摘要翻译：
虽然共同和公共产品的利益是共享的，但当自愿提供捐款时，这些利益往往很少。不合作提供或保存这些货物是从当地渔业到全球气候变化等可持续性挑战的根本所在。在现实世界中，这种合作困境发生在具有复杂战略利益的多重互动中，并且经常没有完整的信息。我们认为，跨多个联盟的自愿合作（类似于多中心）不仅有助于产生更多的不可排斥的公共产品，而且可能允许向更合作、更稳定和更包容的治理方法演变。与以前的任何研究相反，我们表明，多联盟治理的这些优点远比文献中出现的单个例子更普遍，并且在不同的条件下是稳健的，这些条件包括可排除性、不可排除的公共利益的可共体性以及回报-贡献函数的任意形状。我们首先证实了这样一个直觉，即一个没有强制执行的单一联盟，以及参与者在不知道贡献回报的情况下追求自身利益的联盟，容易导致合作失败。其次，我们证明了同样的悲观模型，但在多联盟治理结构下，通过承认在利益博弈中合作的边际收益，可以获得相对较高的合作。在没有强制执行的情况下，通过大量自愿合作论坛发展而来的公益制度比单一的包容性制度更能成功地维持和加强合作。
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英文标题：
《Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public
  goods》
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作者：
V\'itor V. Vasconcelos, Phillip M. Hannam, Simon A. Levin, Jorge M.
  Pacheco
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Physics        物理学
二级分类：Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems        自适应和自组织系统
分类描述：Adaptation, self-organizing systems, statistical physics, fluctuating systems, stochastic processes, interacting particle systems, machine learning
自适应，自组织系统，统计物理，波动系统，随机过程，相互作用粒子系统，机器学习
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
--

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英文摘要：
  While the benefits of common and public goods are shared, they tend to be scarce when contributions are provided voluntarily. Failure to cooperate in the provision or preservation of these goods is fundamental to sustainability challenges, ranging from local fisheries to global climate change. In the real world, such cooperative dilemmas occur in multiple interactions with complex strategic interests and frequently without full information. We argue that voluntary cooperation enabled across multiple coalitions (akin to polycentricity) not only facilitates greater generation of non-excludable public goods, but may also allow evolution toward a more cooperative, stable, and inclusive approach to governance. Contrary to any previous study, we show that these merits of multi-coalition governance are far more general than the singular examples occurring in the literature, and are robust under diverse conditions of excludability, congestability of the non-excludable public good, and arbitrary shapes of the return-to-contribution function. We first confirm the intuition that a single coalition without enforcement and with players pursuing their self-interest without knowledge of returns to contribution is prone to cooperative failure. Next, we demonstrate that the same pessimistic model but with a multi-coalition structure of governance experiences relatively higher cooperation by enabling recognition of marginal gains of cooperation in the game at stake. In the absence of enforcement, public-goods regimes that evolve through a proliferation of voluntary cooperative forums can maintain and increase cooperation more successfully than singular, inclusive regimes.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.11337