摘要翻译：
算法决策的长期影响是由部署的决策规则和个体响应之间的动态关系形成的。我们研究了一个动态学习环境，在这个环境中，每个人都希望得到一个积极的分类--包括许多重要的应用，如招聘和学校录取，在这个环境中，每个人根据他们的群体的期望收益投资于积极的结果，并更新决策规则以最大化机构利益。通过描述这些动态的平衡，我们表明，由于跨群体的异质性和缺乏可实现性，对理想的长期结果产生了自然的挑战。我们考虑了两种干预措施，即按组解耦决策规则和补贴投资成本。我们证明了解耦在可实现的情况下达到最优结果，但有不同的影响，否则可能依赖于初始条件。相比之下，即使在缺乏可实现性的情况下，补贴投资成本也能为弱势群体创造更好的平衡。
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英文标题：
《The Disparate Equilibria of Algorithmic Decision Making when Individuals
  Invest Rationally》
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作者：
Lydia T. Liu, Ashia Wilson, Nika Haghtalab, Adam Tauman Kalai,
  Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  The long-term impact of algorithmic decision making is shaped by the dynamics between the deployed decision rule and individuals' response. Focusing on settings where each individual desires a positive classification---including many important applications such as hiring and school admissions, we study a dynamic learning setting where individuals invest in a positive outcome based on their group's expected gain and the decision rule is updated to maximize institutional benefit. By characterizing the equilibria of these dynamics, we show that natural challenges to desirable long-term outcomes arise due to heterogeneity across groups and the lack of realizability. We consider two interventions, decoupling the decision rule by group and subsidizing the cost of investment. We show that decoupling achieves optimal outcomes in the realizable case but has discrepant effects that may depend on the initial conditions otherwise. In contrast, subsidizing the cost of investment is shown to create better equilibria for the disadvantaged group even in the absence of realizability.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.04123