectures，因此就没能对其进行说明，希望各位xdjm谅解！

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-15 12:22:21编辑过]

好东西，应该给多家分

谢谢！希望斑竹能给我加精并加分就行了。在此谢谢看过我的帖子并回帖了的xdjm！

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-17 20:19:31编辑过]

Paul A. Samuelson – Biography

"In this age of specialization, I sometimes think of myself as the last 'generalist' in economics," wrote Paul Anthony Samuelson, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "with interests that range from mathematical economics down to current financial journalism. My real interests are research and teaching... " His work in economic theory has been in modern welfare economics, linear programming, Keynesian economics, economic dynamics, international trade theory, logic choice and maximization. In terms of economic philosophy, Professor Samuelson calls himself "a 'modern' economist... in the right wing of the Democratic New Deal economists." He was born in Gary, Indiana, in 1915. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Chicago University in 1935, and the degrees of Master of Arts in 1936, and Doctor of Philosophy in 1941 from Harvard University. He was a Social Science Research Council predoctoral fellow from 1935-1937, a member of the Society of Fellows, Harvard University, 1937-1940, and a Ford Foundation Research Fellow from 1958-1959. He received honorary Doctor of Laws degrees from Chicago University and Oberlin College in 1961, and from Indiana University and East Anglia University (Eng.) in 1966. He was awarded the David A. Wells Prize in 1941 by Harvard University, and the John Bates Clark Medal by the American Economic Association in 1947, as the living economist under forty "who has made the most distinguished contribution to the main body of economic thought and knowledge." Even while a graduate student at Harvard, he had already won international renown and had made significant contributions to economic theory. Confronted by contradictions, overlaps, and fallacies in the classical language of economics, he sought unification - and clarification - in mathematics. In his first major work, Foundations of Economic Analysis, published in 1947, he demonstrated that this approach worked. He told economists that they had been practicing "mental gymnastics of a peculiarly depraved type," and that they were like "highly-trained athletes who never run a race." He was not claiming mathematics as the cure-all or end-all of economic analysis, but he was insisting that mathematics was essential to an understanding of what economics was all about. His Economics: An Introductory Analysis, first published in 1948, has become the best selling economics textbook of all time. The textbook has sold more than a million copies and has been translated into French, German, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Arabic. It is now in its fifth edition. "The book's emphasis on different themes has changed with the changing of the nation's economic problems," wrote Business Week in 1959. "The first edition was dominated by the end-of-the-war worry that widespread unemployment would return... later editions put growing stress on fiscal and monetary controls over inflation. In the later editions Samuelson has worked toward what he calls a 'neoclassical synthesis' of ancient and modern economic findings. Briefly, his synthesis is that nations today can successfully control either depression or inflation by fiscal and monetary policies... Some economists feel that Samuelson's book... is really his greatest contribution. It has gone a long way toward giving the world a common economic language." He was co-author of Readings in Economics, published in 1955, and has co-authored numerous other works in the field. His latest book is Linear Programming and Economic Analysis, written in collaboration with Robert Dorfman and Robert Solow and sponsored by a grant from the Rand Corporation. Mathematical economics is applied to practical problems in international trade, transportation and marketing, competitive strategy in business and government, industrial production, and defense planning. Such complex problems of choice can now be analysed by the mathematical economics which Professor Samuelson has developed. He came to M.I.T. in 1940 as an Assistant Professor of Economics and was appointed Associate Professor in 1944. He served as a staff member of the Radiation Laboratory from 1944-1945, was Professor of International Economic Relations (part-time) at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1945. He was appointed Professor at M.I.T. in 1947 and is now an Institute Professor. He was a Guggenheim Fellow from 1948-1949. Professor Samuelson has served widely as a consultant. He worked for the National Resources Planning Board from 1941-1943 (in charge of war-time planning for continuing full employment); the War Production Board and Office of War Mobilization and Reconstruction in 1945 (economic and general planning program); the United States Treasury, 1945-1952; the Bureau of the Budget in 1952; the Research Advisory Panel to the President's National Goals Commission from 1959-1960; the Research Advisory Board Committee for Economic Development in 1960. He was a member of the National Task Force on Economic Education from 1960-1961 and has been a consultant to the Rand Corporation since 1949. He is an informal consultant for the United States Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisors. He is also a consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank. He was Economic Advisor to Senator, candidate, and President-elect Kennedy and was the author of the January 5, 1961 "Samuelson Report on the State of the American Economy to President-elect Kennedy." His consultation for the government has brought him national recognition as an economic advisor. In 1965 he was elected president of the International Economic Association. Contributing in 1958 to a symposium sponsored by the Committee for Economic Development on "What is the most important economic problem to be faced by the United States in the next twenty years?" Professor Samuelson answered, "The threat of inflation." "The history of the twentieth century," he wrote, " - America's century! - has been pretty much a history of rising prices... inflation is itself a problem. But the legitimate and hysterical fears of inflation are - quite aside from the evil of inflation itself - likely, in their own right, to be problems. In short, I fear inflation. And I fear the fear of inflation. Avoiding inflation is not an absolute imperative, but rather is one of a number of conflicting goals that we must pursue and that we may often have to compromise. Even if the military outlook were serene - and it is not - modern democracies must expect in the future to be much of the time at, or near, the point where inflation is a concern. Our greatest economic problem will be to face that concern realistically, to weigh inflation's quantitative evil against the evils of actions taken against it, to develop methods of adjusting to the residue of inflation which attainment of the 'golden mean' might involve. The challenge is great but the prognosis is cheerful." In an interview in 1960 with U.S. News World Report, Professor Samuelson talked about a new kind of inflation - what he called "cost-push." As contrasted to the familiar kind of inflation - where too much spending power pulls up prices and wages - cost-push inflation is "a force that operates year-in and year-out, whenever we are at high employment, to push up prices. It's a price creep, not a price gallop; but the bad thing about it is that, instead of setting in only after you have reached overfull employment, the suspicion is dawning that it may be a problem that plagues us even when we haven't arrived at a satisfactory level of employment." In his report to President-elect Kennedy in 1961 on the state of the American economy, he wrote: "Various experts, here and abroad, believe that the immediate postwar inflationary climate has now been converted into an epoch of price stability. One hopes this cheerful diagnosis is correct. However, a careful survey of the behavior of prices and costs shows that our recent stability in the wholesale price index has come in a period of admittedly high unemployment and slackness in our economy. For this reason it is premature to believe that the restoration of high employment will no longer involve problems concerning the stability of prices. "Economists are not yet agreed how serious this new malady of inflation really is. Many feel that new institutional programs, other than conventional fiscal and monetary policies, must be devised to meet this new challenge. But whatever the merits of the varying views on this subject, it should be made manifest that the goal of high employment and effective real growth cannot be abandoned because of the problematical fear that re-attaining prosperity in America may bring with it some difficulties; if recovery means a reopening of the cost-push problem, then we have no choice but to move closer to the day when that problem has to be successfully grappled with." In this report to President-elect Kennedy, Professor Samuelson made certain minimal policy recommendations "that need to be pushed hard even if the current recession turns out to be one that can be reversed by next summer at the latest." He urged strong support of pledged expenditure programs, including: increasing defense expenditures and foreign aid on a basis of merit and need, vigorously pushing educational programs, high priority for urban renewal and health and welfare programs, highest priority on improving unemployment compensation, acceleration of useful public works and highway construction programs, help for depressed areas programs, and natural resource development projects. To stimulate residential housing, he recommended reducing mortgage rates, mortgage discounts, insurance fees, and extension of maximum amortization periods, and a step-up in the Federal National Mortgage Association mortgage purchasing program. In monetary policy he specifically urged more reliance upon short term issues (to nudge a reduction in long term rates), and decisive actions to improve our international balance of payments position. On the question of unemployment levels, Professor Samuelson made these comments in an interview with U.S. News World Report in December, 1960: "I think, without question, that unemployment of more than 6 per cent is something to be concerned about. You don't push the panic button, but you don't relax and enjoy it either... I myself don't believe in a numbers game in which you give a maximum tolerable percentage, because I think, truly, it does vary with the times... I would hesitate to specify the figure today, but I will say this: it would be, in my mind, less than a 4 per cent figure - that is, for the period ahead. I would not, realistically, think we could hope for a 2 per cent figure in the near future, as certain European countries have been able to do. But I do think that if we are pretty zealous in this matter and insist upon getting low figures - say, 3.5 per cent - then our very success in accomplishing that may lead to a new epoch just beyond when we could hope to go below 3 per cent... " A further question in the interview asked what degree of responsibility the government has to insure high employment. Replied Professor Samuelson: "I think I would say simply that the American people have expressed the choice that it is their concern to see that large departures from high employment will not be tolerated... I never look upon the government as something in Washington that does something to us or for us. I think of public policy as a way in which we organize our affairs, and so I do think it is part of fiscal responsibility and monetary-policy responsibility to be discontented with the sort of unemployment we had in the prewar decade, and with the sort of exuberant booms leading to crises and panics that we have had throughout the history of our capitalistic system." Summing up, he made this prediction for the decade: "I think the '60s will give us the potentiality of very good growth. More and more of our social problems of the past are, in fact, being licked. So I would face the '60s not complacently, but optimistically." Professor Samuelson has been active in a number of honorary and professional organizations. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a fellow of the American Philosophical Society and the British Academy; he is a member and past President (1961) of the American Economic Association; he is a member of the editorial board and past-President (1951) of the Econometric Society; he is a fellow, council member and past Vice-President of the Economic Society. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He is the author of hundreds of articles in journals and magazines. He lives with his wife and six children (including triplet boys) in Belmont, Mass.

From Nobel Lectures, Economics 1969-1980, Editor Assar Lindbeck, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 1992

This autobiography/biography was written at the time of the award and later published in the book series Les Prix Nobel/Nobel Lectures. The information is sometimes updated with an addendum submitted by the Laureate. To cite this document, always state the source as shown above.

据张五常说，他只有看到Samuelson时才发怵！可以想见他在经济学界该有多厉害！

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-15 17:10:46编辑过]

The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1970

Presentation Speech by Professor Assar Lindbeck, Stockholm School of Economics

Your Majesty, Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentleman. One of the salient features of the development of economics during the last decades is the increased degree of formalization of the analytical techniques brought about partly with the aid of mathematical methods. We can perhaps distinguish two different branches of this development. One branch is econometrics, designed for immediate statistical estimation and empirical application - with pioneers such as Ragnar Frisch and Jan Tinbergen, who, last year, jointly received the first prize in economic science in memory of Alfred Nobel - a prize based on a donation by the Bank of Sweden. The second branch is orientated more toward basic theoretical research, without any immediate aims of statistical, empirical confrontation. It is in this latter area that Professor Paul Samuelson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA, has made his great contributions, and for which he has now been awarded the prize in economic science. Generally speaking, Samuelson's contribution has been that, more than any other contemporary economist, he has contributed to raising the general analytical and methodological level in economic science. He has in fact simply rewritten considerable parts of economic theory. He has also shown the fundamental unity of both the problems and analytical techniques in economics, partly by a systematic application of the methodology of maximization for a broad set of problems. This means that Samuelson's contributions range over a large number of different fields. If we are to try to summarize his research achievements and to give a concrete idea of them, it is therefore necessary to limit ourselves to a few examples. We can perhaps divide his contributions into four main areas. The first area is dynamic theory and stability analysis. The characteristic feature of this field is that the analysis is not, as in static analysis, limited to equilibrium positions. Instead, the emphasis is on the question of how the economic system behaves outside equilibrium, and how the economy develops from period to period in a chain of development phases. What Samuelson has done here is, in particular, to specify the conditions under which an economic system is stable, in the sense that it tends to return by itself to equilibrium after a disturbance. He found that the conditions for stability often coincide with the conditions under which static analysis leads to what are usually regarded as "normal" conclusions, such as the conclusion that an increase in demand results in a rise in the equilibrium price. This is, in fact, an application of Samuelson's famous "correspondence principle", whereby a bridge was built between static and dynamic analysis, which earlier had usually been regarded as two completely different methods of analysis. Another area where Samuelson has made great contributions is consumption theory and the closely connected theory of index numbers. In older theory in this field, it was usual to start with the assumption that households display well-defined preference patterns for consumer goods, in the sense that they can define how they evaluate alternative baskets of consumer goods. On this basis, theorems about consumer behavior were derived by deductive methods, by analyzing the effects of changes in, for instance, incomes and prices. Samuelson started at the other end, by defined preferences on the basis of observable behavior. The household, so to speak, revealed its preferences by its own behavior. This was the starting point for Samuelson's theory of "revealed preferences", a theory which has provided economists with considerably improved tools for analysis in consumption theory. Empirical studies of observable behaviour became better integrated with our theoretical constructs. A third area where Samuelson has made great contributions is general equilibrium theory, in which is studied the interaction between a great number of different variables - in principle, all prices and quantities in the economic system. A few examples from international trade theory can be used as illustrations of this. One example is the question of the gains from international trade. It has long been known that international trade, under certain well-defined conditions, leads to a higher national income for the countries concerned. It is also known that foreign trade may lead to income redistributions within countries, with the result that certain groups are in fact pushed into less-preferred positions. The question then is whether we may say, in a meaningful way, that a country, as a whole, has gained by international trade. What Samuelson did here was to show that those individuals gaining by such trade will be better off even if they have to compensate completely those who tend to lose on international trade. In this sense, free trade is potentially superior to protection. In analyzing the effects of tariffs on the distribution of income, Samuelson also showed, together with Wolfgang Stolper, that a tariff that raises the price of an import commodity results in an increase in the factor rewards for those factors of production which are used relatively intensively in the production of the protected commodity, whereas the factor rewards for other factors will fall. Samuelson also showed under what conditions international trade results in an equalization of the factor rewards between countries engaged in international trade - the so-called "Factor Price Equalization Theorem". Here Samuelson followed up a line of research started by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. A fourth area, finally, where Samuelson has made outstanding contributions, is in the field of capital theory. One criticism which has long been directed against traditional capital theory is that it is based on the assumption that it is possible to construct a concept of an aggregate stock of capital, that is, a sum in money terms of the value of all capital goods in society. Samuelson now showed, partly in cooperation with Robert Solow, that it is possible to develop a logical capital theory - and to speak about a well-defined price of capital - even without adopting such an aggregate concept of capital. Another contribution within capital theory was that Samuelson further elaborated the conditions for economic efficiency over time. It is in this context that we should see his famous "turnpike theorem" which defines conditions for maximal growth and shows that it might pay for a country to choose an economic growth path characterized by a maximal growth rate - what he calls a "turnpike" - with proportions between the production sectors that are completely different from the proportions we start from, or those we intend to achieve in the final position. I now turn to you, Professor Samuelson. You have, probably more than anybody else, shown the advantages of strict formalization of economic analysis. Thereby you have, in fact, set the style for several generations of economists during the last decades. In spite of the high level of abstraction of much of your work, you have dealt with important economic and social problems in the real world. The sense of relevance in your production can be found in practically all fields where you have worked: in building your consumption theory on observable behavior, on the basis of your theory of "revealed preferences"; in formulating capital theory in the context of a large number of heterogenous capital goods; in analyzing dynamic processes and stability in situations outside equilibrium situations; in explaining business cycles by a combined multiplier-accelerator model; in studying the place of collective goods in the context of general equilibrium analysis; in analyzing maximum growth; in studying the distribution of consumption between generations by your "consumption loan" model; and in analyzing the gains from trade and the effects of tariffs on the distribution of income. It is safe to say that, in many of these fields, you have achieved classical, not to say, "definite", formulations in the context of neo-classical or neo-Keynesian economic theory. It is a great honour to convey to you the congratulations of the Royal Academy of Sciences, and to ask you to accept from the hands of His Majesty, the King, the 1970 Prize in Economic Science dedicated to the memory of Alfred Nobel.

