摘要翻译：
许多市场依赖于交易员如实地告知谁在过去作弊，并将这些交易员排斥在未来的交易之外。本文考察了真实沟通在激励相容的情况下。我们发现，如果双方都有短视的偏离动机，那么只有在交易量较小的情况下，沟通动机才会得到满足。相比之下，如果只有一方有短视的偏离动机，那么沟通动机并不限制支持性贸易量。因此，通过贸易结构化，一方要么先采取行动，要么通过外部执法来保证其合作，会有很大的好处。
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英文标题：
《Communication and Cooperation in Markets》
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作者：
S. Nageeb Ali and David A. Miller
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. Accordingly, there are strong gains from structuring trade so that one side either moves first or has its cooperation guaranteed by external enforcement.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.09839