摘要翻译：
收入损失会对家庭产生负面影响，迫使他们减少一些主要商品的消费。这可能导致健康问题，从而给社会带来巨大成本。我们建议，为了防止这些负面后果，消费者可以购买保险，以确保在损失部分收入的情况下，能够充分消费一种主要商品。我们提出了一个具有逆向选择和内生保留效用的两期/两好委托代理问题，以建立具有实物收益的保险模型。该模型允许我们获得保险合同的半显式解，并应用于燃料贫困的背景下。对于这一应用，我们的模型允许得出结论，即使在从家庭角度来看效率最低的情况下，即当保险由垄断提供时，这种机制通过确保家庭足够的能源消费，显著降低了家庭燃料贫乏的风险。通过与收入保险的比较，实物保险的有效性得到了凸显，但我们的结果仍然强调了规范实物保险市场的必要性。
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英文标题：
《Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods: efficiency
  of in-kind insurance》
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作者：
Cl\'emence Alasseur and Corinne Chaton and Emma Hubert
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  An income loss can have a negative impact on households, forcing them to reduce their consumption of some staple goods. This can lead to health issues and, consequently, generate significant costs for society. We suggest that consumers can, to prevent these negative consequences, buy insurance to secure sufficient consumption of a staple good if they lose part of their income. We develop a two-period/two-good principal-agent problem with adverse selection and endogenous reservation utility to model insurance with in-kind benefits. This model allows us to obtain semi-explicit solutions for the insurance contract and is applied to the context of fuel poverty. For this application, our model allows to conclude that, even in the least efficient scenario from the households point of view, i.e., when the insurance is provided by a monopoly, this mechanism decreases significantly the risk of fuel poverty of households by ensuring them a sufficient consumption of energy. The effectiveness of in-kind insurance is highlighted through a comparison with income insurance, but our results nevertheless underline the need to regulate such insurance market.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.02099