From Nobel Lectures, Economics 1969-1980, Editor Assar Lindbeck, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 1992

Paul A. Samuelson – Banquet Speech

Paul A. Samuelson's speech at the Nobel Banquet in Stockholm, December 10, 1970

Your Majesty, Your Royal Highnesses, Students of Stockholm, I stand here tonight to respond to your nice words as a consequence of the normal working out of the democratic process: because I am allergic to committees or am too much the absent-minded professor, the other Laureates met to select a speaker without me. Naturally, then, they nominated me for this task. Still, I hope you will not freeze into custom the habit of having the economist make your speeches even if, alas, therein may lie his comparative advantage. I say alas because there is only one law in the science of talk, that of Gresham's law whereby bad talk drives out good.

On behalf of my colleagues, we say thanks to you students for joining in these festivities. You are the posterity we work for. I can assure you that we are bestowing on you the most glorious gift of all - plenty of difficult problems still unsolved.

Perhaps I may in concluding be permitted to interrupt the gaiety of these ceremonials with one note of regret. I speak to you from the mind. If Alexander Solzhenitsyn had been here to speak from the heart, from his heart, all of us would be the better for it, you and me, all mankind and I dare to think every country under the sun without a single exception. His spirit hovers over our celebration here tonight. Thank you.

From Les Prix Nobel 1970.

How I Became an Economist

by Paul A. Samuelson 1970 Prize Winner in Economics

From one point of view my studying economics was the result of accidental blind chance. Prior to graduating from high school I was born again at 8:00 a.m., January 2, 1932, when I first walked into the University of Chicago lecture hall. That day's lecture was on Malthus's theory that human populations would reproduce like rabbits until their density per acre of land reduced their wage to a bare subsistence level where an increased death rate came to equal the birth rate. So easy was it to understand all this simple differential equation stuff that I suspected (wrongly suspected) I was missing out on some mysterious complexity.

Luck? Yes. And all my life I have been at the right place at the right time. Chicago was at that period the top center for old-fashioned neoclassical micro-economic study. But I didn't know that; my reason for entering there was simply because the University of Chicago was close to my school and home. Later when I was bribed to leave the Eden of the Chicago womb, choice boiled down to either the Harvard or the Columbia Graduate School. My revered Chicago mentors--Frank Knight, Jacob Viner, Henry Simons, Paul Douglas, ...--without exception said, "Pick Columbia." Never one to blindly accept adult advice, I picked Harvard. I picked it by miscalculation, expecting that it would be a little oasis on rolling green hills.

Thanks in part to the evils of Adolph Hitler, my 1935-40 sojourn at Harvard coincided with its economics renaissance under Joseph Schumpeter, Wassily Leontief, Gottfried Haberler, and the "American Keynes" Alvin Hansen. (Also, for me, I was able to become the sole protegé of the polymath Edwin Bidwell Wilson, who had himself been the sole protegé of Yale's great physicist Willard Gibbs.) Contemporary Harvard graduate students came to match in brilliance the new Harvard faculty. Richard Musgrave, Wolfgang Stolper, Abram Bergson, Joe Bain, Lloyd Metzler, Richard Goodwin, Robert Triffin, James Tobin, Robert Solow,... --all of them my pals--became the 1950-2000 era stars in world frontier economics. Harvard made us, yes. But as I have written many times, we made Harvard.

The Duke of Wellington said, "The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton." I can say, "World War II was won in the seminar rooms of Cambridge, Princeton, and Los Alamos."

Perhaps more important than the causal role of casual luck was the salutary fact that economics was just right for me. This field was then entering a mathematical phase in both theory and statistics. As a precocious youngster I had always been good at logical manipulations and puzzle-solving IQ tests. So if economics was made for me, it can be said that I too was made for economics. Never underestimate the vital importance of finding early in life the work that for you is play. This turns possible underachievers into happy warriors.

1932 was the bottom point of the Great Depression. That was a good time to be not yet in the labor market. Just when I had completed my advanced training, World War II came, followed by fifty years of exploding college economics enrollments. My generation had a strong wind at its back. My famous teachers had become full professors only after 40. Wunderkinds in my generation could become anointed before age 30. Outside the Ivory Tower, economists were sought out by governments, corporations, Wall Street traders, and textbook publishers. One comes to understand the importance of biography in a scholar's research contributions. Before university, I never opened the copy of Adam Smith on my father's bookshelf. But I did experience first hand, in my virtual infancy, the disappearance of the horse economy, the arrival of indoor plumbing and electric lighting. After that radio waves through the air or TV pictures left one blasé. More important it was to see with my own eyes the First War's induced boom in the U.S. Steel-planned Gary, Indiana: East European workers were overjoyed to be able to work 12-hour shifts, seven days a week. I saw, too, and my family learned the hard way, how recession follows the boom the way sparrows used to follow the horse. Also, when I was age 10 and we lived in Miami Beach, Florida, I experienced first hand what a real estate mania was like. And what it was like when the bubble burst. All that prepared me for the Great Depression and for post-war inflations. My Chicago-trained mind resisted tenaciously the Keynesian revolution; but reason won out over tradition and dogma.

So after all, as I look back in my ninth decade over my long career in economics, I realize that all those incidents of good luck have to be understood against the background of fundamental trends in economic history. Mine has been a grandstand seat from which to observe most of a century of basic economic history. Bliss it was to be in the forefront of the revolutions that have changed economics forever.

Always I have been overpaid to do what has been pure fun.

Is There Life After Nobel Coronation?

by Paul A. Samuelson 1970 Prize Winner in Economics

The Role of Luck

Young Einsteins and Bohrs may have been inspired to be more creative and harder workers by the dream of winning a Nobel Prize. Since there was no political economy Nobel award before 1968, that could not have been an operative motive for my generation of economists.

On the 1970 December day in Stockholm when I met the erudite King Gustaf--who spoke to all new laureates in their own language--my obligatory personal autobiographical speech addressed the question asked so often of Nobelists such as the Swedish chemist Tiselius: "How can one win a Nobel Prize?" With a straight face, I stressed the importance of working hard. Also I ticked off the value of knowing great teachers and great contemporaries at great university centers. Having great students didn't hurt either. Finally, in a crescendo of becoming modesty, I concluded by stressing the indispensable role of simple Luck.¹

This last banality puts emphasis on being at the right place at the right time. After Max Planck stumbled onto quantum physics, opportunity arose for Bohrs and Borns, Heisenbergs and Schrödingers, Einsteins and de Broglies, Diracs and Feynmans. In a way, that is the kind of luck not vouchsafed to a random 1890s physicist. Also, it is a variety of luck to happen to be at Göttingen or Copenhagen in a particularly active epoch. (All the more credit to a Fermi or Landau who started out in Italy or the USSR.) To levitate down from Valhalla to economic studies, a similar serendepity obtained in certain years at Chicago, LSE, Cambridge, and Harvard. Of course, one must add what Pasteur said should go without saying: "Luck fructifies in the prepared mind."

To these obvious connotations of "luck," I need to add attention to a quite different dimension. When A wins a scarce prize, inevitably there is usually a B of essentially equal promise and accomplishment who gets passed over. Science and scholarship constitute a galaxy of stars. Prizes are of necessity, and by their nature, miniscule in number relative to potential deservers of them. The Fifty-fifth Chair of the Academy--the one just not given--is occupied by Nx50 worthy creators. Nature does not define a unique hierarchy of achievement: Newton, Darwin, .... Another committee, or the same one on a rainy day, could spin the wheel of fortune and come up with a different, and who can say an inferior list?

Why is there no Willard Gibbs on the Pantheon's shield? The chance factor of death often intervenes. Why a Marconi and no Hertz?² Deprived by sepsis of a normal life span, Heinrich Hertz, like Moses, could not live on into the Promised Land. Diabetes being the scourge it is, the blessed 1923 Prize for the development of insulin was shared between Banting and his department head Macleod. Fair? Banting did not think so. Boycotting Stockholm, he insisted on splitting his half of the prize money with his lab co-worker Best. Historians of science have concluded that at least four scientists were key to the insulin breakthrough: Banting, Best, Macleod, and a biochemist visiting London, Ontario from Alberta. Judged by cumulative later achievements, Best's was the most distinguished career.

Just as luck may determine whether or not a person ever wins a Nobel, luck can decide whether an ultimate prize comes too late or too early. It ought to be enough, you may say, to receive one's just reward ultimately? Actual human beings have not always felt that way. In point of historical fact, even Planck and Einstein were honored unduly long after their 1900 and 1905 achievements. One great scholar privately complained that Swedish "political correctness" delayed his inevitable award. At another time A and B once shared one award, which competent juries could regard as unfair to each: according to my unprovable surmise it was not because of lack of recognition of B's superlative merits, but rather that some voting member might have begrudged giving a full amount to A. That sort of thing can motivate novels, but of course real life often does anticipate art. In a novel, X's well-deserved recognition can be delayed until after a committee member makes sure that borderline B is beatified. Ibsen's characters know that this sort of thing could never happen in academia.

Important discoveries often come from a team coordinated by a leader. Sometimes the second banana deems it cruel bad luck that all the kudos went to the Maestro. When it was the year for physicist Alvarez to go to Stockholm, he spent his prize money to take all his Berkeley lab with him: they filled a bus. Another Berkeley physicist, when his year arrived, told the press modestly but not necessarily with utterly false modesty, "A Berkeley committee gave me this award. They did so by luckily picking me to have first whack on a new important collidor." Research is a cooperative game involving more players than there can be prize winners.

Effects of the Prize

I pass on to speculations about what the effects the Prize tend to be on a laureate's subsequent career. Certainly, Nobel's own original purpose has not been realized: he seems to have thought that each prize would go for the best work in the recent previous year(s). That prize, he hoped, would subsidize and support the young winner's research efforts for the rest of life. One vulgar view is that the reverse of Nobel's wish is what actually happens. After winners receive the award and adulation, they wither away into vainglorious sterility. More than that, they become pontificating windbags, preaching to the world on ethics and futorology, politics and philosophy. At circular tables, where they sit they believe to be the head of the table. Having known essentially all of the 1969-2002 laureates in economics, I must report a more nuanced pattern of outcomes. Since prizes do not arrive at the beginning of careers or at their inflection points, we ought to estimate before-and-after age-corrected productivities on an age-corrected basis. Once Newton has discovered the one-and-only System of the World, do not expect to find a new version in every subsequent decade.

An acquaintance of mine in biology regarded his Nobel year as the worst one in his life. Being a research wet-lab worker, he hated the press interviews and hoopla. Others I've known have gloried in it: so to speak they sported their bauble on the January subway. One wife of a physical scientist attributed her divorce to the Nobel Prize. (Her spouse has not recorded his opinion.) It is a matter of record that Einstein promised his first wife the future Prize money: in his case this was not an act of chutzpa or hubris--it was a sure-thing expectation. A more recent laureate, receiving the million-dollar award when he did and not a year later, was obligated to split it half-and half with a previous spouse. When the press quizzed him, he replied philosophically: A deal is a deal. One science leader informed me that his prize in effect amplified his subsequent academic salary annually (!) by an equivalent amount. In the more modern epoch, the Nobel Foundation has been such a skillful investor in a time of ebullient stock markets that this can no longer be true.

Here is my summing up. Of the more than two-score economic winners, about half of whom have had their careers closed by death, I judge them to have subsequently published about what could have been rationally extrapolated from profiles of performance. An exact quality measure would be more difficult to estimate.

