摘要翻译：
在非单调推理文献的早期显然没有观察到的一个事实是，Reiter在他的缺省逻辑论文中没有直接形式化非正式缺省。相反，他把缺省翻译成某种自然语言命题，并提供了后者的形式化。几年后，摩尔指出，像赖特所使用的命题与默认值有着根本的不同，并表现出某种自认知性质。因此，赖特把他的缺省逻辑发展为一种自认知命题的形式化，而不是缺省的形式化。本文的第一个目的是说明赖特的缺省逻辑作为一种形式化推理非正式缺省的方法的一些问题直接归因于缺省逻辑的自认知性质以及非正式缺省与赖特的形式缺省之间的不匹配，后者是赖特作为非正式缺省表示的自认知命题的形式化表达。本文的第二个目标是比较Reiter和Moore的工作。虽然他们都试图形式化自认知命题，但在各自的逻辑中的推理模式是不同的。我们重温了摩尔和赖特的直觉，并从自定理的角度来呈现它们，在自定理中，理论可以包括指代该理论自己的定理的命题。然后，我们分别讨论了Moore和Reiter的逻辑学中这一观点的形式化，使用了我们先前开发的缺省逻辑和自认知逻辑的统一语义框架。我们认为赖特的缺省逻辑比摩尔自己的自认知逻辑更好地形式化了摩尔关于自认知命题的直觉。
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英文标题：
《Reiter's Default Logic Is a Logic of Autoepistemic Reasoning And a Good
  One, Too》
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作者：
Marc Denecker, Victor W. Marek and Miroslaw Truszczynski
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最新提交年份：
2011
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Artificial Intelligence        人工智能
分类描述：Covers all areas of AI except Vision, Robotics, Machine Learning, Multiagent Systems, and Computation and Language (Natural Language Processing), which have separate subject areas. In particular, includes Expert Systems, Theorem Proving (although this may overlap with Logic in Computer Science), Knowledge Representation, Planning, and Uncertainty in AI. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes I.2.0, I.2.1, I.2.3, I.2.4, I.2.8, and I.2.11.
涵盖了人工智能的所有领域，除了视觉、机器人、机器学习、多智能体系统以及计算和语言（自然语言处理），这些领域有独立的学科领域。特别地，包括专家系统，定理证明（尽管这可能与计算机科学中的逻辑重叠），知识表示，规划，和人工智能中的不确定性。大致包括ACM学科类I.2.0、I.2.1、I.2.3、I.2.4、I.2.8和I.2.11中的材料。
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英文摘要：
  A fact apparently not observed earlier in the literature of nonmonotonic reasoning is that Reiter, in his default logic paper, did not directly formalize informal defaults. Instead, he translated a default into a certain natural language proposition and provided a formalization of the latter. A few years later, Moore noted that propositions like the one used by Reiter are fundamentally different than defaults and exhibit a certain autoepistemic nature. Thus, Reiter had developed his default logic as a formalization of autoepistemic propositions rather than of defaults.   The first goal of this paper is to show that some problems of Reiter's default logic as a formal way to reason about informal defaults are directly attributable to the autoepistemic nature of default logic and to the mismatch between informal defaults and the Reiter's formal defaults, the latter being a formal expression of the autoepistemic propositions Reiter used as a representation of informal defaults.   The second goal of our paper is to compare the work of Reiter and Moore. While each of them attempted to formalize autoepistemic propositions, the modes of reasoning in their respective logics were different. We revisit Moore's and Reiter's intuitions and present them from the perspective of autotheoremhood, where theories can include propositions referring to the theory's own theorems. We then discuss the formalization of this perspective in the logics of Moore and Reiter, respectively, using the unifying semantic framework for default and autoepistemic logics that we developed earlier. We argue that Reiter's default logic is a better formalization of Moore's intuitions about autoepistemic propositions than Moore's own autoepistemic logic.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1108.3278