摘要翻译：
总统辩论被视为通过向选民透露候选人的信息来提供重要的公共利益。我们考虑了一个内生的总统辩论模型，在这个模型中，现任者和挑战者（私下知道她自己的素质）公开宣布他们是否愿意参加公开辩论，同时考虑到选民对候选人的选择取决于她对候选人素质的信仰和自然状态。研究发现，在平衡状态下，辩论发生或不发生与挑战者的素质无关，因此候选人的声明没有信息。这是因为选择退出被认为比输掉辩论更糟糕，因此挑战者从不拒绝参与。
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英文标题：
《A Model of Presidential Debates》
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作者：
Doron Klunover, John Morgan
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  Presidential debates are viewed as providing an important public good by revealing information on candidates to voters. We consider an endogenous model of presidential debates in which an incumbent and a challenger (who is privately informed about her own quality) publicly announce whether they are willing to participate in a public debate, taking into account that a voter's choice of candidate depends on her beliefs regarding the candidates' qualities and on the state of nature.It is found that in equilibrium a debate occurs or does not occur independently of the challenger's quality and therefore the candidates' announcements are uninformative. This is because opting-out is perceived to be worse than losing a debate and therefore the challenger never refuses to participate.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.01362