Nobelists in all fields have been known, like Attila the Hun, to suddenly invade other fields. Study of the brain is one tempting field, but as yet with perhaps no revolutionary breakthroughs. Scholars who began in physics--Delbrück and Crick and Gilbert--do seem to have scored well enough in molecular biology to win the Prize in Medicine (and in Chemistry for Gilbert, ed.). I am not aware that a reverse flow from genetics to physics has been symmetrically voluminous or successful. A scholar I know best, to jusfity his imperialism, proclaimed: "It was Pius Ninth who promulgated the nineteenth century Dogma of Papal Infallibility, asserting, 'Before I was Pope I believed in that. Now that I am Pope, I can feel it.'" The laureate's jest is: "Before I won a Nobel, I felt my omniscience. Now I know it." In my own case, after 1970, I relaxed on Sundays my focus on mathematical economics to publish papers on mathematical Darwinism. It was an engaging experience, and in the event not a particularly humbling one.

Concluding Reflections

Yes, there does seem to be life after Stockholm. But this doesn't give a definitive answer to the question: "Net, are prizes and gold medals good things?" The answer must be Gödel-esque: A Scotch Verdict of "Unprovable."

Is the joy of the universe outweighed by the Weltschmirtz of those who do not win? October can be a somber month in the Senior Common Room: many are called, few are chosen. On the other hand, science, scholarship, and human welfare are bigger than the passing mob of researchers who struggle with them. A more egalitarian society, with no differential payoff to effort and to ability, however acquired, might well be a more serene society. One must weigh against this how actual humans have evolved under the realistic Darwinian and cultural conditions of the past: perhaps cumulative progress might then result to be the less? Is there not some realistic tradeoff between more equality and more cumulative progress?

My title began with a question. And now my final sentence answers a question with a question.

---

1. See my brief personal 1970 autobiography delivered at the Nobel Banquet and my assigned speech to the Stockholm students at the midnight dance. 2. Gustav Ludwig Hertz (not to be confused with Heinrich Hertz referred to by the author) won the Nobel Prize in Physics, 1925. Ed.

萨缪尔森的《经济分析基础》与现代西方经济学的数学化 内容提要:本文对美国著名经济学家、美国第一个诺贝尔经济学奖获得者保罗·A·萨缪尔森的代表作《经济分析基础》的主要内容作了系统的概括性分析，并在此基础上，对萨缪尔森的理论和分析方法及其对现代西方经济学的影响作了客观的的评论。 关键词:萨缪尔森，经济学，纯理论，数学化

本世纪30年代以后（特别是二次大战以后），西方资产阶级经济学的发展主要可以概括为以下3个方面：一、垄断竞争理论，二、现代宏观经济理论，三、经济理论的数学化。美国经济学家张泊伦的垄断竞争理论和英国经济学家罗宾逊的不完全竞争论是上述第一个方面的发展的主要代表。凯恩斯的宏观经济学构成上述第二个方面的发展的基础，凯恩斯及其追随者（包括萨缪尔森）所提出的经济理论和政策形成了二次大战后西方资产阶级经济学发展的主流。萨缪尔森的《经济分析基础》（以下简称《基础》）最早成文于1937一1938年，1941年以论文的形式发表。这部著作主要与上述第三个方面的发展有关，它是现代西方数理经济学的早期代表作之一。这部著作与其他少数几本著作（如希克斯的《价值与资本》 （1939年）和纽曼发表于20和40年代的著作）共同为现代西方数理经济学奠定了基础。按照西方经济学界的看法，西方经济学从用20世纪30年代以前的语言表达和图解式的分析方法转变为用现代数理经济分析方法这一重大发展过程，萨缪尔森作出了具有开创性的贡献。可以说，他所作的贡献比其他任何人都要大。萨缪尔森对西方经济学的发展集中地反映在他的《基础》一书中。《基础》出版以来将近半个世纪的时间里，使用高深数学的风气一直盛行于西方经济学界，这种现象的出现被人归因于《基础》的问世。《基础》在西方经济学中成了一部划时代的著作，甚至有的人把它奉为现代数理经济学的“圣经”。它所开创的数学形式主义与新古典理论相互综合的分析方法——新古典综合分析，在欧美经济学界一直占居着主导地位。以萨缪尔森为代表人物的新古典综合派也一直是西方经济学的主流学派。萨缪尔森本人亦于1970年荣获诺贝尔经济学纪念奖金，成为美国获得诺贝尔经济学奖的第一人。 那么萨缨尔森在《基础》中对西方经济学究竟作了那些“理论贡献”呢？萨缪尔森的数理分析方法对西方经济学后来的发展究竟产生了什么影响呢？对于这些问题，笔者概述如下。 一、《基础》为现代西方经济学增添了一些新内容 萨缪尔森将他在1941年发表的论文“分析经济学的基础”加以改写和扩充，写成《基础》一书，并于1947年出版。该论文的副标题是“经济理论的实际观察意义”，而《基础》的扉页则引用了美国数学家J·威拉德·吉布斯的话。“数学是一种语言”作为警句，可以说，上述副标题和警句以最简明的形式反映了《基础》一书的宗旨和主题。在《基础》中，萨缪尔森用数学方法系统地概述、分析和总结了西方经济学界已有的研究成果，并试图从两个最一般的原理，即最大化原理和对应原理实证性地推导出比较均衡论中的所有重要结论。在用数学方法重新分析和总结前人研究成果的同时，他提出了若干新见解，着重对比较静态学和动态学理论作了补充和发展。 概括他说，《基础》对西方经济学所作的发展可以分为两个方面：其一是将数学形式主义与新古典理论结合在一起，开创一种新的分析方法；其二是在分析总结已有理论的同时，在经济学某些专门领域提出新的理论。两者之中，前者是萨缪尔森的主要贡献。《基础》一书的核心在于“分析”。众所周知，数学中的分析学从极限概念出发发展为了关于导数的理论，使整个数学发生了质的变化。从此，数学由初等数学发展到高等数学，由静止的科学发展为运动的科学。从《基础》的内容来看，作者写作该书的意图是试图在经济学领域引起一场变革，使整个西方经济学的研究方法和理论内容发生彻底的转变。这种变革一旦发生，那么，《基础》中的理论和分析方法作为这一转变的基础和起点，其意义也就显而易见了。随着《基础》的问世，这一变革的确在西方经济学领域里出现了，《基础》一书随之成了一部划时代的著作。 纵览全书，作者从“最大化”假设出发，用数学方法重新概述比较静态学，迸而提出“对应原理”，并以此将比较静态学和动态学结合在一起，试图使经济学从静态和比较静态分析发展为动态分析。根据作者的设想，西方经济学最终还要从动态分析发展为比较动态分析。在这里，整个理论从个别到一般，从静止到运动的发展线索和思路是十分明显的。就经济理论的专门问题来说，《基础》对西方经济理论的发展有：关于最大化原理和对应原理的论述，关于性质、成本和生产函数、消费理论的分析论，显示的偏好理论和动态稳定性理论的分析，这些论述和分析对西方经济学也都产生了重要的影响。下面对这些理论作一简要阐述。 （一）性质分析和最大化原理 关于性质分析和最大化原理的论述贯穿《基础》一书的始终（特别是《基础》的第一章至八章）。所谓性质分析，是一种通过对（代表经济系统的）函数系统中变量变化方向：（即变量变化的代数符号为正或负）的考察来把握函数系统变动的特性的分析。关于性质的假设，在西方经济学发展的早期阶段就已经出现，但是试图通过建立经济模型对性质规定加以系统阐述的作法则出现于20世纪30年代以后，希克斯在他的竞争经济一般均衡模型中第一次进行这种尝试。继希克斯之后，萨缪尔森在《基础》中对性质分析方法作了进一步系统的阐明，并且把性质分析看成是新古典经济学比较静态理论的三个主要来源之一（另外两个主要来源是最大化假设和均衡稳定假设）。在《基础》中，就性质分析来说，萨缪尔森主要集中论述了性质分析中的消元解法，详细阐述了如何依*使一个系统的方程数目与未知数数目相等的方法来解决成本和生产理论，消费者行为理论和福利经济学中的性质确定问题。希克斯和萨缪尔森为性质经济学的全面发展奠定了基础。在他们之后，又有许多经济学者对性质分析作了大量研究，例如兰卡斯特（lancaster）和戈曼（Gorman）60年代所作的研究，使性质分析方法得到进一步发展。 另外，《基础》从最大化（或极大化）原理出发，对成本和生产理论、消费理论和很利经济学进行了分析。“萨缪尔森是认识到并且强调最大化（或同样还有最小化）在比较静态学定理推导中起关键作用的第一个经济学家。例如，适合于产出的供给曲线，对一个利润最大化和接受价格的企业来说总是上升的，而适合于投入的需求曲线则总是下降的，这些仅从最大化假设就可以推导出来。” 从《基础》的篇章结构来看，它有着严谨的逻辑层次。《基础》的第一和第二章概述比较静态学的一般问题。第三章的证明，就大多数经济情况来说，人们凭借均衡位置是极大值或极小值位置的假设便能推导出重要的经济学定理。第四章将最大化原理应用于企业的成本和生产理论。第五章将约束最大化分析应用于消费者行为理论。第六和第七章讨论消费者行为理论中的某些特殊问题。第人章研究福利经济学，在关于社会福利函数的论述中，最大化分析（或极值分析）最终得以全面完成。萨缪尔森运用最大化原理对显示的偏好理论、成本和生产函数作了系统的分析。并且建立了社会福利函数。另外，萨缪尔森证明了下述原理：基本极值问题的解有下述一般特征：（1）与长期相比，短期内的生产要素需 求弹性和商品供给的弹性较低。（2）与非定量配给相比，定量配给条件下产品的（补偿） 消费需求弹性较低。萨缀尔森把这个原理称为夏特利尔原理（Le Chatelier Principle）。 （二）显示的偏好理论 关于显示的偏好理论的分析是《基础》一书的重要内容之一。对西方经济学家来说，有一个迫切需要解决的问题，即是否存在着一种能够表明下述情况的分析方法：人们所观察到的消费选择行为是由人们所观察不到的追求偏好（或效用）最大化的消费动机支配的 （这个问题后来被人看成是所谓的“合理性问题”的一个主要组成部分）。由于大部分经济理论都是以追求偏好（或效用）最大化的消费者行为为根据的，因此解决上述问题对于西方经济学就越发显得重要。显示的偏好理论运用简单的数学方法和逻辑推论表明，选择行为具有追求偏好（或效用）最大化的特征，从而解决了这个问题，因此被西方经济学界看成是对于消费者行为理诊的一大贡献。为解决“合理性问题”，西方经济学界也曾有人用另外的方法进行尝试。这就是“可积性理论”。这是显示的偏好理论与可积性理论所要解决的同一个问题、不过两者在研究方法上有着显著的差别。可积性理论在证明时使用数学上的积分法，并且通常以微分形式表示它的前提假设；而显示的偏好理论在证明过程中使用具有“离散”（或不连续）和“显示”形式的数学方法和假设前提。显示的偏好理论是萨缪尔森于1938年创立的，其中的大部分术语和一些公理也是萨缪尔森提出来的。继萨缪尔森之后，胡萨克（Houthakker）认为萨缪尔森确立的显示的偏好公理是“弱公理”，与此对应，他又提出了显示的偏好的“强公理”。里奇特尔（Richter）进而确立了显示的偏好的“全等公理”。另外，尤咋哇（Uzawa）和罗斯（Rose）等人对于与公理有关的问题作了进一步的证明。从50年代开始至今，有许多经济学家对显示的偏好理论作过研究，显水的偏好理论作为消费理论的重要组成部分逐渐发展起来。 （三）成本和生产理论 《基础》中的成本和生产理论（即成本函数和生产函数）是以利润最大化的原理为基础的。萨缪尔森研究该理论的目的是为了说明需求理论和供给理论的基本特性。究其理论发展过程，关于成本和生产的二重性研究最早出现于霍特林（Hotelling）在30年代发表的两篇文章。继霍特林之后，萨缪尔森在《基础》中，从利润最大化原理出发，对成本函数和生产函数作了系统的性质分析，全面地论证了成本函数与生产函数之间的二重性关系，从而得出有关成本和生产的系统的比较静态结论，并为成本和生产理论的进一步发展提供了条件。随后，谢泼德（Shephard）于1953年出版了一本具有影响的著作——《成本与生产函数》，他利用凸集理论严格地论证了成本函数与生产函数之间的二重性，最终完成了西方经济学中的传统成本和生产理论向现代成本和生产理论的转变。 具体他说，关于生产者行为模型的传统研究方法的出发点是生产函数具有可加性和齐性的前提假设。在生产函数具有可加性和齐性的假设条件下，经济学家们能够从函数以及生产者均衡必要条件推导出需求函数和供给函数。但是，这种方法有一个重要的缺陷，即上述假设对生产者行为类型加上了严格的限制条件，使得上述模型无法与依*实际观察而确定的生产者行为类型相适应。这种不切实际的传统模型是科柏（Cobb）和道格拉斯（Douglas）在1928年创立的，并且一直被西方经济学界沿用了20多年。到了50和60年代，阿罗（Arrow）、钱纳里（Chenerv）、明哈斯（Minhas）和索洛（Solow）等人的研究暴露了传统方法的局限性。他们指出，科柏—道格拉斯生产函数在投入品的替代类型上加了一个先决的限制条件，即所有的投入品之间的替代弹性都必须等于一的限制。这个限制条件使理论研究与实际的经济活动相差甚远。 在批判科柏—道格拉斯生产函数的基础上，阿罗等人建立起常数替代弹性生产函数（即CES生产函数），依*将替代弹性作为函数的一个未知参数，从而使传统方法的灵活性得以增强。然而生产函数仍然保留着可加性和齐性假设，并且在替代类型上加了非常严格的限制条件。例如，麦克法顿（ McFadden）和尤咋哇证明，在CES生产函数中，所有投入品之间的替代弹性必须是相等的。 成本和生产理论的二重性分析，使人们有可能消除传统方法对经济计量模型的限制。这种二重性分析就是上面所说的由霍特林创立、并由萨缪尔森和谢泼德加以发展的成本和生产函数的二重性分析。但是，萨缪尔森在《基础》中并没有对生产和成本函数之间的二重性进行充分彻底的论证，直到1954年他才对常数规模收益生产函数和要素价格边界之间的二重性作了确切的阐明。这种“二重性无论在理论和实际两方面潜在的应用性在以后的10多年里都役有被人们认识。然而，在70年代，成本，收益和利润函数之类的概念才在很大程度上取代了生产函数概念，至少在涉及实际经验分析时是如此。” 对应原理是萨缪尔森在《基础》中提出的基本原理之一。萨缪尔森提出这条原理以表明比较静态学与动态学之间的联系，并试图从动态分析（或比较静态分析）中推导出比较静态定理（或动态定理）。后来．另有一些经济学家对这个原理作了一些研究。例如，在70和80年代，迈耶（Mayer）、伯梅斯特（Burmeister）、拉恩（Long）、尼里（Neary）、赫伯格（Herberg）和肯普（Kemp）等人都对对应原理作过研究。不过，总的来说，除了维度很低的情况外，对应原理的适用性究竟如何尚待行一步证明。 在《基础》的第二部分中，萨缪尔森对动态理论作了初步的探讨，其中主要是讨论均衡的稳定性问题。均衡概念在西方经济学中占有中心地位，因此与均衡紧密相联的稳定性概念理所当然地受到西方经济学家的重视。有关稳定性问题的论述至少可以追溯到瓦尔拉1874年出版的《政治经济学原理》和马歇尔1879年发表的《纯粹外贸理论》。在他们提出的均衡理论中都涉及均衡的稳定性假设，以及保证均衡稳定性存在的条件。关于均衡的稳定性问题，西方经济学界进行过长期的争论，其中影响最大的争论是希克斯的《价值与资本》（1939年）和萨缪尔森的《经济分析的基础》 （1947年）中所表达的不同观点之间的争论。该争论有力地推动了西方经济学稳定性理论的发展。经过多年的争论，萨缪尔森在《基础》中所表明的见解在不同程度上为西方经济学界普遍接受，西方经济学界把经济学中的稳定性分为静态稳定性和动态稳定性。静态稳定性分析只能表明对一个经济系统起作用的力量趋向于使经济系统朝着均衡点移动的情况，而不能表明经济系统的实际变动路线是怎样的，也不涉及系统在时间推移过程中是否收敛于均衡位置的问题。因此，只有静态稳定性分析是不够的，必须进行动态稳定性分析。动态稳定性分析用函数万程（组）建立模型，能够解决静态稳定性分析役有解决或无法解决的问题，以微分方程（组）和差分方程（组）为基础的分析方法，最适合动态经济问题的性质。萨络尔森的《经济分析基础》为西方经济学的动态分析奠定了基础。 二、从规范经济学转向实证经济学 根据西方经济学家的见解，经济学分为实证经济学和规范经济学。实证经济学所说明的是经济事实究竟是怎样的，而规范经济学所探究的则是经济活动应该是怎样的，实证经济学不包含任何的伦理道德观念（或价值判断准则），它只分析经济活动的实际情况。例如，对于一个经济系统来说，它只分析系统中的某些变量发生某种变化时，整个系统会出现什么样的变化。或者说，整个系统的变化方向和大小如何。它不涉及“应该”怎样或“不应该”怎样，以及什么是“好”的或什么是“坏”的之类的问题。规范经济学则研究经济生活应该怎样安排，应该生产哪些商品和提供哪些劳务。应该怎样组织生产和由谁来组织生产，以及生产要素和产品应该怎样分配等“应该”怎样或不应该“怎样”的问题。为了回答这些问题，就需要确立某种有关是非好坏的价值判断准则。这种价值判断准则实际上往往取决于分析者本人的伦理道德观念。

