摘要翻译：
本文考察了大民主国家选民对选举犯罪信息披露的反应。我把重点放在巴西，那里的选举法院在每次选举前都公开候选人的犯罪记录。使用2004年至2016年间竞选公职的当地候选人样本，我发现选举罪的定罪将候选人的当选概率和选票份额分别降低了10.3个百分点和12.9个百分点。这些结果不能用选举过程中法官、选民或候选人行为的（潜在）变化来解释。我还对法庭文件进行机器分类，以估计对严重和琐碎罪行的不同惩罚。我记录了更大的选举惩罚（6.5 p.p.)如果候选人被判重罪。这些结果通过检验司法信息如何影响选民的决定，并表明选民对更可信的信息来源反应更强烈，从而补充了信息捷径文献。
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英文标题：
《Electoral Crime Under Democracy: Information Effects from Judicial
  Decisions in Brazil》
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作者：
Andre Assumpcao
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  This paper examines voters' responses to the disclosure of electoral crime information in large democracies. I focus on Brazil, where the electoral court makes candidates' criminal records public before every election. Using a sample of local candidates running for office between 2004 and 2016, I find that a conviction for an electoral crime reduces candidates' probability of election and vote share by 10.3 and 12.9 percentage points (p.p.), respectively. These results are not explained by (potential) changes in judge, voter, or candidate behavior over the electoral process. I additionally perform machine classification of court documents to estimate heterogeneous punishment for severe and trivial crimes. I document a larger electoral penalty (6.5 p.p.) if candidates are convicted for severe crimes. These results supplement the information shortcut literature by examining how judicial information influences voters' decisions and showing that voters react more strongly to more credible sources of information.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.10958