摘要翻译：
安喜欢橘子比喜欢苹果多得多；鲍勃喜欢苹果比喜欢橘子多得多。明天他们将以同样的概率收到一个水果，那就是橘子或苹果。给每一个代理人一半是公平的每一个实现的果实。然而，同意出现的任何水果都将归更喜欢它的agent所有，给每个agent带来了更高的期望效用，并且在平均意义上是公平的：在期望中，每个agent更喜欢自己的分配而不是平均分配水果，即他得到了公平的份额。我们将这一熟悉的观察转化为一个经济设计问题：在绘制一个随机对象（水果）时，我们了解每个代理人的实现效用，并可以将其与他的效用分配的平均值进行比较；没有关于分布的其他统计信息。我们以最有效的方式只使用稀疏信息来充分描述划分规则，同时给每个人公平的份额。尽管单个实用工具的概率分布是任意的，而且经理大多不知道，但当经理完全访问此分布时，这些规则的执行范围与最佳规则相同。
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英文标题：
《On the fair division of a random object》
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作者：
Anna Bogomolnaia, Herve Moulin, Fedor Sandomirskiy
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Ann likes oranges much more than apples; Bob likes apples much more than oranges. Tomorrow they will receive one fruit that will be an orange or an apple with equal probability. Giving one half to each agent is fair for each realization of the fruit. However, agreeing that whatever fruit appears will go to the agent who likes it more gives a higher expected utility to each agent and is fair in the average sense: in expectation, each agent prefers his allocation to the equal division of the fruit, i.e., he gets a fair share.   We turn this familiar observation into an economic design problem: upon drawing a random object (the fruit), we learn the realized utility of each agent and can compare it to the mean of his distribution of utilities; no other statistical information about the distribution is available. We fully characterize the division rules using only this sparse information in the most efficient possible way, while giving everyone a fair share. Although the probability distribution of individual utilities is arbitrary and mostly unknown to the manager, these rules perform in the same range as the best rule when the manager has full access to this distribution.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.10361