按照西方经济学界的看法，以庇古的福利经济学为代表的旧福利经济学是一种规范经济学。到了本世纪30年代：旧福利经济学所依据的价值判断准则受到了猛烈的抨击。英国经济学家罗宾斯对于旧福利经济学的批评最有代表性。他认为，经济学应该是一种实证科学，从理论上说，是否有可能证明甲在处境A中所得到的福利比乙在处境B中所得到的福利多些（或少些），是值得怀疑的。与此相同，一个经济学家在判断福利增加或减少时。他所依据的标准来自他本人的伦理道德观念。然而，经济学家理应进行客观的实证分析。作为经济学家，他们没有资格作出这种以个人伦理道德观念（或价值判断准则）为根据的判断。由于罗宾斯等人的批评和坚持，西方经济学界对于实证经济学和规范经济学作出了明确区分。同时，人们在福利经济学的研究中尽量避免采取涉及个人伦理道德观念的假设，尽可能使新的福利经济学符合实证经济学的标准。这种作法的结果是：福利经济学逐渐转变成实证经挤学的一部分，实证经济学由此得到扩充；规范经济学的范围则相应缩小——只限于政治家所讨论的那些政策性问题。于是，实证经济学与规范经济学的区别大致上形成了这样一种差别：实证经济学所包含的是无可争辩的事实和西方经济学界无争议的伦理道德观念，而规范经济学则包含有争议的伦理道德观念。与此同时．一方面，萨缪尔森同意罗宾斯等人的见解，认为经济分析是实证性分析，应该尽可能排除一切伦理道德观念。例如，萨缪尔森在《基撇》中自始至终强调经济分析的任务是要得出“有意义闲定理”。所谓“有意义的定理”就是能够实证性地加以证明或证伪的定理。这也就是说，在分析经济学中，萨缪尔森认为有必要排除分析者个人的伦理道德观念，甚至排除一切伦理道德观念，从实际的经验性假设出发，以实际数据资材为依据，运用逻辑法则报导出“客观的”结论。另一方面，萨缪尔森又认为福利经济学（或社会福利函数）不能没有个人效用比较假设，缺少这一假设条件，就不可能确定唯一的社会福利最大化状态。萨缪尔森在社会福科函数中明确地加这个人效用比较假设，从而将个人的伦理道德观念（或价值判断准则）明确地包含在社会福利函数之中。这种个人效用比较关系是一种外界实际存在的和确定的关系。它与经济分析者本人的伦理道德观念不完全是一回事。在这种意义上，似乎可以说它是“无可争议的”。萨缪尔森的社会福利函数明确地包含伦理道德观念，这种伦理道德观念则又是所谓的“无可争议的”伦理道德观念。按照实证经济学和规范经济学的新的划分标准，这个社会福利函数就仍然可以被看成是实证性的。 三、从先验性演绎分析转向实证性归纳分析 萨缪尔森提出的显示的偏好理论标志着西方经济学的消费需求理论从先验性演绎分析向实证性归纳分析的转变。 显示的偏好理论是由萨缪尔森首先提出来的。该理论最早出现于萨缪尔森1938年发表的《纯粹消费者行为理论的一个说明》一文，其主旨是在完全不使用效用概念的条件下重新阐述消费需求理论。萨缪尔森根据个人偏好必然通过消费选择行为显示出来的原理，直接对个人消费选择行为作出假设，提出显示偏好的弱公理： 假定有0、1两种情况和口种商品。n种商品的价格和数量分别由Pi和Xi表示（这里的1=1，2，…，n）．在0情况中，第i种商品的价格和数量分别为Pio和Xio，由Xio组成的商品组为商品组0，在1情况中，第i种商品的价格和数量分别为Pi1和Xi1，由Xi1组成的商品组为商品组1，则有 此处有一公式 换言之，若消费者在能够选取商品组1时选择了商品组0，那么这就表明该消费者在能够得到商品组0时，他一定不会选取商品组1。事实上，西方经济学的消费理论曾经有过这样一种发展趋势：从先验的心理假设出发转变为从实证的经验假设出发，从先验的演绎推理变为实证的归纳推理。在基数效用论到序数效用论的转变中，这一趋势初露端侃。 我们知道，无论基数效用论者还是序数效用论者，在研究消费需求理论时，通常都将效用论作为分析的出发点。他们总是首先假定，对于消费者个人来说，存在着某个效用函数，或者某种偏好次序，并由此出发建立整个消费需求理论。就效用概念本身来说，序数效用论与基数效用论并不存在本质的差别。序数论并不否定效用是人们心理上所得到的满足或者人的内心体验和省察。在这一点上，两种效用理论的看法是完全一致的。序数论与基数论的主要差别在于它们的研究起点不同，基数论的研究起点是可以按基数衡量的效用。序数论的研究起点是不能按基数衡量而只能用序数表示的效用。从理论上说，坚持基数论，就不能回避直接对人的内心体验和省察进行数值测定的问题。这也就是说，如果理论上需要的话，基数论者应该能够准确地用基数数值表明人的每一心理活动。要作到这一点显然是很困难的／而且这样做必然要涉及效用具有独立性和可加性之类的不切实际的假设，相比之下，序数效用论者却不需要这样做。他们只需确定消费者的主观偏好次序，而主观偏好次序又是根据人们的消费选择表现来确定的。序数论之所以能够取代基数论而为西方经济学界所普遍接受，其原因就在于：它试图从人们对于不同商品的选择行为出发，通过人们主观的内心体验和省察在实际选择活动中的客观表现来把握人们的主观体验和省察，以及试图用偏好次序的编排来代替效用数值的计量，从而避免了效用计量和加总上的困难。从基数效用论到序数效用论的转变并没有使需求分析变成由行为表现到心理动机的分析，就其实质来说，序数效用论与基数效用论完全是一致的——它们对于消费需求的分析都是从主观心理动机即效用出发。与此同时，显示的偏好理论的出现则使消费需求分析完全建立在消费者选择行为之上。人们的主观心理活动是难以直接把握的无形的东西，而人们对于不同商品组合的选择行为则是明确显示出来的容易把握的事实。显示的偏好理论从人的行为出发来分析人的动机，从而使它成为一种与效用论的分析顺序相反的分析，即由消费选择行为到主观心理动机的分析，由于人的偏好是看不见摸不着的主观心理状态，因此关于人的偏好的假设便具有一定的先验性。一般的消费需求理论正是建立在这种先验性假设之上的，如果能够放弃这种先验性假设，直接对个人消费选择行为作出假设，并且以此作为消费需求理论的研究的起点，那么消费需求理论的实证性显然便会由此而增强。不过，这里有一个问题：能否找到一种方法来证明人们所观察的行为来自偏好最大化的动机（或者效用函数）。或者说，能否找到一种方法实证性地从实际的消费选择行为，推导出支配人们选择行为的主观规律。如果能够解决这个问题，那么人们便能够以直观的现实为 依据来分析那些看不见摸不着的主观心理活动的规律，从而为主观心理分析提供实际的基 础。同时，如果能够作到这一点，那么人们就可以完全不使用关于个人搞好的主观心理假 设，而将消费需求理论直接建立在关于消费选择行为的假设之上，从而使消费理论获得更 加切实的依掘。从以上分析可知，显示的偏好理论就是一种能够满足上述要求的分析方法。它的出现标志着资产阶级经济学中的消费需求理论在实证分析方面向前迈进了一大步。 另外，随着显示的偏好理论的出现，有些资产阶级经济学家进一步将效用论所提出的先验性假设与显示的偏好理论所提出的实证性假设综合在一起，统称为需求合理性分析，他们认为，效用理论与显示的搞好理论既不相同，又相互补充。简单他说，就其前提假设来说，两者所涉及的都是动机与行为的关系问题。效用理论的基本问题是：是否存在着一个效用函数与某种偏好相对应。而显示的偏好理论的基本问题是：人们所分析的消费选择是否产生于某一种偏好。效用论是从偏好或动机出发来探讨偏好或动机所支配的需求行为，而显示的偏好理论则是从需求行为出发来寻找需求行为赖以出现的动机。将两者综合在一起，便形成所谓的“需求合理性分析”。更严格他说，需求合理性分析是由下述两个方面组成的（1）如果分析是从偏好关系R出发的，那么人们便可以提出下述问题：偏好关系R产生什么样的需求选择，假定它所产生的选择是h，那人们便可以说R使h合理化。或者R是啦动因，或者说，需求h具备了合理性需求的必要条件。（2）如果分析是从h出发的，那么人们便可以提出下述问题：是否有某种偏好R可以被看成是h的动因或者使h得讽产生。如果存在着某个使h得以产生的几那么人们便可说h是合乎理性的（或上是有动固的）．或者说，需求6具备了合理性需求的充分条件。总之，一种需求要成为合乎理性的（或有动因的）需求就必须具备以上两个条件。 随着显示的偏好理论的发展，有人进一步提出有关显示的偏好的若干公理和定理。有人运用显示的偏好公理来讨论需求合理性问题的主要解，以及将显示的偏好与可积性结合起来进行讨论，从而，使显示的偏好理论的应用范围有所扩大。 四、关于柏格森一萨缪尔森社会福利函数 柏格森一萨缪尔森社会福和国数是对帕累托最适宜理论的补充和发展，该函数所要解决的问题是资产阶级福利经济学的基本问题——资本主义竞争能否使整个社会产生最大的经济福利。 社会福利函数是由柏格森于1938年首先提出来的。后来，由萨缪尔森在《基础》第八章中予以系统阐明，柏格森一萨缪尔森社会福利函数便由此而得名。 事实上，福利经济学的出现，完全是西方资本主义国家内部基本矛盾激化的结果。资本主义国家之间发展不平衡和帝国主义国家之间各种矛盾的激化，导致第一次世界大战的爆发并促使俄国十月社会主义革命取得胜利。面对资本主义国家内部矛盾的加深和社会主义革命的胜利，西方资产阶级迫切需要缓和国内的阶级矛盾，改善整个社会状况。为适应这种需要，一些资产阶级经济学家试图从增进社会福利着手来寻求解决社会问题的途径。于是，福利经济学便由此而产生。 1920年，英国经济学家庇古建立了第一个福利经济学体系。庇古的福利经济学是以基数效用论为基础的。由于效用无法按基数衡量和测定，庇古的福利经济学不仅存在着理论上的困难，而且不能成为经济政策的依据。为了解决这个难题，意大利经济学家帕累托取消了效用基数衡量和效用可加性假设，用序数效用论来代替基数效用论。序数效用论后来经过勒纳和希克斯的发展和推广，逐渐取代基数效用论而成为福利经济学的基础·在序数效用论的基础上，帕累托提出社会资源最优配置理论。按照这种理论，完全竞争能够实现资源的最优配置，并且能够使个人效用实现最大化。帕累托最优理论的基本原则（即帕累托原则）是，如果社会从局面甲转变为局面乙，至少使一个人的处境变得好些，而同时没有使任何一个人的处境变得坏些，那么从甲到乙的这种转变就是好的。这条原则从纯理论角度来看似乎是可以成立的，然而从实际活动的角度来看就并非如此。实际情况显然是，任何一项经济政策都必然会使一些人的处境变得好些，而使另一些人的处境变得坏些。因此，如果不作进一步的修改和补充，帕累托原则对于经济政策的制定就起不到指导作用。 为了改变这种状况，使福利经济学成为现实经济政策的理论依据，西方经济学家从两个方面对帕累托原则进行了修改和补充：一是提出补偿原则，二是建立社会福利函数。所谓补偿原则就是，由经济政策的受益者对经济政策的受损者作出补偿，或者假定前者对后者作了补偿，并且以补偿（或假定的补偿）以后整个社会是否有人受益或受损为标准来判断一项经济政策是否可取，如果在补偿以后有人受益，那么该项政策就是可取的；如果在补偿以后有人受损，那么该项政策就是不可取的。 资产阶级经济学家霍特林、卡尔多、希克斯、西托夫斯基、萨缪尔森和李特尔都是补偿原则论者。萨缪尔森在《基础》一书中没有过多地涉及补偿原则理论，而是集中于社会福利函数的探讨。 事实上，对个人和单个企业的福利（或产量）的最大化向社会福利最大化的转变。只有帕累托所确定的那些最优条件是不够的。以帕累托条件为依据，无法使最大值位置得到唯一的确定。因此，对于社会福利最大化，帕累托条件只是必要条件而不是充分条件。柏格森一萨缪尔森社会福利函数用数学形式阐述了帕累托最优条件，并在此基础上对社会福利最大化条件作了补充。该函数除包括帕累托生产最优条件和交换最优条件外，还包括不同个人的效用比较条件。个人的偏好（或效用）是因人而异的，它取决于个人的伦理道德观念和价值判断准则。只有将个人偏好比较假设包含在社会福利函数之中，才能确定最高的社会福利水平。与其他新福利经济学家不同，萨缪尔森将帕累托生产最优条件和交换最优条件以及不同个人的效用假设表示成数学中的函数形式，并用这3个函数组成社会福利函数，从而将个人的伦理道德标准（或价值判断准则） 作为一个社会福利最大化的条件而明确地包含在社会福利函数之中。根据萨缪尔森的见解，只有这样，社会福利最大化位置才能得到唯一的确定。并且，有了这样的社会福利函数以后，人们就可以通过社会福利函数来判断函数中参数（包括政策参数）的变化所引起的社会福利变化到底是使补会福利增加，还是使社会福利减少，从而判断一项经济政策（包括根据补偿原则制定的政策）是否可取。这样一来，也就克服了“一些人处境好些，另一些人处境坏些”所引起的理论上的困难。另外，柏格森一萨缪尔森社会福利函数所要解决的问题是福利经济学的基本问题一资本主义竞争能否导致最大的社会福利。