摘要翻译：
我们提出了一个数据中介模型来分析在存在信息外部性的情况下共享个体数据的激励。数据中介从个人消费者那里获取关于他们的偏好的信号。中间人在产品市场中转售信息，企业和消费者可以根据需求数据做出选择。个人数据的社会维度--个人数据可以预测他人的行为--产生一种数据外部性，可以降低中介机构获取信息的成本。我们推导出中介的最优数据策略，并确定它在向企业提供关于市场需求的精确信息的同时，保留了消费者身份的隐私。当消费者数量变大时，该策略使中介能够捕获信息的总价值。
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英文标题：
《The Economics of Social Data》
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作者：
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Tan Gan
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  We propose a model of data intermediation to analyze the incentives for sharing individual data in the presence of informational externalities. A data intermediary acquires signals from individual consumers regarding their preferences. The intermediary resells the information in a product market wherein firms and consumers can tailor their choices to the demand data. The social dimension of the individual data-whereby an individual's data are predictive of the behavior of others -- generates a data externality that can reduce the intermediary's cost of acquiring the information. We derive the intermediary's optimal data policy and establish that it preserves the privacy of consumer identities while providing precise information about market demand to the firms. This policy enables the intermediary to capture the total value of the information as the number of consumers becomes large.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.03107