摘要翻译：
我们考虑了序数偏好下的对象概率分配问题。我们设计了一种分配机制，称为警惕进食规则(VER)，它适用于几乎任意的可行性约束。它通常是有效的约束，可以有效地计算一大类约束，如果代理具有相同的偏好和受相同的约束，它可以平等地对待它们。当可行分配集是凸的时，我们还基于序数平均主义给出了我们的规则的一个刻画。我们关于VER的结果不仅适用于分配问题，而且也适用于所有的集体选择问题，其中Agent对离散结果有序数偏好。作为一个案例研究，我们假设对象对Agent具有优先级，并将VER应用于受稳定性约束的概率分配集合。当优先级为平坦时，VER与（扩展的）概率序列规则相一致，当偏好和优先级为严格时，VER与agent提出的确定性延迟接受算法相一致。虽然VER总是返回一个稳定的、有约束的有效分配，但它不能是策略证明的、无约束的、有效的和无嫉妒的。然而，我们表明，这三个性质中的每一个都与稳定性和约束效率不相容。
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英文标题：
《The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic
  Design with Constraints》
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作者：
Haris Aziz and Florian Brandl
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  We consider the problem of probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that applies to nearly arbitrary feasibility constraints. It is constrained ordinally efficient, can be computed efficiently for a large class of constraints, and treats agents equally if they have the same preferences and are subject to the same constraints. When the set of feasible allocations is convex, we also present a characterization of our rule based on ordinal egalitarianism. Our results about VER do not just apply to allocation problems but to all collective choice problems in which agents have ordinal preferences over discrete outcomes. As a case study, we assume objects have priorities for agents and apply VER to sets of probabilistic allocations that are constrained by stability. VER coincides with the (extended) probabilistic serial rule when priorities are flat and the agent proposing deterministic deferred acceptance algorithm when preferences and priorities are strict. While VER always returns a stable and constrained efficient allocation, it fails to be strategyproof, unconstrained efficient, and envy-free. We show, however, that each of these three properties is incompatible with stability and constrained efficiency.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008.08991