就其内容来说，福利经济学主要是围绕三个论题展开的。其中的第一个论题是，完全竞争的资本主义经济是否一定产生有利于整个社会的公众福利。根据现代资产阶级经济学的解释，国民总产值达到最大数量时，并不等于公众福利得到了最大的实现；只有当社会经济达到帕累托最优境界时，才算是实现了最大的公众福利。作为对第一个主要论题的解答，福利经济学得出第一个基本定理：假设所有的个人和企业都是追求自身利益的价格接受者，那么由竞争达到的均衡就是帕累托最优的。福利经济学的第二个主要论题是，在一个由中央机构决定分配格局的经济中，公众福利要依*（经过适当调整的）市场机制来实现，还是要以完全取消市场机制的方式来获取，对照第二个主要论题，福利经济学得出第二个基本定理：在中央机构决定分配格局的经济中，如果所有的个人和企业都是追求自身利益的价格接受者，那么在对个人和企业适当征收税款并发放转移支付的条件下，依*竞争的市场机制便能够实现帕累托最优状态。柏格森——萨缪尔森社会福利函数是在帕累托生产最优条件和交换最优条件的基础上，从纯理论的角度探讨帕累托最优状态的实现的。它试图使帕累托最优状态具有唯一的确定性。因此，萨缪尔森建立社会福利函数的主旨是使上述福利经济学第一论题得到唯一确定的答案。对于福利经济学第一个基本定理来说，柏格森——萨缪尔森社会福利函数显然是一个必不可少的理论环节。 很明显，福利经济学的第一和第二论题涉及一个重大的社会经济问题——市场经济和计划经济孰优孰劣的问题。在这个基本问题上，萨缪尔森与其它资产阶级经济学家所持的意见是一致的，他们都接受福利经济学的上述两个基本定理。这表明，尽管各派资产阶级经济学者在理论上存在着千差万别，但是在市场经济与计划经济谁优谁劣的问题上，他们却是保持一致的——都反对计划经济而主张市场经济。其实，计划经济和市场经济在一定条件下是相辅相成的；在现代社会中，任何一个较为完善的经济体系，既不可能是纯粹的计划经济，也不可能完全依*市场调节。 五、关于对应原理 萨缪尔森提出的对应原理仍然是一个有待证明的西方经济理论假设。 萨缪尔森在《基础》中提出对应原理，将它作为连结比较静态学与动态学的桥梁。关于对应原理的论述，涉及经济学的一些基本概念，我们已经知道，对一个经济系统来说，参数的变化会引起变量的均衡数值的变化，从而使系统的均衡位置改变，或者说，使系统达到一个新的均衡位置。西方经济学中的比较静态分析就是通过对新旧均衡位置的比较来分析参数变化效果的理论（或分析方法）。这种分析不包括关于产生最初均衡位置的历史力量分析，而且也不包括从一个均衡位置调整到另一个均衡位置的转变过程的分析，西方经济学中的动态分析曾经有过多种不同的含义。然而，近年来，动态分析范围趋于集中。它主要是：描述和探究一个经济系统的变量随时间推移而变动的变动路线（或时径），或者确定一个处于非均衡状态的经济系统的变量在足够长的时期内是否收敛于某个均衡数值上。另外，这里涉及“稳定”和“不稳定”的概念。当一个系统受到干扰而轻微地偏离均衡状态时，如果该系统在此以后的变动始终不超出均衡位置的某个确定的领域，那么该系统就是稳定的，否则该系统就是不稳定的。 根据萨缪尔森的见解，一方面，我们可以用经济模型来表述一个经济系统的动态过程，从中了解该经济系统对非均衡作出何种反应。或者说，该动态过程是否具有稳定性（即是否收敛于均衡）。从这种动态分析中，我们不仅能够掌握经济系统的动态性质，而且能够推导出经济系统的比较静态性质，从而得出比较静态定理。另一方面，只要确定了一个经济系统的比较静态性质，即变量的均衡数值因参数变化而变化的性质，我们便可知该经济系统的动态性质，即当该经济系统处于非均衡状态时，它是否趋向于均衡状态。这也就是说，对一个经济体系所进行的动态分析，能够得出有关该系统的比较静态定理，而一个经济系统的比较静态性质则在一定程度上表明该经济系统的动态性质。动态分析和比较静态分析两者之间所存在的这种对应性质，萨缪尔森称之为对应原理。 具体他说，萨缪尔森在《基础》第九章”比较静态学”和“稳定性与动态学”两节的论述中表明，根据商品供求的比较静态分析，当“消费趣好”的变化引起需求增大时，即Dao＞0对，价格是否上升取决于需求曲线在均衡点处的斜率Dpo，与供给曲线在均衡点处的斜率Spo，两者之差的代数符号。只有当供给曲线的斜率的代数值大于需求曲线的斜率的代数值时，即当Spo －Dpo＞O时，需求增大才必然会引起价格上升。这也就是说，在需求 曲线斜率为负的一般假设条件下，当Spo＞0时，显然有Spo一Dpo＞0，这时需求增大必然引起价格上升。当Spo＜o时，只有当|Spo|＜|Dpo|（这时Spo－Dpo＞0）时，需求增大才必然引起价格上升。根据商品供求的动态分析，在需求曲线斜率为负的一般假设条件下，只有当供给曲线的斜率大于零，即Spo＞0时，或者当Spo＜0，并且|Spo|＞|Dpo|时，需求大于供给才会引起价格上升。由此可见，依*比较静态分析所得出的结论，通过动态分析同样能够得到。另外，我们还可以从有关分析中看出，只有当人们所讨论的均衡具有动态稳定性时，才能得出上述结论，否则就不能得出上述结论。这也就是说，比较静态分析的结论离不开动态条件，与比较静态分析相比，动态分析具有更加广泛、更加丰富的内容。另一方面，根据一个经济系统的均衡性质，即变量因参数变化而变化的性质，我们同样能够推断出该经济系统一旦偏离均衡位置将会发生何种性质的变动，即变动是否具有稳定性的结论。这也就是说。关于经济系统的比较静态假设，在一定程度上规定了动态分析的结论。总之，根据对应原理，比较静态分析与动态分析两者之间在理论上具有相互联系、互为补充的关系。 虽然萨缪尔森在《基础》一书的第二部分多处谈到对应原理，但是该原理在这里仍然是一个仅具初步形式的原理。该原理的适用性究竟如何，尚待于进一步证明。为此。萨缪尔森又陆续作过一些研究。例如，他在1971年和1975年发表的文章中，就单变量的完全形式对该定理作了进一步的规定和阐述。此外，其他人就对应原理的适用性也作过一些研究。不过，总的说来，作为连结比较静态学和动态学的一座桥梁，对应原理迄今为止始终役有对西方经济理论产生明显的影响。情况之所以如此，有以下几个方面的原因：首先，根据一些西方经济学家的研究，这个定理只适用于维度数目较少（即变量的数目不超过3）的经济系统，对于维度数目较多的系统，这个定理便不适用。其次，动态稳定条件对比较静态性质只有非常弱的限定，而且单凭系统的比较静态性质也不能确定系统在非均衡状态下的变动是否具有稳定性。另外，常常有这样的情况，一些人试图利用对应原理从系统的动态稳定性质来推断系统的比较静态性质，或者试图从系统的比较静态假设推断出系统的动态稳定性。这种尝试始终未能成功。例如，在50和60年代，经济增长和资本积累理论是当时的热门课题。曾经有人试图根据经济增长过程的收敛条件推断出恒稳状态的性质，以及从假定的恒稳性质中了解增长过程的稳定性。但是，在现代经济增长和资本理论中，经济是始终处于均衡状态的，这里不涉及非均衡的问题。因此，即使能够从中得到有关稳定和均衡的双重结论，这种结论与萨缪尔森的对应原理也只是表面上相似，其实际内容并不相同。总之，与列应原理有关的一些基本问题，目前仍然处于争论之中。关于比较静态均衡分析和动态非均衡分析的关系，西方经济学家所能说的最多不过是：均衡的子系统越小。对原来的非均衡子系统作出稳定性判断的论据就越不充分。稳定的子系统越小，单纯根碾原来的子系统稳定性来证明（或推翻）比较静态结论的分析就越不能令人信暇。 六、《基础》对西方经济学的主要贡献 《基础》对西方经济学的主要贡献是它为现代西方经济学提供了一套进行理论分析的规范和评价学术成就的准则。 从上述分析中，我们可以清楚地看到，就具体的理论内容末说，萨缪尔森在《基础》中确实为西方经济学增添了一些新的内容，但是却没有提出过影响大得足以开创一个体系的见解。他的具有独创性的论点为数不多，构成整个体系的理论都是前人已经提出的那些现成的理论，整本著作所涉及的理论内容基本上没有超出新古典理论的范围。因此，就主要理论观点来说，《基础》对于传统理论的重新表述没有使传统理论体系中的具体论点发生任何实质性改变。然而，《基础》对现代西方经济学的发展却产生了重大影响，其学术地位十分显赫。这又是为什么呢？笔者认为，《基础》之所以能够对西方经济学产生如此重大的影响，主要是因为它为西方经济学界提供了一套研究分析问题的规范和评判科学成就的准则。 首先，它特别强调数学在经济学中的应用，并且用数学形式将西方经济学的现有理论重新加以表述、论证、整理和总结，初步形成了一套严谨的数理经济分析方法，从而使西方经济学有可能沿着数学化方向向前发展。与松散的文字论述相比，数学化的经济理论显得更加严密、更加简洁、更具有科学性，易于成为经济理论整体中坚实的内核。用数学方法重新整理过的新古典经济理论似乎具有更强的“科学性” 其次，甚至更重要的是，《基础》为西方经济学者的学院式研究和探讨提供了一套分析问题的规范，从而为评判经济学家及其所做工作的相对功绩提供了一个”客观标准”。这套标准或者“这套行为范式适合于高等院校的教师和学生，使他们之间的竞争减少到最小限度，使他们在业务和个人间＊上相互关心和支持。”“原先的评价标准主要是某一具体研究取得了哪些重大成就，这种评价标准在研究成果涉及实际的社会条件时导致政治争论；代之而出的新标准则强调某一研究工作技巧上的提高程度。这种标准不仅鼓励经济学家们为了整个专业的利益而扩大学科的‘工具箱’，而且使经济学家可以自命为象其它科学家一样，其工作是超越于‘政治’的”。 再次，尽管数理经济学用高深的数学表述的经济理论远离现实，甚至几乎完全成了一种锻炼智力的体操，但是，对西方经济学者来说，它却至少还有另一种功能：它能有效地排斥门外汉，使那些不懂得高深数学的人对于经济学望而却步。与此相反，这种用数学改造过的经济理论却是大多数经济学家所共同接受的理论，这种“理论为他们提供了一种共同语言，一种在理想境界里交流的工具，正是这一点使经济学脱离了没有受过类似教育的广大公众和学习其他社会科学的人们，也正是这一点使新古典理论能不断地再生产自身而不发生任何变化。”在这种学术气氛中，对西方经济学家来说，重要的是他们彼此之间的交流，而不是面对外部世界。 由于上述原因，现代西方经济学论著中使用数学的风气愈演愈烈，连篇累牍的数理经济学文章充斥经济学论坛，在一些经济学领域，纯数学的应用已经达到了专业数学家的水平；在许多经济学者眼里，不使用数学的论文简直算不上经济学“科学论文”。可见，正是数理经济学“纯科学”的规范性质和学院派经济学家对纯科学体系学究式的癖好和功利主义的需要，把《基础》一步步推向学术成就的峰巅。 另外，既然《基础》是现代西方经济学的一部有代表性的著作，那么，即使该书偏重于单纯分析方法的讨论，它也不可能完全摆脱作者的资产阶级观念，在生产方面，作者把追求本企业最大刮润作为企业生产的宗旨；在消费方面，作者把追求个人最大满足作为个人消费所遵循的准则，并且认为只有这样才是合理的。这充分表明了作者的资产阶级观念。事实上，这些行为准则完全属于资产阶级的行为规范。另外，在《基础》中，关于社会福利最大化分析和定量配给条件下的需求分析，实际上都涉及社会主义和资本主义制度谁优谁劣的问题。在这个方面，萨缪尔森显然是在证明资本主义市场经济制度是一种理想的社会制度。从《基础》中可以看出，萨缪尔森在进行理论分析时并没有完全摆脱个人的伦理道德观念和社会价值判断准则。 综上所述，萨缪尔森的《基础》一书尽管为现代西方经济学增添了一些新的理论内容，但是，这些具体的理论内容并不是它对西方经济学所作的主要贡献。《基础》之所以能够对西方经济学产生如此重大的影响，成为现代西方经济学的一部划时代的著作，主要是因为它为西方经济学界提供了一套理论分析的规范和评判学术成就的准则。这套规范和准则为营造现代西方经济学的学究式学术迷宫提供了一套精巧的建造术，这正是西方经济学界所需要的，它迎合了学术权威们的口味。正是依赖这类建造术，现代西方经济学才逐步演变成为一门独自发展、自我完善的数理逻辑体系。目前，西方经济学的这种纯科学和数学化的发展势头仍然有增无减，西方经济学的复杂程度和精巧程度仍然在不断提高，然而，西方经济理论与经济现实的一致性却并役有因此而有所增强，依*这套理论所作出的经济预测的准确性也并没有因此而有所提高。这正是现代西方经济学在其发展过程中所面临的困难。每当人们看到西方经济学如今所处的局面，就不免会想到《基础》对它所产生的影响。这种影响究竟要把西方经济学引向何方？对于这个问题，在西方经济学界始终存在着各种不同的看法，至今也还没有得出一个明确、统一的结论。

