摘要翻译：
本文考虑一类具有L{e}vy强盗的实验对策，包括Bolton和Harris（1999）和Keller,Rady和Cripps（2005）的强盗。它的主要结果是，当参与者的收益具有扩散分量时，有效（完美贝叶斯）均衡存在。因此，文献中强调的权衡并不依赖于bandit模型的内在本质，而是依赖于通常采用的解决方案概念(MPE)。这不是连续时间的伪影：我们证明在离散时间博弈中有效均衡是均衡的极限。进一步，将解的概念放宽到强对称平衡就足够了。
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英文标题：
《Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games》
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作者：
Johannes H\"orner, Nicolas Klein, Sven Rady
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  This paper considers a class of experimentation games with L\'{e}vy bandits encompassing those of Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Its main result is that efficient (perfect Bayesian) equilibria exist whenever players' payoffs have a diffusion component. Hence, the trade-offs emphasized in the literature do not rely on the intrinsic nature of bandit models but on the commonly adopted solution concept (MPE). This is not an artifact of continuous time: we prove that efficient equilibria arise as limits of equilibria in the discrete-time game. Furthermore, it suffices to relax the solution concept to strongly symmetric equilibrium.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.08953