摘要翻译：
在许多市场上，消费者对公司的质量和成本不确定，所以根据价格和由此推断的质量购买。只有当高质量的公司成本较高时，最优定价才取决于消费者的异质性，而不管成本和质量是私人的还是公共的。如果质量更好的公司成本更低，那么在私人成本和质量下，好质量比坏质量卖得更便宜，但在公共成本和质量下不是这样。然而，如果质量越高，成本越高，那么在两种信息环境下，价格都会微弱地增加质量。
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英文标题：
《Price competition with uncertain quality and cost》
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作者：
Sander Heinsalu
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Consumers in many markets are uncertain about firms' qualities and costs, so buy based on both the price and the quality inferred from it. Optimal pricing depends on consumer heterogeneity only when firms with higher quality have higher costs, regardless of whether costs and qualities are private or public. If better quality firms have lower costs, then good quality is sold cheaper than bad under private costs and qualities, but not under public. However, if higher quality is costlier, then price weakly increases in quality under both informational environments.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.03987