原作者：杜月升

萨缪尔森---生平简介萨缪尔森（Paul A．Samuelson）

获奖年度 1970年 演讲日期 1985年2月6日 出生日期 1915年5月15日

学历 1935年　　芝加哥大学学士 1936年　　哈佛大学硕士 1941年　　哈佛大学博士

经历 1940年　　麻省理工学院经济学助理教授 1944年　　麻省理工学院经济学副教授 1947年　　麻省理工学院经济学教授 1955年　　麻省理工学院客座教授 1945年　　弗莱契法律与外交学院（Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy）国际经济关系教授

重要著作 《经济分析基础》（Foundations of Economic Analysis） 《经济学》（Economics） 《线性规划写经济分析》（Linear Programming and EconomicAnalysis），与多夫曼（Dorfman）及索洛合著。 《经济学文选》（Readings in Economics） 《萨缪尔森科学论文选》（The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A.Samuelson）

过去五六十年间，美国出现经济学蓬勃发展的现象，随即变成世界经济学的重心。1932年我开始在芝加哥大学攻读经济学时，经济学还只是文字的经济学。仅有少数勇于创新者一如霍特林、弗里希（Ragnar Frisch）与亚伦（R.G.D.Allen）使用数学符号；不过如果他们和我早期的经验相同，就难免遭遇著名期刊对运用到微积分的论文严格的设限的情况。矩阵是稀有动物，在社会科学的动物园中尚不见踪迹，充其量只能看到一些简单的行列式。

我的时代的经济学

眼见今日各式符号不但充斥于《计量经济期刊》的篇幅中，连《经济期刊》（Economic Journal）与《美国经济评论》（American Economic Review）也无法幸免，许多对这种现象反感的人士，大概都会觉得我前面所描述的情景宛如伊甸园，而生出向往之心吧！

别想得太天真。在旧式的经济学中，处处充斥因袭过往的陈腐谬论，茁壮的科学新株难以由这片土壤孕育出来，而时髦的教科书与论文，亦无法有效地反映真实世界的景况。

经济学家在1932年真可谓生逢其时。经济学像睡美人，它的苏醒正有待新方法、新典范、新好手与新问题的一吻。科学一如寄生物，病人的数目愈多，生理学与病理学上的进步就愈大，由病理学可以发展出治疗方法。1932年是大萧条的谷底，由这片腐坯的土壤，迟迟长出了一株今天被称为宏观经济学的新学科。

我讲的是凯恩斯革命吗？当然。这个名词指的并不是50年前在凯恩斯、汉森、罗宾逊夫人、勒纳（Abba Lerner）、卡莱奇（Mlichael Kalecki）等人的著作中所找到的那些政策与观念。透过卢卡斯（Robert Lucas）、沙坚特（Tom Sargent）、巴罗（Robert Barro）等人的著作，新兴古典学派（New Classical School）已将早先凯恩斯学派的原理作了一百八十度的翻转。然而，今天无论是货币理论、折衷的主流凯恩斯学派或理性预期学派（rational expectationism）的方程式，如果和瓦尔拉斯与马歇尔（Alfred Marshall）或是两位我在芝加哥的新古典名师奈特（Frank Knight）与威纳（Jacob Viner）的方程式相较，其相去真可谓天差地别。1936年由凯恩斯《就业、利息与货币的一般理论》首创的宏观方法学，固然是1985年挥向凯恩斯学派的利剑，但同时也成为捍卫主流总体经济学的盾牌。

到目前为止，我所谈的都是经济学作为一种科学的内部逻辑及其发展，这些是课堂内所探讨的经济学。当然，对外在经济世界的观察，也被带入了课堂之中。就外在环境的影响而言，1932年到1975年是有利于我这种经济学者发展的时期，大学大幅扩充，工作机会比比皆是。如果借用经济科幻小说的通俗术语，我们那个时代的经济活动，乃是乘着康德拉捷夫扩充（Kondratieff expansion）的巨浪昂然前行。

新政（New Deal）与福利国家的政策，替经济学者在政府机构中创造了庞大的新市场。然后是第二次世界大战，参与战争的计有武器、炮灰和经济学者：就算景气循环因战时管制经济而进入冬眠，资源配置的数量问题也不再存在，经济学者还是可以在作业研究这门新科学上有用武之地，而且即使是名不见经传的经济学者，在这类游戏中能胜过他们的，也只有少数聪明绝顶的物理学家。

接下来适逢战后教育的蓬勃发展。1935年时，杰出的经济研究中心只有哈佛、芝加哥、哥伦比亚等寥寥几所，现在则在各地都有优秀的经济研究所出现。升任正教授毋须熬到45岁，拜一批行动积极的系主任之赐，为战后经济学的天地创建了香格里拉乐土，他们在行政当局授权下，四处延聘薪资也许比他们高一倍的抢手明星教授。一如战时空军有嘴上无毛的上校，年方三十的正教授也荣登崇高的学术位子。

欧陆精英齐集美国

单以人数众多而论，美国的经济学者就比国外经济学者占上风。从第二次世界大战之前，希特勒就为我们送来了一批欧洲大陆的精英。芝加哥是华沙之外波兰人最多的城市，同样的，就瑞典人聚居的城市而言，纽约仅次于斯德哥尔摩。奥地利学派的成员几乎全数为美国罗致。除了爱因斯坦、冯纽曼与费米（Fermi）这些大名鼎鼎的科学家，我们还看到了经济学者库普曼、里昂惕夫（Wassily Leontief）、熊彼特、马尔夏克、哈伯勒（Gottfried Haberler）、顾志耐等许多人。之后，由于美国的实力日益增强，又吸引了更多好手；移民美国的经济学者名单上，相继出现了赫维兹（Hurwicz）、戴布鲁、泰尔（Theil）、巴格瓦地（Bhagwati）、科斯、费彻（Fischer）等多人的名字。近数十年来，我不断看到国外顶尖的博士后学者在美国访问一年，由哈佛巡回到斯坦福，从中获得莫大的激励。他们回国之后，开始积极改革旧世界。五年之间，他们的著作一再被翻印。然后，好像是按照所谓热力学第二定律（second law of thermodynamics）的作用，熊彼特学派倏然退潮。

科学本身显然不适用规模报酬不变的法则。你说这不公平？那么套句肯尼迪总统的话：谁说生命是公平的？

我目睹了经济学者社会声望提高，对金钱的需求也增加。调查显示，收入最高的物理学者、生物学者乃至经济学者，并非任职私人企业，而是在大学里——也许说在各大学间进出较为适当。我并不认识有经纪人的经济学者，不过有些人倒的确有代为安排演讲的办公室。至于在公司董事会担任一席公共董事，则已成为一种时兴的生活方式。年休期间为华府要员提供建言，是项令人晕眩的经验。出身学界的报纸专栏作家，无心插柳之间取得了这项工作所需的全知全能。

传道授业原是课堂中或讲桌旁的事，但现在也泛指在国会委员会中疾呼天下没有白吃的午餐，或是告诉电视机前的观众要低买高卖。

树木不会一直长上天。每道康德拉捷夫波浪，都有它的折退点。历经1932到1965年这段经济学者身份与自尊的扩张期之后，接下来是比较黯淡的岁月。我们变得比较谦虚，而且，一如邱吉尔所言，我们是有很多该感到谦虚之处。经济学者对解决停滞性膨胀的良策一直莫衷一是，让许多非经济学者有幻灭之感，而且说实话，也打击了我们的自满之心。我们四处搜寻新的理论典范，仿佛炼金术士期盼能取得点石成金的新法宝。某篇国家经济局的论文水准不佳，并不一定代表它就没有趣；某篇论文内容艰深，也并不代表它就受人看重。

经济学界最后一位通才

到目前为止，我所谈的都是经济学的事，不过既然这系列演讲的主题是“我成为经济学者的演化之路”，我好像该谈谈“我自己”。杜利（Dooley）说过，老罗斯福总统（Theodore Roosevelt）准备写一本有关美国与西班牙战争的书，书名是《我与古巴》（Me and Cuba）。书的开头是一段献辞：“我的黑人士官是我所认识最勇敢的人。他跟在我的后头上了圣璜山。”

我可以自夸，在谈论现代经济学时，我所谈论的正是“我自己”。我所研究的范畴，涵盖了经济学的各个领域。我有次自称是经济学界最后一位通才，著作与教授的科目广泛，诸如国际贸易与计量经济、经济理论与景气循环、人口学与劳动经济学、财务金融与独占性竞争、教条（doctrines）历史与区位经济学等等。基尔洛（Kilroy）既然也在那里，就应该是共犯。（歌德曾写道，他所听过的罪恶，没有一项是他觉得自己不可能犯下的。索洛对此的反应是，歌德在自抬身价。前句中的“罪恶”也许是我的误译，歌德说的可能只是“错误”。）

接下来要要谈我最严重的错误。诸位是否记得，经济学者曾预测第二次世界大战后会出现大量失业的情形？结果自然是错得离谱。这份1945年官方的末日预测，是由跨单位的团队共同执笔，我并不在其中。但是，如果诸位翻阅《新共和》（New Republic）泛黄的档案，就会找到一篇在下精心撰写的论文，其中在预测上也犯了严重低估的错误。我的良师兼益友汉森就相信，战后会有一波复苏的景气，可惜在这点上他没把我教好。其他像史利特（Sunner Slichter）以及一些凯恩斯学派与非凯恩斯学派的学者，也都比我高明。

