摘要翻译：
一旦关键变电站受到威胁，攻击代理可以在其对等方之间进行协调，利用本地控制设备来策划最大限度地破坏。对于防御者来说，列举和识别所有数字中继以确定系统性风险是至关重要的。通过受损继电器的任何破坏性切换组合都可能导致误操作或对系统产生直接影响。这些攻击初始事件的结果可能会导致网格级联失败。本文结合变电站继电保护的停电等级及其相应的严重风险指数，对继电保护的临界性进行了量化。根据变电站的继电保护类型和母线配置，研究了常用的继电保护方案，如母线差动、方向过流和距离继电保护。这一初步工作还为灵敏度分析提供了三种确定概率的方法。使用IEEE测试系统对提出的风险指数进行了评估。
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英文标题：
《Cyber-Induced Risk Modeling for Microprocessor-Based Relays in
  Substations》
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作者：
Zhiyuan Yang and Chee-Wooi Ten
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Electrical Engineering and Systems Science        电气工程与系统科学
二级分类：Signal Processing        信号处理
分类描述：Theory, algorithms, performance analysis and applications of signal and data analysis, including physical modeling, processing, detection and parameter estimation, learning, mining, retrieval, and information extraction. The term "signal" includes speech, audio, sonar, radar, geophysical, physiological, (bio-) medical, image, video, and multimodal natural and man-made signals, including communication signals and data. Topics of interest include: statistical signal processing, spectral estimation and system identification; filter design, adaptive filtering / stochastic learning; (compressive) sampling, sensing, and transform-domain methods including fast algorithms; signal processing for machine learning and machine learning for signal processing applications; in-network and graph signal processing; convex and nonconvex optimization methods for signal processing applications; radar, sonar, and sensor array beamforming and direction finding; communications signal processing; low power, multi-core and system-on-chip signal processing; sensing, communication, analysis and optimization for cyber-physical systems such as power grids and the Internet of Things.
信号和数据分析的理论、算法、性能分析和应用，包括物理建模、处理、检测和参数估计、学习、挖掘、检索和信息提取。“信号”一词包括语音、音频、声纳、雷达、地球物理、生理、（生物）医学、图像、视频和多模态自然和人为信号，包括通信信号和数据。感兴趣的主题包括：统计信号处理、谱估计和系统辨识；滤波器设计；自适应滤波/随机学习；（压缩）采样、传感和变换域方法，包括快速算法；用于机器学习的信号处理和用于信号处理应用的机器学习；网络与图形信号处理；信号处理中的凸和非凸优化方法；雷达、声纳和传感器阵列波束形成和测向；通信信号处理；低功耗、多核、片上系统信号处理；信息物理系统的传感、通信、分析和优化，如电网和物联网。
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英文摘要：
  Once critical substations are compromised, attack agents can coordinate among their peers to plot for maximizing disruption using local control devices. For defenders, it is critical to enumerate and identify all digital relays to determine the systemic risks. Any combination of disruptive switching via the compromised relays can result in misoperation or immediate effect to the system. The resulting consequence of these attack's initial events would possibly incur cascading failure to a grid. This paper quantifies the criticality of substation protective relays with the combination of the outage level and its corresponding severity risk index. The proposed hypothesized outages are based on the type of protective relaying, bus configuration of a substation, and commonly implemented relaying schemes, such as bus differential, directional overcurrent, and distance relays, are studied. This preliminary work also provides three approaches of determination in probabilities for sensitivity analysis. The proposed risk indices are evaluated using IEEE test systems.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.08408