摘要翻译：
在一个说服游戏中，如果发送者和接收者都反对歧义，发送者能从发送歧义信息中受益吗？本文表明，如果接收者是动态一致的，发送者不能从引入歧义中受益。当两个参与者的偏好都用Maxmin期望效用(MEU)准则表示时，得到了这个结果。然而，如果发送者严格来说比接收者不那么厌恶歧义（在alpha-MEU的意义上），那么即使面对动态一致的接收者，她也可能受益。此收益来自于通过利用歧义态度中的差异来提取\textIt{歧义溢价}。
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英文标题：
《Ambiguous Persuasion under Dynamic Consistency》
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作者：
Xiaoyu Cheng
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  In a persuasion game, if both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse, can the sender benefit from sending ambiguous messages? This paper shows that the sender cannot benefit from introducing ambiguity if the receiver is dynamically consistent. This result is obtained when both players' preferences are represented by the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) criterion. However, if the sender is strictly less ambiguity averse than the receiver (in the sense of alpha-MEU), then she may benefit even when facing a dynamically consistent receiver. This gain comes from extracting an \textit{ambiguity premium} by exploiting the differences in the ambiguity attitudes.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.05376