永远要回头看

我为这个严重的错误而自责。不过如果发现错误后还死不承认，我的自责会更深。我没理会派吉（Satchel Paige）“永不回头看”的建议，在20世纪40年代站在多头这方而获利甚丰，我倒想鼓吹萨缪尔森法则：“永远要回头看。你可能会由过去的经验学到东西。我们所作的预测，通常并不如自己记忆中的那样正确，二者的差异值得探究。”格言有云：“如果你必须预测，那么就经常为之”，这并非只是玩笑之辞或自认无能，而是体认到残酷的事实比美丽的理论重要。未来有些部分不能由过往推知，这也正是科学无从措手之处。好在有待科学做的事还很多，而且许多科学任务尚未完成。

接下来，我要比较明确地谈谈自己在学术与研究上的发展历程。我不喜欢套用虚骄的陈腔褴调，因此也无意重复一些前人自传的写法。四卷的《萨缪尔森科学论文选》（Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A.Samuelson）中，有种种我个人的回忆散布于学术篇章之间。不过这方面资料蕴藏最富者，首推我于1968年在国际经济协会（International Economic Association）世界年会中的主席致辞。那篇讲稿巧妙地以 《一位经济学者之路》（The Way of an Economist）为标题，双关的用字表达出两重意义，一是所经历过的经济学之路，一是行路者的个人风格。同样地，我今天在前面谈到“我的时代的经济学”时，另一方面也是意指具备我特有节奏的与风格的经济学。

第二项个人自传资料来源，是我所写的《黄金时代的经济学：个人回忆录》（Economics in a Golden Age：A Personal Memoir），收录于霍尔顿（Gerald Holton）所编《20世纪的科学：思想来龙去脉研究》（The Twentieth CenturySciences：Studies in the Biography of ideas）一书中。

第三项来源是《我的人生哲学》（My Lifetime Philosophy），标题是别人订好的，是《美国经济学人》（The American Economist 27，1983）一系列的学者介绍，亦收录于《萨缪尔森科学论文选》的第五卷之中。

以下容我以第三人称的方式，客观地简述自己的研究生涯。萨缪尔森老是受幸运之神眷顾，一辈子都是待遇偏高而工作量偏低。他自幼聪颖，深受父母宠爱，成绩一直名列前茅，但到了高中，学业却一落千丈。他的出生日期按日历记载是1915年5月15日，但事实上应该是1932年1月2日，地点是芝加哥大学。

他天生是从事学术研究的料，在芝加哥的平均成绩是A，在哈佛是A+，但他进入经济学的领域纯属偶然。结果证明，经济学这一行如天造地设般地适合他，仿佛是历代经商先祖的基因，找到了命定的归宿。

早露头角

他想争取的荣耀无不手到擒来，而且来得很早。他在大学阶段获得大学部社会科学奖章，而就在毕业之前，社会科学研究委员会新设了一个试验性经济学奖学金计划，他成为首位得主，而能从容地在哈佛就读。他在芝加哥曾受业于奈特、威纳、舒兹（Henry Schultz）、西蒙斯（Henry Simons）、道格拉斯（Paul Douglas）、内夫（John U．Nef）与明兹（Lloyd Mints）等大师，再到哈佛接受熊彼特、里昂惕夫、威 尔逊（Edwin Bidwel Wilson）、哈伯勒、钱伯霖（Edward Chamberlin）与汉森的教导。

在奖学金用完之前，他克服了研究学会（Society ofFellows）对经济学的排斥，骑在柏莱图（Vifredo Pareto）的肩上进入初级研究员的神圣圈子。他在学会的同僚有哲学家昆恩（Willard van Orman Quine）、数学家伯克霍夫（GarrettBirkhoff）、两度获诺贝尔奖的物理学家巴定（John Bardeen）、化学家威尔逊（Bright Wilson）与伍华德（Robert Woodward）以及博通诸家的列文（Harry T．Levine）等人。他在那里迈开步伐，发表论文的速度极快，连期刊都来不及容纳他那些半数学化的东西。

有人说萨缪尔森是由物理学家与数学家的身份出道，这并不正确。但他在大学时代就察觉到，数学会为现代经济学带来革命。他持续研究数学，到现在还记得第一次看到拉氏乘数（Lagrange multipler）的情景，如果根据最大胆的推则，他据此独立发现了埃奇沃斯——斯塔克尔伯格（Edgeworth－Stackelberg）双头垄断的非对称解——此项见解使他得以不受纳什-库尔诺（Nash-Cournot）错误之解的蒙蔽。

他的《经济分析基础》（Foundations of Eoconomic Analysis）一书，大部分是担任初级研究员时所写，后来成为他的博士论文，并获得哈佛的威尔斯奖（David A．Wells Prize），后来在1947年又获美国经济协会（American Economic Association）的克拉克奖章（John Bates Clark Medal），这项奖励是以40岁以下具学术潜力的人士为对象。到1970年，《经济分析基础》的水准得到三度肯定，协助他赢得诺贝尔奖，这是经济学奖项开始颁发的第二年，也是美国学者首次获奖。

如果说萨缪尔森在芝加哥时期如婴儿初生，那么在1940年10月，他接受麻省理工学院邀请时，又以成人之身再生了一次。麻省理工学院的拉力在哈佛未受阻拦，因此可移动之物就移动了。对萨缪尔森而言，这是再好不过的事。男孩在父亲的庇荫之下永远长不大，只有在自己的土地上，才能筑起属于自己的高楼。萨缪尔森与一些杰出同僚共同努力，终能在麻省理工学院建立世界首屈一指的经济学中心。海明威笔下的芸芸众生常 说，活得好就是最佳的报复；但在清醒的现实中，看到麻省理工学院的维纳（Norbert Wiener）在成名后，仍然为被逐出哈佛而闷闷不乐的例子，令萨缪尔森更加珍惜他与哈佛的联系，也努力为母校争光。

萨缪尔森于1915年生于美国印第安纳州的加里(Gary)城。20岁时，毕业于芝加哥大学，获文学学士(B.A.)学位；翌年，又获得哈佛大学文学硕士(M.A.)学位；5年后获得哈佛大学博士(Ph.D.)学位。此外，萨缪尔森还曾获得多所大学的名誉学位。其博士学位论文的题目是《经济理论的运营意义》("The Operatinoal Significance of Economic Theory")，获哈佛大学威尔斯(David A.Wells)奖。在1947年美国经济学年会上，保罗·道格拉斯以学会会长的身份把美国第一届克拉克(John Bates Clak)奖章授予了当时未满40岁的萨缪尔森，并预言萨缪尔森在经济学领域将有无可限量的前途。果然，萨缪尔森不负所望，23年后便获得了世界经济学的最高奖，诺贝尔经济学奖。从1940年起，萨缪尔森还曾担任美国计量经济学会会长，美国经济学会会长，国际经济学会会长和终身荣誉会长，以及在一系列政府机构和公司任经济顾问和研究员。 萨缪尔森的著作颇丰，主要著作有：《经济分析的基础》（ Foundations of Economic Analysis,1947.）、《经济学》（Economics,1948.)、《线性规划与经济分析》（Liner programming and Analysis,1958),以及独自撰写和与多夫曼、索罗等合著的大量文章，这些文章被选编入《保罗.A萨缪尔森科学论文集》（Collected Sciontific Paper of Paul A. Samuelson)第一、二、三、四、五集。 有的经济学家在评论萨缪尔森在经济学领域中的影响时指出，萨缪尔森在经济学领域中可以说是无处不在。人们进入大学一开始学习经济学便遇到了萨缪尔森，读的是萨缪尔森的《经济学》教科书；而当进入高层次经济理论研究之时，人们还是离不开萨缪尔森，这时萨缪尔森的《经济分析的基础》成了经济理论研究的指导；在几乎所有的经济学领域，诸如：微观经济学、宏观经济学、国际经济学、数理经济学，人们总是能从萨缪尔森的有关著作中获得启示和教益。 萨缪尔森作为新古典经济学和凯恩斯经济学综合的代表人物，其理论观点体现了西方经济学整整一代的正统的理论观点，并且成了西方国家政府制定经济政策的理论基础。本世纪70年代，西方国家经济陷入“滞胀”困境，使以“新古典综合”作为理论基础的经济政策遭到破坏，萨缪尔森的经济理论受到了来自各方面的挑战，由此，形成了西方经济学界的旷日持久的大论战。虽然，以萨缪尔森为代表的经济理论的正统地位发生了动摇，但是，西方国家经济作为一种“混合经济”仍然离不开萨缪尔森的经济理论。萨缪尔森也从其他学派的经济理论中吸收了许多重要的理论观点，对自己的理论加以修正和完善，使之适合于变化了的经济情况。由这点看来，萨缪尔森仍不失为经济学大家的风范。萨缪尔森作为一个非马克思主义经济学家，对马克思的经济理论，特别是对马克思的价值理论持根本否定的态度。并发表了一些批评马克思经济理论的文章。在这些批评性的文章中，突出表现了萨缪尔森反对马克思经济理论、维护传统的经济学的基本立场．

荣耀接踵而至

同行之间对他也很快就给予不断的肯定，包括美国艺术与科学学院（American Academy of Arts and Sciences）、国家学术院（National Academy）、美国哲学学会（American Philosophical Society）、英国学术院（British Academy）等。正如赚第一个一百万最困难，得到一项荣誉之后，另一项也会接踵而至。如果你已经累积了一打的荣誉学位，那么随着岁月的流逝，荣誉数目自然会加倍。萨缪尔森的第一个荣誉学位来自芝加哥大学——他的母校，也是他不再信奉的教会——最令他感动。当哈佛授予荣誉给他本国的先知时，他也感到欣然。

专业学会副主席与主席的头衔也纷至沓来：计量经济学会、美国经济协会、国际经济协会等。如果有银河经济俱乐部，大概也少不了他。

在麻省这种经济学研究的新地方，会收到许多来自世界各地的邀约。但萨缪尔森倾向于不动如山。在1966年成为驻校教授之后，由于有极佳的研究机会，而且没有固定的教学任务，他实际上又回到永久的初级研究员的阶段。既已到达乐园，他就留着不动了。

但也会偶尔到外面逡巡一番。他曾为国会的委员会讲课多次。当他受聘为联邦机构的顾问时，经常会加速该机构的终结，幸好美国财政部与联邦储备理事会虽曾请他担任学术顾问，倒是逃过了此劫。萨缪尔森认为美国太过珍贵，不能完全托付给那些只有大方向的思想家，如盖伯瑞斯（Kennethe Galbraith）或罗斯托（Walt Whitman Rostow）等人，因此他对史蒂文森（Adlal Stevenson）与哈里曼（Avered Harriman）讲授经济学，并终能成为肯尼迪在参选总统阶段的经济顾问。他最后并未去华府那块应许之地，但能支援肯尼迪经济顾问委员会中核心的智囊，如海勒（Walter Heller）、托宾、戈登（Kermit Gordon）等人，他也颇觉有趣。

对于万事不缺的人，神仙还能赐给他什么呢？施蒂格勒在提到萨缪尔森1947年的《基础》与当时刚出版不久的1948年畅销教科书《经济学》时，用了以下的文字介绍：“萨缪尔森功成名就，如今要追求财富了。”不久之后，麻州贝尔蒙（Belmont）即可闻到燃烧房地产抵押证明的烟味。不止于此，盖伯瑞斯在《财星》（Fourtune）的一篇书评中曾预言，新生代的经济学将是来自《经济学》一书，结果此一预言也真的应验了。曾有人听到萨缪尔森志得意满地自语：“只要这个国家的教科书是由我写的，就让其他人去拟定法律条文吧！”这本教科书在耶鲁遭到巴克利（William Buckley）抨击为诋毁上帝与人，结果反而为它营造了全新的声势，世界各地的销售也直线上升。

四分之一世纪前，对某位写了一本畅销书的学者乍得的声名，《经济学》的作者曾恳切地作了一番评述：“撰写教科书是项困难的工作，但报酬十分可观——我指的不单是金钱的报酬。与整个时代成千上万的心灵接触，是学者一生难逢的际遇。把我们经济学者所知的经济学化为文字，实在是令人兴奋的事。我但愿能与读者分享这份兴奋之情。”

著作之乐

住嘴！讲得够多了。对《名人录》式的简介，这样已经过多了。上面所描述的内容，也适用于很多追求成功的人。厌恶军旅生涯的西点毕业生，或许愿意承诺一项浮士德式的交易，以虚掷一生来换取升迁与勋章。

在学术与科学的领域中，我所看重的报酬是能穿梭于神秘的森林中进行奇妙的探索。我21岁即开始撰文出版，此后不曾中止，希望往后也能一直继续下去。约翰逊（Harry Jobnson）去世时，有18篇文章正在校稿中，真可谓战死沙场！（即使是像他这种做事绝不半吊子的人，18篇也是过量了。）

我的思绪里永远思索着各种经济观念与关系。大文豪据称也会灵感不继，文思永久或暂时枯竭，而我却无此困扰。如同我在另文中所说，繁多的议题与疑问在我的脑海中萦绕，或许终我一生也写不完。某种我曾注意到的统计方法，也许哪天能用来解决某项金融上的问题。

恰似孕妇分娩一般，我在著作出版时会有解脱之感。我是否已经出版太多？别人尽可有他们的评断，而找自己，几乎打从心底就不曾后悔自己写过的任何篇章、论文、附注或注脚。反倒是某些编辑因耐性不足或受限于篇幅或编排的考虑，多次横加删除，令我耿耿于怀。

