摘要翻译：
一个善意的委托人向一个理性的不注意的代理人提供信息，而不将代理人处理信息的成本内部化。无论主体提供什么信息，代理都可以选择忽略某些信息。我们研究了一个可处理的二次支付模型中的最优信息提供，其中完全披露不是最优的。我们刻画了激励相容的信息策略，即代理人愿意充分关注的信息策略。在一个有三种状态的主要例子中，最优披露涉及以中间注意力成本的信息失真。随着成本的增加，最优信息突然从淡化状态转变为夸大状态。
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英文标题：
《Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework》
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作者：
Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet, Dong Wei
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some. We study optimal information provision in a tractable model with quadratic payoffs where full disclosure is not optimal. We characterize incentive-compatible information policies, that is, those to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading example with three states, optimal disclosure involves information distortion at intermediate costs of attention. As the cost increases, optimal information abruptly changes from downplaying the state to exaggerating the state.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.07729