或许这意味着老餐的品味欠缺？希望不是。个人对古典诗人豪斯曼（A．E．Housman）在下列对话中的观点深有同感。一位友人问他，为何在他的有关拉丁文的选集中未选入某篇文章，“难道你不认为这篇不错吗？”“是不错，”豪斯曼答道，“但对我来说还不够好。”而我在拜读某些学者的近作时，也不时会向索洛问起一句哈第（G.H.Hardy）曾问过利透伍德（J．E．LittleWood）的话：“为什么一个能写那样文 章的人要干这种事？”

杰出的学者为其未来著作所设定的标准与时俱进。每天写一封信不难，但如果五年都不写，那就真的没什么可报告的了。

对于重视科学界大人物或大成就的观念，我一直不敢苟同。涓滴之水都有助益，老农夫边说边朝池塘吐口水。我们应就自己所面对的最急迫问题尽力而为，之后就算落入报酬率递减的情况，对应为之事尽力而为，仍是最佳的策略。况且，说不定什么时候，就让你碰到了熊彼特学说中的创新或达尔文理论中的突破，使曲线又回到报酬率递增的阶段。

在莫扎特与布拉姆斯之间，我偏好莫扎特。我很感谢斯拉法遗留给我们贵重的金块，但如果他也能同时惠赐一些珍珠宝石必然更好。每当忆及他动人但忧伤的眼神，不禁会想套句詹姆土（William James）的话——如果他出生时有一瓶香摈，应该会成为比较快乐的人。凯恩斯一生未曾遭遇写作的困境。晚年时有人问他，如能重来一次，他会做一些什么不同的事，他的答复是：“我会喝更多的香槟。”

不绝的灵思

稍早我曾招认，我这辈子都是待遇偏高而工作量偏低，即使是我的好友，也可能同意前者，但对后者有些朋友可能会抗议：“算了吧，你整天都工作，周末和假日也不例外。如果传闻属实，你连半夜做梦时也经常不忘工作呢！”的确如此，只是对我而言，从事经济分析是游戏而非工作。对自己讨厌的工作避之惟恐不及，我在这点上可说是恶名昭彰。行政事务我是全力规避，而且因为表现不称职，久之也就少接到这方面的任务 分派。像罗伯逊（Dennis Roberrson）一样，我总是最后才洗*子，因为万一原子弹不久之后就爆炸，不是根本没必要洗了吗？

如果必须填一份复杂的问卷，我可能会因而提出一项交易理论或人口遗传学的新模型，反正只要能尽量拖延那件讨厌的事就好了。

描写画家、音乐家、诗人或科学家的小说，经常忽略了他们平日工作时间内在做些什么。其实再想想，有关商业大亨的虚构小说，也同样没有精确描述这些企业家在做什么。

因此，对听众谈到经济学家时，我应该具体地描绘他们在科学方面的酝酿工作。我是怎样开始注意到问题的？突破点在什么时候？发展的步骤为何？事后回顾，这项研究对知识的领域有何贡献？

该从哪里开始呢？我有一本用来记载研究思考的大记事本，以1983年的那本为例，1月1日的那一栏，我可能顺手记下了如何设计一个线性规划系统的数字实例，足以推翻经济学的夏特里耶原理（Le Chatelier principle）的原型。这项研究一直尚未发表，其源头可追溯到一项早在1949年的研究——或甚至早到1937年，当时我还是威尔森门下的学生。然后在1月2日和3日，还可以找到这个问题的记录，可能还有对相关问题的演绎。

在1983年之中，类似这样的记录可能超过五十项。然而刚好记载于这本床头笔记本中的事项，也并非我该年所有研究的完整描述，甚至连这些研究的抽样代表也称不上。

因此，我要找一个较充裕的时间，才能详细说明某些著名研究成果是如何酝酿成形的。等不及的读者可参阅我1982年在Jorgen GeltingFestschrift的文章，题目是《阮赛最适可行租税与最适公共用事业价格之历史》（A Chapter in the History of Ramsey's Optimal Feasible Taxation and optimal Public Utility Pricess）。

追求成功的动力

在结束之前，我想提一下科学家的动机与报酬。科学家和亚当·斯密的生意人一样贪得无厌与竞争激烈，然而他们所追逐的不是物质享受，甚至不是金钱本身，也不是一般人所指的权力。学者求的是名。他们所求的名，诚如我1961年在美国经济学会会长致辞中所说，乃是在同行——他们敬重也希望赢得对方敬重的同行之间的名誉。社会学者默顿（Robert K．Merton）曾在《科学社会学》（The Sociology of Science）一书中，探讨我所称的这个“龌龊的小秘密”。

我自己也不例外。林肯的律师合伙人及传记作者亨敦（William Herndon）曾经观察到，诚实古怪的林肯在内心深处，一直有个小小的野心之钟在滴答作响。在我自己的价值天秤上，无论是《新闻周刊》专栏作家的头衔、因眼光独到而投资获利数百万、乃至担任权贵或总统顾问而掌握的权力，如果比之于对科学王国的贡献所能赢得的认可，可说都是轻于鸿毛了。

有次我曾问友人统计学者弗利曼（Harold Freeman）：“如果魔鬼和你谈一笔交易，以一项精彩的理论交换你的灵魂，你会怎么办？”“我不会答应，”他说，“但如换到是不平等（inequality）理论，则另当别论。”我喜欢他的回答。我曾证明，再笨的人也不至于笨到平均值六万标准差（standard deviation）以下，这项萨缪尔森不平等理论使我名噪一时。不论后继的学者就此再加发挥，还是在更早的文献中可找到类似的先例，都不足以改变我从中获得的乐趣。因为这就是科学研究，只要能够对当时的科学界能有贡献，就当时而言也就足够了。

我因为早熟而早露头角。在年轻时，我不知不觉地行事匆忙，实在是由于家族中多位男性长辈均未克享天年，使我自认寿数有限，加上家父于我23岁时英年早逝，大家认为我亦难逃此一命运，也带给我极为沉重的阴影。因此当时我的想法是，该做的事就要趁早做。然而，现代科学却带来了改变，遗传可以经由环境加以修正。无论如何，我一直身体健康。一般人在谈到科学家的贡献与他们的成就时，往往低估了健康这项因素的重要性。我有位值得尊敬的友人，终生为恼人的偏头痛所苦，有人会不公平地把他归类为低成就者。我则认为，他算得上是将自己资源明智运用的贤人。

关于早年成名，还有一点值得一提，那就是可以使人放轻松。如果能一竿在手，静待鱼儿上钩，为何还要汲汲于争名夺利呢？

为自己工作

我很早就认定，学者是为自尊——也就是学者们自己所一致看重的事物而工作。然而，一旦期盼他人赞美之心稍歇，你就可以自在地为自我肯定而工作。能带来真正满足的工作，才是你会自认满意的工作。也许要达到这种境界，多少要有个信念，那就是一位巧匠所喜爱者，也终会获得其他人的认同。

无论何时，我都力求让自己快乐。有人认为我在热力学的领域里搅和，是想要提升经济学在科学上的正确性，或是要驳斥经济学者不能了解物理学复杂理论的说法。事实上，这种方法学上的尝试，与其说是增加名声，倒不如说是在对名誉课税。那又如何？

税是我们为文明所付的代价。这类工作很有趣，而且我认为对人类知识的深度与广度均有禆益。

就更深的层面而言，一个人并非只为同僚间的美名与赞誉而工作，也不只为个人兴趣或探索之乐而工作。就更深的层面而言，某位生理学家的对手，并非其他著名学府的同行，他的对头是癌症。经济学家说到底也是如此。客观的真理远在彼方，纵然千辛万苦，也要设法了解。如果厌倦学术圈的勾心斗角，或是目睹民主与文明在身旁崩坏，你总是可以退隐下来，致力于追求这客观的真理。复杂的数学不会虚骄掩饰，即使闹牙疼，最佳的止痛剂莫过于把难解的景气循环或复杂的控制理论演练上五回合。

我说这些并不是在开玩笑，有个实例可以为证。已故的内瑟（Voss Neisser），是对社会研究新学派（New school for Social Research）卓有贡献的流亡经济学家。他有次告诉我，在希特勒逐步掌权的黑暗时代，能钻研于解决瓦尔拉竞争性均衡（Wlrasian competitive equilbrium）之解，实在是一种解脱。我十分理解也完全同意。

有人问我是否高兴获得诺贝尔奖，我思考一下才答道：“是的，生命中能带来纯粹乐趣的事少之又少，这件事倒真是如此。”这项荣誉是个惊喜，而且来得颇早，但也不致早到甚至连我也会担心。我所尊敬的朋友都为我感到高兴。如果有人有什么相反的意见，恕我迟钝不知。我的家人都喜欢斯德哥尔摩的相关庆祝活动。有些科学界同僚一想起那些把他们由实验室中拉出来的访问及种种恼人的差事，就觉得苦不堪言。我倒是能 自得其乐，而且我还发现，只消过了几天出门有司机的日子，很快就会上瘾了。

社会学者研究诺贝尔奖对得奖人有何影响。例如，桂冠得主是否会进入生产低落的时期？他们与人合著的论文是减少还是增加？名字是领衔或殿后居多？别人引用其著述的情况是否增加？他们变更领域的倾向有多大——诸如物理学者搞起脑的问题，或是化学家变成和平问题或最低工资的专家？

对我而言，这是个容器——几乎要——溢出的情况。我心中最后一丝罪恶感业已消失，当我选择离开经济学领域中的主要干道，去探索费雪（R．A.Fisher）的生存价值（survival value）或马克斯韦尔（Clerk Maxwell）使热力学第二定律失效的魔鬼形象。我仍如鹰隼般紧盯着企业趋势与最新风潮，我仍撰写经济学中许多不同领域的文章，但经济学界最后一位通才再也不觉得有必要站在——我是说设法站在——所有经济学文献的顶端。

行将迈入古稀之龄，我的感觉如何？和音乐家瓦格纳（Wagner）与威尔第（Verdi）同登高寿的歌德曾说，年老与年轻之别，在于年轻人的体力总是呼之即来，随时待命；反之，八旬老翁只有在巅峰状态下，才能有最佳表现。以我个人而言，行年虽已六十九，状况仍如二十五，日子似乎总还是一如既往般美好。然而一如诗句有云与理之必然，9月已至，残存的美好时光终将逐渐消逝。

Press Release: The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2004

11 October 2004

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences has decided to award the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2004, jointly to

Finn E. Kydland Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh and University of California, Santa Barbara, USA, and

Edward C. Prescott Arizona State University, Tempe, and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, USA

"for their contributions to dynamic macroeconomics: the time consistency of economic policy and the driving forces behind business cycles".

New theory on business cycles and economic policy

The driving forces behind business cycle fluctuations and the design of economic policy are key areas in macroeconomic research. Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott have made fundamental contributions to these areas of great significance, not only for macroeconomic analysis, but also for the practice of monetary and fiscal policy in many countries.

Time Consistency of Economic Policy

The higher taxation of capital households expect in the future, the less they save; the more expansive monetary policy and the higher inflation firms expect, the higher prices and wages they set, etc. The Laureates showed how such effects of expectations about future economic policy can give rise to a time consistency problem. If economic policymakers lack the ability to commit in advance to a specific decision rule, they will often not implement the most desirable policy later on. Kydland and Prescott's results offered a common explanation for events that, until then, had been interpreted as separate policy failures, e.g., that economies become trapped in high inflation even though price stability is the stated objective of monetary policy. Their awarded work established the foundations for an extensive research program on the credibility and political feasibility of economic policy. This research shifted the practical discussion of economic policy away from isolated policy measures towards the institutions of policymaking, a shift that has largely influenced the reforms of central banks and the design of monetary policy in many countries over the last decade.

Driving Forces Behind Business Cycles

Research by the Laureates also transformed the theory of business cycles by integrating it with the theory of economic growth. Whereas earlier research had emphasized macroeconomic shocks on the demand side of the economy, Kydland and Prescott demonstrated that shocks on the supply side may have far-reaching effects. In their business-cycle model, realistic fluctuations in the rate of technological development brought about a covariation between GDP, consumption, investments and hours worked close to that observed in actual data. Previous business-cycle models had typically been based on historical relations between key macroeconomic variables. But models that had functioned quite well during the 1960s began to break down under the more turbulent economic conditions of the 1970s, with oil-price shocks and concurrent inflation and unemployment. The Laureates laid the groundwork for more robust models by regarding business cycles as the collective outcome of countless forward-looking decisions made by individual households and firms regarding consumption, investments, labor supply, etc. Kydland and Prescott's methods have been widely adopted in modern macroeconomics.

Read more about this year's prize

Information for the Public

Advanced Information (pdf)

Links and Further Reading

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Finn E. Kydland, born 1943 (60 years) in Norway (Norwegian citizen). Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh in 1973. Professor at Carnegie Mellon University and University of California, Santa Barbara, USA.

Edward C. Prescott, born 1940 (63 years) in Glen Falls, NY, USA (US citizen). Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh in 1967. Professor at Arizona State University, Tempe and researcher at Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, USA.

The Prize amount: SEK 10 million, will be shared equally among the Laureates.

Contact persons: Fredrik All, Information Officer, phone +46 8 673 95 63, +46 706 73 95 63, fredrik@kva.se and Eva Krutmeijer, Head of Information, phone +46 8 673 95 95, +46 709 84 66 38, evak@kva.se

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-1-14 10:56:48编辑过]

上nobel的网站就可以了，哈哈，还想来这里赚钱啊！！

珍品！谢谢！！